“NST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. INTRODUCTION 1. Agency planning and operations directed at C …”
“n providing information on Cuba via radio communication and Latin American diplomatic pouches. Radio SECRET E2, IMPDET CL BY 055636 NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 2. SECRET”
“… inistration urgings to do something about Castro, CIA established a large Station in Miami in September 1961 to continue operations against Cuba. The operations described below were developed and run by the Miami Station; many of them were still in the developmental stage at the time …”
“… which was mailed to 18 Latin American countries, to DMR members and to press and radio organizations in the U.S. Radio programs directed at Cuba were pre- pared and broadcast over station WMIE in Miami. Copies of these programs were sent to various Latin American countries and were b …”
“phlets a year to various Latin countries and France. NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 4 3- SECRET SECRET b. Union Deportiva de Cuba Libre (UDCL): A sports oriented organization established by CIA in October 1962. Led by a well known Cuban sports figure and a prominent Cu …”
“n and changing the site of the XVI Amateur Baseball World Championship from Cuba to another country. c. Comite DeOrganizaceones Juveniles Cubanas in el Exilio (COJCE): A youth organization headed by a former Cuban Boy Sc …”
“… Bay of Pigs. The DRE was primarily a para- military organization and prior to April 1961, 21 DRE members were trained and infiltrated into Cuba to create resistance and guerrilla units. This DRE apparatus was destroyed in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. Subse- quent paramilitary o …”
“1960 as a rallying point for middle and upper echelon trade unionists in exile. Led by former Cuban NW 65924. Docld:32356933. Page 6 - 5- SECRET SECRET labor leaders, FORDC published a weekly circular letter which was mailed to labor organizations throughout Latin America. Prior ”
“FORDC also maintained contact with international labor organizations. f. Unidad Revolucionaria (UR): Originally established in Cuba in December 1960 as a clan- destine resistance movement. Its leadership was largely put to death or imprisoned as a result of the Bay of Pi …”
“led to Cuba and other Latin American countries. On a NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 7 -6 SECRET SECRET weekly basis the UR published a list of free world …”
“… urposes, CIA also supported several prominent exiles who prepared propa- ganda materials. Zig Zag Libre was a successful satire magazine in Cuba prior to the Castro regime. The Agency supported its former editor who published an edition for mailing into Cuba. In the 1963 period it wa …”
“… nsiderably as a result of its use in the Bay of Pigs opera- tion. Most audience response was received from Caribbean countries out- side of Cuba. 5. Mailing Operation:”
“ost audience response was received from Caribbean countries out- side of Cuba. 5. Mailing Operation: Most propaganda mailing operations were directed to Latin American countries outside of Cuba. This project, initiate …”
“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”
“… NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 10 9- SECRET SECRET refugees was large, and it was relatively easy to obtain information on current events in Cuba and Cuban exiles that could be utilized opera- tionally. Following the crisis, the flow of refugees decreased signifi- cantly. As a result, …”
“st valuable operational activity under- taken by the Station. In summary, this Group: a. activities. Infiltrated exile groups and reported on their b. Maintained extensive files on Cuban exiles, exile groups and Cuban Government personalities. c. Monitored Cuban radio broadcasts ”
“… 33 Page 11 : 10 SECRET SECRET 3. Intelligence Net: In mid-1962, the Agency recruited a former Cuban politician to establish an agent net in Cuba. This individual recruited a member of the presidential entourage, a Cuban working in a foreign consul, and a third individual. These indiv …”
“in the arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the net. 4. Juana Castro: Juana Castro, younger sister of Fidel Castro, was one of the more significant CIA agent recruitments. She was a strong supporter of her brother until she realized he had led the r”
“, or to obtain reporting. d. Exfiltrate significant political defectors. e. Commit acts of sabotage. Each of these operations were approved by the Special Group or its succes- sor, the 303 Committee. They were a major preoccupation of the Miami Station and large amounts of money ”
“s were planned of which 15 were cancelled. Of the NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 13 - 12 SECRET SECRET operations carried out, four învolved sabotage and ten others encountered contact with Cuban forces. Thus, during 1963, the Castro Government was aware of at least 14 operations i”
“… cer of : railroad ties. Its loss was felt, and noted in a Castro speech, when a hurricane destroyed most of the railroad's lines in part of Cuba several weeks later.”
“speech, when a hurricane destroyed most of the railroad's lines in part of Cuba several weeks later. NW. 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 14. 13 SECRET”
“… ANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans) SUBJECT: Operational Plen for Continuing Operations Against Cuba 1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph …”
“DOCUMENT TS Invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. A SCURCE 1, IN C5 HIT3 JTCA SECRET - SENSITIVE PAPER GO. - —DO NOT DESTROY thy”
“0 B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal con ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destr …”
“Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the .control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba …”
“14-00000 $‘ severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasing ly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our in …”
“… vernment. H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued. J, -3-”
“… few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on n continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba. J. In view of …”
“extent possible, discredit the Castro- communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world. -4-”
“… se of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.nr-in D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter- intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on: M”1, Capa …”
“… e and Intelligence Collection - All feasible . effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelli gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli- gence collection and related operational activity at the present tine and its development during the past six …”
“Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled • almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection -6- !”
“with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to …”
“strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through . 4 thedevelopment of additional resident agents in Cuba -7- 10 V”
“… onal legal travellers. 4. Linison/ Operations: We will continue to press the linison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectiv …”
“… controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable Operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the curre …”
“… survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where s …”
“unless in any case -8nthere are overriding reasons to the contrary. The I"remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually "examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets. -10- Ana”
“… d intelligence collection and nt the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appe …”
“Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acc …”
“… ly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba. F. Counterintelligence; The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be …”
“operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate inten …”
“… action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals. FS appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba. ,4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Cas …”
“propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, 'with special emphasis on selective black operations. -14-”
“… ept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intellige …”
“outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following: % -15-”
“subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups. E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished. F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P. WILLIAM K. HARV”
“… urpose of this plan is to cutlies the action to We undertaken by theCentral Intelligence Agency against the Ometro/ Commmist government of Cuba during FX-63 and for such longer " period as may be directed. ****** P96-27dkthran7 B. Poc the purpose of this plan the following assumpti …”
“SECRET CNSINL -2- on Coban'-Bloc relationships. *MLS .- : Covertly support the above-cited V. 8. national objectives with respect to Cuba. III. XANED mmussoe/ewntereeli--"--fef * 1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of. Juha - . with particular emphasis on the follo …”