“re U.S. armed int ervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt polic ies of isolating Castro and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement/ with minimum losses in assets and U”
“ity of considering the objectives of any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these aims, its likelihood of success and in general whether or not it would be "proper" and in the American interest. In addition, the Special Group had the responsibility for framing ”
“… 1963, but also, and equally important, we did not keep adequate records of just what projects (and in what detail) were discussed with the Special Group.2/ 1/Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, Subject: "Policy Coordination 2/Ibid. of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967 NW 6600 …”
“uding operations which use labor, youth, students, a nd influential military organizati ons as po li tical pressure groups. Economic action programs designed to influence governments to support U.S. national policy objectives, or to prevent Bloc countries from obtaining some stra”
“utralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere and will be taken in such a way as to permit dise ngagement/ with minimum losses in assets and United States prestige. The plan provides that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence be approved in advance by ”
“on, the Special Group had the responsibility for framing covert operations in such a way that they l ater could be "disavowed" or "plausibly denied" by the United States Government or at least b y the Presi- dent. Political sen sitivity was the ch ief crite rio n for sub mission ”
“… 1963, but also, and equally important, we did not keep adequate records of just what projects (and in what detail) were discussed with the Special Group.2/ 1/Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, Subject: "Policy Coordination 2/Ibid. of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967 NW 6600 …”
“litical leaders, including operations which use labor, youth, students, a nd influe nt ial mi litary organizations as political pressure groups. Economic action programs designed to influence governments to support U.S. national policy objectives, or to prevent Bloc countries fro”
“develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan p ermi ts intelli gence, political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the target area, or other developments which would require U.S. armed”
“… 1963, but also, and equally important, we did not keep adequate records of just what projects (and in what detail) were discussed with the Special Group.2/ 1/Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, Subject: "Policy Coordination 2/Ibid. of CIA's Cove”
“l oc countries from obtai ning some strate gic politico- economic advantage in countries or areas of importance to U.S. global strat eg y. Paramilitary acti on programs. CIA clandestine and covert action annexes to U.S. Country Internal Defense Plans.3/ The 1963 instruction also ”
“- 3 - 6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures t”
“INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page _ 3 of 6 FILE: the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the .U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He, doubted that the CIA even would have ”
“-14- These events are discussed below under subheading A. Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein. "senior American officials'' means individuals in the White House or servin”
“Mu0° wa 7 TO0T9FYY bim vistal t -44- event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order banning consideration of assassination within .the Agency. One of the. programs forwarded to General Lansdale by the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled ”
“9/1/75 Draft Based on (b) SECRE Subcommittee Meeting, 8/29/75 The Question of Authorization Outside The Central Intelli gence Agency In The Eisenhower Administration. 1. Summary As discussed in the preceding section, the evidence as to whether Allen Dulles, CIA Di”
“CERRA 1.1 2 national security operational matters); .John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff Secretary and the President's son) and from Thomas Parrott (Secretary to the Special Group and special assistant to. Allen Dulles). In summary. the evidence was: (i) Bissell testified”
“TAr S CCUML JAN1 7 (iii) White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed. 1. Gordon Gray. Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from Ju”
“te1 16. IMETk air 5, 001442 10 practice for dealing with the President. (Parrott, pp. 13-14.)* Parrott testified that early in 1959, President Eisenhower directed the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve. or reject all significant covert act”
“47 As discussed -below in detail at pp 9 after the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Augmented, Lansdale directed Harvey to prepare a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders. However, no such plan was ever”
“Augmented chose a plan advanced by McCone that assumed Castro’s continuance in power and had the more limited objective of splitting off Castro from "old-line Communists".* (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). The decision and "action" of the Special Group Augmented at the August 10 ”
“of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60, ”
“-14- These events are discussed below under subheading A. Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein, "senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or serving ”
“4 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 1 for Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be 2 the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under 5 Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the eocnomic area, 4 which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first ap”
“Department sf siste and need not be again referred to the Special Group. - ' 9. Cuba . . Mr. Dalles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at this meeting the problem nf the Agency’s relations with the exile groups, the payment to dependence of the strike force and t”
“DECKER 11 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided , 2 -he did a number of things. Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discuss”
“DE KE 11 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 i part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided. 2 he did a number of things. Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discuss”
“SECKE: 11 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided 2 ihe did a number of things. Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro w”
“between the key analytic correla tion of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was de signed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper”