“most valuable operational activity under- taken by the Station. In summary, this Group: activities. a. Infiltrated exile groups and reported on their b. Maintained extensive files on Cuban exiles, exile groups and Cuban Government personalities. content. c. Monitored Cuban radio ”
“cruited infiltration agents. NW 65924 Docld:32356768 Page 11 10 - SECRET SECRET 3. Intelligence Net: In mid-1962, the Agency recruited a former Cuban politician to establish an agent net in Cuba. This individual recruited a member of the presidential entourage, a Cuban working in”
“gence agent until 1964 when it was determined that she would be more valuable in a defector role. D. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION OPERATIONS As noted earlier, infiltration/exfiltration operations, which started in mid-1962, were undertaken for a variety of purposes, such as: a. Empl”
“or to obtain reporting.. d. Exfiltrate significant political defectors. e. Commit acts of sabotage. Each of these operations were approved by the Special Group or its succes- sor, the 303 Committee. They were a major preoccupation of the Miami Station and large amounts of money a”
“s were planned of which 15 were cancelled. Of the NW 65924 Docld:32356768 Page 13 12 SECRET 5 SECRET operations carried out, four învolved sabotage and ten others encountered contact with Cuban forces. Thus, during 1963, the Castro Government was aware of at least 14 operations i”
“… its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG’s report on this particular ,matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document brea …”
“11104-10102-10227 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 •* s...1 14 February 1977 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC - 0 (201-50539) (AMCAPE-D) 1. SZULC was born on 25 July 1926 in Warsaw, Poland. He arrived in B”
“eeADE1 we.wfLI ./ frequently mentioning the name of other CIA officers with whom he was acquainted. 3. Although the suspicions have increased, and SZULC’s anti-Agency activities have become much more serious and blatant in the 1970’s, it has not been possible to clear up ”
“… e Attachment A) reported that SZULC was ’’directed” by the Polish regime in Warsaw to seek employment in U.S. journalistic circles. This report runs like a thread throughout his file and is repeated and garbled in several versions over the years. The report 2 I, 1 SR”
“… never been adequately explained and was apparently never - I(- representative in 15-1 by the British reported in full to London Rio. This report and other questions that arose early in his career (his contacts with a cousin who was a Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in Rio) were, …”
“SECRET ) A a. The 1948 FBI report that SZULC was involved in supplying the Polish Legation in Rio with information from his personal contacts and from Ambassador John C. …”
“SECRET f. In 1959, on a trip to Santiago, Chile, SZULC claimed to be ’’cleared” and requested an interview with an Agency representative. This was the first of numerous such requests. In addition, it was in about 1959 that he also began making a point of telling Agency personnel”
“6 SECRET 7 m. Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965: •’After reading and re-reading this man’s various -. files, I began to feel that this man in his position would be an ideal 'agent of influence'. It was U! ! noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually ”
“13-00000 ■ € SECRET ? end his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible damage. The current paralysis of all anti-Communist action by i the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the 112 S”
“TEPDET LUNEI Cuban agent as early as July 1963 (which would have been when he was screening names for the AMTRUNK Operation), one 01 from LITAMIL-9, and the other from Fernando REY reported by 02 VASLOUCH-1. As mentioned above, these charges could well J be true; yet RABEL co”
“,104-10102-10232^ 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 st* he DicaS-E StanoasO----ro-oC--arr----e-*=--=-------=--=Z------Z------------=-------------- RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce SECRET 14 February 1977 ME”
“1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles, particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved. He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA. 3. About February 1963 MORENO and Enrique CAYADO Ribera reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an oper”
“… NO INDEXING REQUIRED E ACTION REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED • FYI. BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY REFERENCES) 1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes SMEDIFY’s traces on SZULC. 2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy . SACHS, wh …”
“America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer. ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961. (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat) ”
“… nce that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned /*: to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs. …”
“/ J 4 0174. Jo Ahab Toll IDgu DColid eyy odishe* / Tadeusz SZULC Born: C. 1926. Nationality: I (G) (fa. Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955. Occupation: Journalist. A June 1947: •• Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSS. Is, on good ter”
“Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY. Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press At”
“traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony; in Rio de Janeiro.. I June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to Ne”
“.9 • . 4* ne 27h v’ • -2- Sept. 1951: : Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, * John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject. March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject . volunteered tha”
“… Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK. 1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March.. Station views on the operation are summarized below. .2. The AMTRUNK operatio …”
“- 31 March 1963 . PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH. The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 …”
“… n DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment ”A” to this dispatch is PARMERS 3 TRUNK / report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as 4 attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the 8 AMTRUNK group, and …”
“operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.”
“… aA flict with A/2’s evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that 1080; DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which”
“… tions. This infor- mation was obtained from sensitive telephone taps in the process of routine operating procedures on 22 November 1963. 3. Report not substantiated by Mexico Station records: On 30 November 1963 CIA Headquarters cabled Mexico City that a report had been received that t …”
“… h unusual activity as this would have gone unnoticed by the Mexico Station team of observers who reported on Cubana Airlines flights. 4/ 4. Report not substantiated by Mexico Station records: On 2 November 1964 the Hamburg Base reported that a source in Cuba claimed to have seen an air …”
“tested source who had provided the report died before he could be questioned for additional details. 5. The SSC V report page 103 further complicates travel data by the listing of t …”
“ate of 1 December 1963 which is the date it was received. 2/ NW 65924 Docld:32356927 Page 3 SOURCES: 1/ Transcripts from Cuban Embassy and Cubana Airlines conversations on 22 November 1963 discussing arrival time of flight, it's delay in arriving, and departure. Joint CIA Mexican”
“… tions. This infor- mation was obtained from sensitive telephone taps in the process of routine operating procedures on 22 November 1963. 3. Report not substantiated by Mexico Station records: On 30 November 1963 CIA Headquarters cabled Mexico City that a report had been received that t …”
“… h unusual activity as this would have gone unnoticed by the Mexico Station team of observers who reported on Cubana Airlines flights. 4/ 4. Report not substantiated by Mexico Station records: On 2 November 1964 the Hamburg Base reported that a source in Cuba claimed to have seen an air …”
“tested source who had provided the report died before he could be questioned for additional details. 5. The SSC V report page 103 further complicates travel data by the listing of t …”
“ate of 1 December 1963 which is the date it was received. 2/ NW 65924 Docld:32356928 Page 3 SOURCES: 1/ Transcripts from Cuban Embassy and Cubana Airlines conversations on 22 November 1963 discussing arrival time of flight, it's delay in arriving, and departure. Joint CIA Mexican”
“… ASED WITH DELETIONS CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/21/93 COMMENTS: JFK36 : F16 1993.07.21.17:24:23:680470: REPORT Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 65924 Date: 10-25-2021 [R] ITE …”
“as designed to fill the gap in coverage by the regular news media. It was accepted in the hemisphere NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 8 7 SECRET SECRET as an accurate and objective reporter of events. It prepared four news bulletins a week which were distributed to 1200 Latin America”
“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”
“st valuable operational activity under- taken by the Station. In summary, this Group: a. activities. Infiltrated exile groups and reported on their b. Maintained extensive files on Cuban exiles, exile groups and Cuban Government personalities. c. Monitored Cuban radio broadcasts ”
“cruited infiltration agents. NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 11 : 10 SECRET SECRET 3. Intelligence Net: In mid-1962, the Agency recruited a former Cuban politician to establish an agent net in Cuba. This individual recruited a member of the presidential entourage, a Cuban working in”
“termined that she would be more valuable in a defector role. D. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION OPERATIONS As noted earlier, infiltration/exfiltration operations, which started in mid-1962, were undertaken for a variety of purposes, such as: a. Emplace arms and communications caches fo”
“, or to obtain reporting. d. Exfiltrate significant political defectors. e. Commit acts of sabotage. Each of these operations were approved by the Special Group or its succes- sor, the 303 Committee. They were a major preoccupation of the Miami Station and large amounts of money ”
“n coasts and harbors, and it would be logically assumed that the U.S. had a hand in these actions. 5 During 1963, a CIA trained exile paramilitary group committed two acts of sabotage which inflicted some damage, caused a great deal of commotion and attracted a lot of publicity. ”
“… ts development during the past six months is delineated .in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared te serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign 1 / Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document …”
“14-00000 fPoneeThAR a JSidS juuia NIUE support the operation. The two principals, MORENO (AMICE-27) and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) claimed to have contact with high-level GOC officials. They completed four infiltration missions to Cuba and were terminated in March ”
“1966, in addition to CUBELA and GUIN, and that all of the principals of the AMTRUNK network active during 1963 and 1964 had been rolled up. The Cuban press reportedly identified DIAZ (AMICE-14) as the clandestine infiltree who recruited GUIN. COMMENT: It appears that the opp”
“14-00000 6° v JOWL on-island anti-Castro forces, and tying up CIA time, money, and manpower for an operation of their own creation. Following are some reasons which might have contributed to its failure: a. The controversial nature of the principal initiators, Tad SZULC, ”
“… d as a prison physician, and reportedly was driving a jeep unescorted, which is unusual treatment unless one is trusted by the regime. He report edly is now practicing medicine as a private physician in Havana. f. The questionable activities and current where abouts of AMTRUNK- …”