“… and sort of federal the ability of government officials. 0 BRIEN: Well, what do you see happening as a result of this A in. terms of Diem to just simply govern in those years? Lis ability 0 Is th E value to govern deteriorating?”
“… S DALE : • That was one of them. wss O'BRIEN: Well what... As I understand it there’s A A some rub between the U.S. in this regard and Diem about putting through some land reform which would cure some of the rural cultural problems that the French had sort - of created, as …”
“… g is then implementing it correctly) and I was pushing him mostly on A implementing his measures. 9 Now the land 0 reform worked that Diem approved and used as the basis for his decrees came from - Wolf Ladejinsky and Wolf, was, when he left U.S. employment, wm actually e …”
“… some changes there and make these things work because certainly Are landlords and others were circumventing the .law of the land that Diem thought was operating, or when he .circumvented it, he was doing it for good reasons of his own, which was again open to education by …”
“… action, A though, doesn't it? LANSDALE : . Yes. TAPE II SIDE I LANS DALE : You asked about the falling out between 3 Lade jinsky and Diem. I know there was A just something of that nature, but what it consisted of, or why, I don't know. 1 remember that the American amba …”
“… yond anything like land reform. And I suspect that Lodejinsky had started getting very political in his talk as a result of this with Diem, : A 6 and that Diem had resented it. But beyond this, there was a very deep affection between the two. When I was there in ‘59 or. …”
“-84- Diem as a man, and I know that Diem recipro cated this very much. There was point where the rational thought would end and the feelings o …”
“… the Thai’s or the South Vietnamese- AY.loop4 it's about a toss up which one was down more 3 ' / 6 on the Khmers than the other. And Diem used to follow the predictions of the royal fortune-teller in nohm Penh to Sihanouk. A Apparently, they were spending a lot of intell …”
“… ll was supposed to do, and of course) W7 I got called in on ther things immediately. But I wasn’t even invited along to go in and U see Diem with him. I said, Look, these are old friends of mine. If you’d like, why I’ll do anything I cantoyou can hit them high, and .A I’ll hi …”
“-117- them plane side,, and these people from the presidency said, "President Diem wants you to come to dinner tonight." and I said, "Well, witha I better check on my boss on this." Taylor was. busy, but I grabbed Rostow …”
“… things out of the thing in the palace. This was very different; from an official protocol meeting. O’BRIEN: Yas. 01 Yas. Yeah.2 How is Diem at that point? LANSDALE: He was a very changed man. It was the first *** time in our talks with each other... When I met him at the palac …”
“… as some. Now where. . Hmm, there was some, and I can't remember just • where it was coming from. This was one of re ' . the things that Diem asked me when I saw him. He asked me if he should ask for U.S. troops, and I said, "Do you need them?" He said, I asked you a question," …”
“… self.) The ICA member and the representative of Jack Bell’s office did raise questions as to whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was not a more important' precondition to solution in Viet Nam than military action in Laos. I made the following points about th …”
“… e to have the NSC and the President review the Laos situation? Other Matters I raised the question as to the next step in consideration of Diem’s proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces. I was told that the matter was being studied in Defense. It was the view of the DoD re …”
“… INCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, IS THE REAL POWER IN THE PROVINCE. CAC WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVINCE BY NGO DINH. CAN, BROTHER OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND POLITICAL LEADER OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF BRINGING ALLBA* 2 : MAJOR PROVINCIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CO …”
“… rrupt elements in the middle and lower echelons of the Government, despite the fact that there is still indication of respect for President Diem's motives and honesty. Strategic Hamlets Certain resentment has arisen over the construction of strategic hamlets particularly those to whi …”
“… OF CONTENTIS TENTATIVE. SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F), WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY. APPR IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT BOTH DIEM AND NHU HAVE BECOME AT LEAST PARTIALLY UPSET OVER CERTAIN AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND”
“… IDERABLE AMOUNT OF TENSION HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVER OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. BOTH DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU WERE CONCERNED OVER RECENT "INFRINGEMENTS" OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY. MAAG WAS CITED AS A VIOLATOR IN THIS CONNECTION, B …”
“… UA THIEN AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM’S TACTIQS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, I.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL .1" % OVER CENTRAL VIIETNAM ,THEY WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM …”
“… S THAT THE COMBINATION OF THREE UNWISE POLITICAL ACTS IN THE PAST MONTH MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE FATAL TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT NGUDINH DIEM DESPITE ITS GAINS IN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET COMMUNISTS (VC). THESE THREE ACTS WERE: DISMISSAL OF HUYNH VAN LANG OF THE …”
“… NH CAN HAS ALWAYS OPERATED. LIKE AN AUTONOMOUS POLICE STATE AND HAS BEEN NOTORIOUS FOR ITS FAVORITISM TOWARD CATHOLICS, BELYING PRESIDENT DIEM’S EARLIER REPUTATION FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. MANY VIETNAMESE CATHOLICS FEAR THAT”
“… -T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CHINA (TAIWAN) REPORT NO. TDCS-3/540,863 CTB Pro SUBJECT DISCUSSIONS. BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND DATE DISTR. 19 MARCH 1963 8 LE VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG OF NATIONALIST CHINA . . PRECEDENCE ROUTINE DATE OF 4-9 MARCH 1963 REFEREN …”
“… G THE VISIT OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S (CHINAT) VICE PRESIDENT .CHEN CHENG TO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 4 TO 9 MARCH 1963, HE AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM CONVERSED IN EXCESS OF TWENTY HOURS, CHIEFLY IN PRIVATE WITH ONLY AN INTERPRETER PRESENT. THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS E …”
“… ETNAM, AND THE USE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS A BASE FOR CHINAT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINA MAINLAND. CHEN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OFFERED DIEM UNRESTRICTED MILITARY TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, PLUS UP TO ONE DIVISION OF COMBAT TROOPS TO FIGHT IN VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIFORMS: CHEN …”
“… ISSEM COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS -3/541,020 TRS RP A.Ji- SUBJECT . THE SEEKING OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME DATE DISTR. : 20 MARCH 1963 A ILL PRECEDENCE ROUTINE ■ DATE OF MID -MARCH 1963 REFERENCES IN 89614 INFO. PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON …”
“SEEKING TO PROVOKE AMERICAN REAC'TJON. THE LINE THAT DIEM IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT HIS FAMILY, ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAMS ARE NOT, IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AS WELL AS …”
“… HESE INDIVIDUALS.) 2, ACCORDING TO THESE OPPOSITIONISTS,. THE COUNTRY HAS REACHED A COMPLETE IMPASSE AND SOMETH I NG MUST HAPPEN SOON. IF DIEM SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS, OUT OF WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EMERGE AS THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES. DIEM REMAINS IN POWER O …”
“NHU AND HIS WIFE MUST BE ELIMINATED; WITHOUT THEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RE-ORIENT DIEM.. 3. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ARE EITHER CONFUERTI …”
“… HE PAPER WAS A COMPARISON OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THE UNITED STATES WHERE GANGSTERISM AND RACE RIOTS EXISTED, THE CONCLUSION BEING THAT THE DIEM REGIME WAS NOT REALLY TOO BAD AFTER ALL. 3. GREGORY .STATED THAT THE WHITE PAPER CONSISTED OF OVER TWENTY. PAGES, WAS NOT FOR LOCAL CONS …”
“… V, HVBRIMe) 2 S**GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGHNHUMIGHT - BE DOQAd AVM WIMH WIP VvDW 1 cowo p: a WLELING TO OVERTHROWITHE DIEM GOVERNMENT, LE THOUGHT THATTHEY :be-CI MA 140 IM. IEKEGEY8X COWIBOH 02 Ihoo - * SHOULD PRICE ED WITHOUT NHU E ADD !NG THAT ALL THAT”
“… se 3 - -GENEVA ACCORDS 1120 CJUGXYLTHE COUR WOULD NOT BE STAGED UNTIL AFTER THAT 2 DATE. THE COUP WOULD (BE DI RECTED AGAINST PRESI DENT DIEM AS WELL AS 10361"ton IGTHE: NGO. DINH NHUS. AND OTHE GROUP LANNED TO E STABLISH A CONSTETUT ONAL.I CONF DENTl61 tI ."-A-*60 CLASSIFICAT …”
“… PARAGRAPH-2.nrt VT DoycA wrio WID naty LED DICEN Snyumz AA BLS- ------ -rriA’m-.’YS-YRYIT 9" ura t. BX4MIDWJULY 1963 PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM WAS. CONSIDERABLY DISTURBED. . TTON BEVE2T8 vezoyD 10 darks tocriag Ho OVER THE DESIGNATION- OF HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO T …”
“… . ON 16 JULY 1963 MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, NO WED THECvo Ovi MEBE Yrr 2160089 IHV LHE BRDDH I212 THEA MILITARY ADVT SOR TO PRESIDENT DIEM, CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT, SAID- : HRILLOD DIEM ICrD HTPH O 13 TARA 20071 LHE BLMH XCAEM THE HOV THAT HE LACKED THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE …”
