“… ct 1. Participate In inter-agency esspoade .action planning andexecution sW^ IDasl 2 Prevent essential al and supplies from reaching . Cuba. YIN- t*: + ‘th : wrenne-m R * fh* Harass forld Trade with Cubas D. ly.boloq1.al. in loit the will of the Cobven ted or people Iist …”
“Mfr oronw Hag resistance group or uprising. 2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plant against Cuba. iv. DOLRAUXIOK: P (vo :2. P To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required develop the following program: 0 “toaye-ge 00 -err …”
“… nal, cultural, student, and other grevps .which have a potential for getting their rarsega 0008% 8* %6-l to their counterparts inside of Cuba. te-neekXeemeel” * -7' The program will be basically for developing og maintaining a minimma stand-by capability for top in the ****2*835- …”
“… Coordinator, by Tad SZULC (AMCAPE-1) of the New York Times. On 6 February 1963, Albert C. DAVIES, (Lt. Col. on military detail to WH/4 - Cuba) met with SZULC • 2* at SZULC’s residence, to discuss the plan. SZULC referred to it as the "Leonardo Plan." While at first hesitant, SZ …”
“concerning Cuba. He decided against that approach, however, and instead determined to use the Cuban Coordinating Group. SZULC later said that George 4 …”
“14-00000 1 TAAV The follow-up meeting on 9 February (in a safehouse) was attended by HURWITCH, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, Dr. Nestor MORENO, and David MORALES, Col. A. DAVIES and Alfonso RODRIGUEZ of the CIA. 3. A 11 February 1963 memorandum from RODRIGUEZ to the Chief, SA”
“… and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) claimed to have contact with high-level GOC officials. They completed four infiltration missions to Cuba and were terminated in March 1964. 4. Early phases of the operation resulted in the on-island recruitment of Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz (AMTRU …”
“1966, in addition to CUBELA and GUIN, and that all of the principals of the AMTRUNK network active during 1963 and 1964 had been rolled up. The Cuban press reportedly identified DIAZ (AMICE-14) as the clandestine infiltree who recruited GUIN. COMMENT: It appears that the opp”
“… d perhaps others. C. SZULC’s direct contact with the White House, if true, placed him in a position to pass U.S. policy infor- mation on Cuba to the opposition, (There is a note by Richard Helms on a 23 September 1963 cover sheet requesting Alfonso RODRIGUEZ to maintain periodic …”
“… lso began making a point of telling Agency personnel the names of other Agency officers he had identified. g. An article SZULC wrote on Cuba for the NYT in December 1959 was hailed as an antidote to the excessively favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but in f …”
“President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, McGeorge BUNDY and Robert HURWITCH on Cuban matters. 5 OCAAry SECRET”
“… fter he arrived until it was granted in December 1962. The first contact was with Albert C. DAVIES (Lt. Col. on military detail to CIA - Cuba), and was arranged at the behest of Colonel GROGAN, the Assistant to the Director, on SZULC’s request. k. In early 1963, at President KE …”
“… ce. Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for her father, her whole family were "fascists." She said that her father quit the NYT because …”
“… February 1977 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT : Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091) 1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba. His father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued to live in …”
“for and distrust of the Agency, which was undoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLKSY, made his involve ment in AMTRUNK a liability to the security of the operation. It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle 3 ■ SLUNET”
“… ol over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1 B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the Operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is …”
“AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a. homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. : This in turn gives rise .to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible histo”
“week of 25 March. Removed from ProjectA II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE 96/1(6 The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among PoM: high level military and civilian leaders of the government 68-4 culmina”
“… s great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba jia. air in January 1962 . Although A/2 does not consider himse If "an ally of kuBARK he has been”
“… Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of t …”
“… margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts., D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA 1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the 24 two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by A/3's father and”
“… INo c. Sergio MENDEZ, agegabout 50, born in Cienfuegos, a former (senator (1954) as well as the former head of the 6 (Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK con fidante during Castro’s takeover. MENDEZ has an a …”
“4-00000 SECRET 4c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following Operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.' 08 (Lester RODRIGUEZ age late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Crist”
“… r, A/3 is leary of staying at his 24 father’s farm for any length of time and he does not want his 4 (father j to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the •farm'will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents t …”
“… si ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under take a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi ness competently. Unfortunately A/3 gi …”
“… safehoused. He explained that he was was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father's farm”
“… s only to serve him makes him a marginal candi- date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated ‘.three-days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will again his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents. ! S EVOrR (6 wdMEP 10/PV J i”
“-2- 3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation.. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re cruit two assets with th”
“control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre- sents a difficult handling problem. 2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a : law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been in volved much of his adult life in clandesti”
“shaoptern:ais EIT - 11 - 4■ D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA —•--------------- - ---------------- 1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported …”
“… in Pinar del Rio. A Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain Iarms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into I Cuba without his absence having been known to the authori- ties. Was responsible for safehousekeeping Vargas Gomezj 06 Y for nearly one month …”
“… files were negative on Avila and Lawton. E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and 1 with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the …”
“to ZRMETAL: TODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban”
“… ch is anti-Communist and which operates on oh democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a '[P mbig point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent t'-O that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and …”
“… and Brand's fellow consp for many years. Iglesias owned a 50 ft. yacht. Brand asked Iglesia's help to use his yacht to smuggle weapons into Cuba. Iglesias was in very low spirits. He sai that it was useless for the cubans to fight Fidel, since Fidel had a powerful ba from the Soviet …”
“… d been a member of the American Army, at Fort Dix, New Jersey. He had been to Europe as a member of the American Army. He deserted to go to Cuba and join the forces fight Batista. He became a member of Faure Chon's guerrillas in the mountains of Las Villas. Robayna said that he was w …”
“… tart checking Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a well known communist, and also to give all the informa he could gather about the top communists in Cuba. Vidal agreed to this. In a meeting with Losada, he informed Brand that the leader of the group at Rio Hondo, a man by the name of Lazaro S …”
“… mountains. H to talk with Lancis only about the laborers at the Electric Company, because B wanted Lancis to organize the labor section of Cuba Libre. In his next meeting with Brand, Lancis refused to have anything to do with l He gave Brand a written report about Losada and Losada' …”
“would say that Robayna had five hundred men under his command. figure is accepted by Brand as good. NW 65924 Docld:32356993 Page 5 ☐ -5- By the first days of September Brand had met Dr. Rodolfo Henriquez Lauranzon, a well known Cuban dentist. This dentist lent his house many time”
“rez had been recommended by Cabanas and events be a courageous, dedicated and faithful companion. th In a new meeting with Jose Fernandez Planas, Brand met a young physician know Anselmo. In this meeting they said they had found a D.Z. and that they were goin give Brand a map poi”
“… the moustache looked too dark. Brand's conclusion abo this is what follows: 1) The disguise was very good, but hairpieces don't last lon in Cuba's climate, If one wears them daily, as Brand did, they are not good for more than twelve or fifteen days. 2) The disguise was good as long …”
“… reports from this Captain, and also from the Subsecretario de Hacienda and from the Member of the Supreme Court. Gomila went to Santiago de Cuba to see the Captain, but Brand does not know the oucome of their meeting, because Brand didn't see Gomila again. One day Brand went to Ferna …”
“… ewhere nea El Escambray mountains. Meanwhile, Cabañas had seen Brand several times, and had informed him ot the recruitings he had made for Cuba Libre among the drivers and conductors of Coopera de Omnibus Aliados. Finally, the newspapers in town published some pictures of Plinio Pri …”
“… ecided to discontinue operations, he recrui Dr. Milanes, who was willing to bring aggroup of about 30 of his fellow physicians to work with Cuba Libre. But then, Benito Fernandez came to see Brand and told him that Nino Diaz was in Santiago, making contacts with different groups. Sin …”
“consisted of a review by Mr. RANKIN and his staff of the gaps in their investi- gation to date. "8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, members of Mr. RANKIN's staff questioned Mr. HELMS and Mr. ROCCA regarding the extent of the CIA file on OSWALD for the p”
“0. The Commission, Mr. RANKIN said, would be interested in any information held by CIA on Jack RUBY. "11. Mr. HELMS was then asked if CIA had done any follow up to its original telegraphic dissemi- nation of the information on OSWALD'S visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in ”
“course of the discussion, he viewed the following specific items of original Agency docu- mentation: "a. DIR-74673 dated 18 October 1963 to State, FBI, and Navy reporting contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico, by American, Lee OSWALD. (Forwarded to Commission under cover of DDP mem”
“D, who visited Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico on 28 September 1963. (To Commission under cover NW 65924 Docld:32357059 Page 8 OLORLI 8 of DDP memo dated 31 January 1964, p. 8.) "h. Originals of the thirty documents from CIA's dossier on OSWALD which were for- warded to the ”
“Mr. RANKIN's staff showed us a detailed memorandum they had prepared based on all of the informa ti on available to them, including our own contribution concerning OSWALD's stay in the USSR. "4. Members of Mr. RANKIN's staff then spoke about having found a book in OSWALD's posses”
“wing specific items of original Agency docu- men tation: "a. DIR-74673 dated 18 O ctober 196 3 to St ate, FBI, and Navy reporting contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico, by American, Lee OSWALD. (Forwarded to Commission under cover of DDP memo, No. 4-1554, dated 24 March 1964.) "b. ”