“… , THAT MAY HAVE-BEEN.THE TIME TO HAVE CHANGED THE GOVERNMENT. V° - 9652: CCL Cl dWi2. T&IHCED 2% CurN D-EK ZNWL,! 1.. 4i3DW5 - AFTER 1960 DIEM CHANGED COMPLETELY, BECOMING CONVINCED THAT THE WAS S° GeeVK HxN MISE JHS DRTO a 12: OPERATING UNDER A MANDATE FROM HEAVEN, TATS WAS APPA …”
“ILLUSTRATION OF DIEM’S IRRATTONAL 1 - : JAW HE TVciko JHE 2056081 O IHE ECOETESLWD YDAOCVLED Y CHLOE Me 1 ATTITUDE. DIEM. TOLD"MI NH. ON 13 JULY THAT THE BINH X …”
“MADE SUCH STRONG, STATEMENTS AGA NST, DIEM.) SVndrdekc YONBIMS • GCvluc J.9L Lirfnt wo./ht Datureas: al Khosavt: ring.ChHSA.r. PAVITOE 0As on cam tiestn%OK 4; 464 ..€ . c- . -A ,4 …”
“… CASES EARLIER AND FAIRLY DETAILED CONVERSATIONS WITH OAI, WHO HAD SPOKEN STRONGLY AGAINST GVN FOR HANDLING OF BUDDHISTS AND ALSO DENOUNCED DIEM AND NHU BY NAME FOR MOUTHING THEORIES WHICH WERE MEANINGLESS TO POPULATION, WHO OAI SAID HAD LOST 150,000 KILLED IN PAST TEN YEARS, IT DISA …”
“… 3/656,739 I SUBJECT : GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH PLANS TO MAKE HIS DATE DISTR. 19 SEPTEMBER 1963 FINAL DECISION SOON ON ANY ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME PRECEDENCE ROUTINE DATE OF . 15 - 16 SEPTEMBER 1963 REFERENCES IN 227 14 ‘INFO. -PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1963) …”
“… MPLETELY _ DISCOUNTED SINCE AN INDIVIDUAL CONNECTED WITH THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP HAS. SAID THAT KHANH MIGHT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, AND SINCE KHANH’S. ! • NAME HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS ONE OF A NUMBER OF ALLEGEDLY DISSIDENT GENERALS. 1 1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1963 …”
“… MENT BY LIEUTENANT NGUYEN NGOC LINH, KHANH’S AIDE, ON 18 SEPTEMBER. LINH ALSO SAID THAT THAO WAS READY TO-MOVE WITHIN A WEEK TO OVERTHROW DIEM. — 3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT. — ARC END OF MESSAGE CATION —DI …”
“… TOP OF THE ICEBERG OF WHICH' WE ARE STILE GETTING ONLY TANGENTIAL GLIMPSES. 3. THE GENERALS MEANWHILE ARE NOW PRESSING PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM FOR A * REPLY TO THE DEMANDS MADE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE MARTIAL - LAW PHASE. AS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, T …”
“… ’ TOWARD GAINING TIME IN WHICH TO MONITOR AND BREAK UP ANY COUP COMBINATION WHICH " MAY BE DEVELOPING. THE OUTCOME OF MANEUVERING BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU AND THE MILITARY DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS, OR POSSIBLY EVEN DAYS, IS LIKELY TO BE • OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE COURSE OF …”
“… ASE THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON ARE. THE,RUMORS THAT THE BAN ON DANCING WILL BE LIFTED. NATIONAL DAY WOULD BE THE LOGICAL TIME FOR DIEM TO ANNOUNCE REVAMPING OF HIS GOVERNMENT, PROVIDEI THIS DELICATE OPERATION CAN EE COMPLETED IN.TIME. 6. A STRIKING. THING ABOUT THE ELEC …”
“NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD HIM THAT AT A MEETING OF CABINET OFFICERS IN EARLY OCTOBER IT WAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NGO DINH NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER.. CUONG SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD BE V …”
“… TDCS-3/562,014 PAGE2 DISCUSS THE STATUS OF NGO DINH NHU IN THE GOVERNMENT. THO SAID THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER, REASONING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND TO REDUCE NHU'S INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, …”
“… HER PREPARATION WOULD PREVENT BLOODSHED. C. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF SUITABLE EXPLOSIVES TO BLAST A CONCRETE BUNKER WHERE PRESIDENT DIEM IS EXPECTED TO HIDE. THE ONLY OPENING TO THE BUNKER, OTHER THAN A HEAVY DOOR,”
“IS THE VENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE COUP GROUP HESITATES TO USE FLAME THROWERS OR POISON GAS BECAUSE THEY PREFER TO TAKE DIEM ALIVE. D. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES LANG AND GENERALS KHIEM, KHANH, AND DUONG VAN MINH. GENERAL TRI HAS AGREED TO JOIN CL …”
“… 786*-83- HAMLET PROGRAM, SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED SEPARATELY W.l TH: PRESIDENT . M M COMROWFA NETD SA CIAIF BEEAYA 2" THE GEMEEVE aneric* DIEM. AND NGO DINH NHU ABOUT NHU’S CONTACTS WITH THE V.I ET CONG (VC) Th VorM Mtn HVO TOED INVO LH12 IMLOWYIIOW LHVO BESCIED _. -. IMVI H12' …”
“… ICITED VIETNAMESE oboyfn.fifetly vExED rin HON HE urEN He BEOYeDLW BA LHE BECat s 1 AIR FORCE (VNAF) SUPPORT FOR A COUP D’ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. 1_--- ________ • ordr-lsVv.lfsi CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS GROUP.) ,CONFIDENTIAL Excluded from automatic CIB • do …”
“… D THAT-NHU’ S PLANS TO.DEAL.WITH THE COMMON ISTS MUST BE® Previ FORESTALLED:e 2. THAO-SAID THAT DURING THE WEEK 9-15 SEPTEMBER-PRESIDENT DIEM;” SUMMONED HIM AND ASKED HIM HOW HE, DI EM, WAS REGARDED BY THE PEOPLE. 'THAO REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL PERSONALLY .POPULAR BUT …”