“… from the above components. 5. Arrangements will be made by OLC with Printing Services Division for priority reproduction of the HSCA draft report immediately upon receipt. The number of copies will be determined by agreement among the above parties. Distribution of copies will be by h …”
“… hey are not practical for a pressure operation such as this will be. 7. Present HSCA planning is to have available for our review a Summary Report to be considered by the full Committee in public sessions mid-November. The Staff Summary of the investigations are planned for mid- to lat …”
“… MENT INFORMATION AGENCY ORIGINATOR: CIA FROM: BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT D., OLC TO: DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS TITLE: PLANNING FOR FINAL HSCA REPORT DATE : 10/17/1978 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : CIA INVESTIGATION HSCA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS SECRET : 1A i CURRENT STAT …”
“… eputy Director for Administration Deputy Director for Science & Technology General Counsel S. D. Breckinridge : Planning for the Final HSCA Report : 1. We have asked the HSCA to arrange to give us sections of its report at different times to facilitate our review and response. There ha …”
“… ection by the DCI. Until advised to the contrary (and we will try to clarify it) our working assumption is that the submission of the final report to us will constitute a written notice of the desire to have the material in that report published. If the Committee does not receive a res …”
“… from the above components. 5. Arrangements will be made by OLC with Printing Services Division for priority reproduction of the HSCA draft report immediately upon receipt. The number of copies will be determined by agreement among the above parties. Distribution of copies will be by h …”
“… hey are not practical for a pressure operation such as this will be. 7. Present HSCA planning is to have available for our review a Summary Report to be considered by the full Committee in public sessions mid-November. The Staff Summary of the investigations are planned for mid- to lat …”
“… budget briefings on 14 March and a meeting of the Special Investigation Subcommittee on 17 March to discuss the recently completed staff report on CIA activities in Australia. 10. (Unclassified - DFM) LIAISON Talked with Doug McCullough, Senate Select Committee on Ethics staff, …”
“… spective personnel files disclose the following: SA Poptanich was then fluent in the Russian language (Nosenko's native tongue). The Annual Report of Performance Rating, dated March 31, 1962, noted that SA Poptanich, during the previous twelve months, had participated in the interro- g …”
“cld:32370072 Page 6 4 House Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA) or verbatim transcripts of FBI interviews with Nosenko that concerned Oswald and/or the assassination of President Kennedy. A_document has been located which indicates that FBI pe”
“e indicative of a lack of Soviet governmental involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy. NW 65924 Docld:32370072 Page 7 5 House Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (KSCA) "7. What significance - with respect to possible foreign involvemen”
“ion. Therefore, the FBI is satisfied that Nosenko reported the facts about Oswald as he knew them. : "8. If the answer to question 6 is cifferent from the response to question 7, when did the change occur and why?" The FBI had no direct access to Nosenko from April 3, 1964 until ”
“hen did the change occur and why?" The answer to question 8 is considered responsive to question 11. "12. What was the FBI's position from 1964 to 1968 on whether Noserko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald?" The FBI did not take a position, fr”
“d:32370072 Page 9 7 House Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA) i As indicated in the responses to questions 7 and 8, the FBI, as of October 1, 1968, found no substantial basis to conclude Nosenko was not a bona fide defector; as of liay 11, 197”
“… 26 July 1965 Items from Nosenko Study (1968) in Response to HSCA Request, 29 March 1978 Loose file Peter Deryabin Material on Nosenko Hart Report CIA Study”
“e to HSCA Request, 29 March 1978 Loose file Peter Deryabin Material on Nosenko Hart Report CIA Study "Conclusions & Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Copy #1 1 October 1968 The Examination of Bona Fides of KGB Defect …”
“f the First Section? Yes. Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No. NW 65924, Docld:32370111 Page 5 0003653 IRU Page 5 67491 SECRET 2 To your knowledge was there any misleading information in the CHEREPANOV papers? No. Did you ever personally meet”
“… or electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No. Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes. Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes. Was th …”
“… y will not arise in the case of overseas operations, but the SSC could revive some of the domestic improprieties covered by the Rockefeller report, such as the LSD experiments or mail intercepts. The issues which this could raise concern: An employee's need to have prior consultation w …”
“Nosenko 27 July 1978 1 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT : Handling of Tapes of Nosenko's Testimony 1. The testimony of Nosenko on 19 and 20 June, during the Executive Session of the HSCA at CIA, was recorded under special agreement. Nosenko would not agree to the recording unles”
“e available for use on these days. Mr. Blakey phoned on Tuesday asking that arrangements be made. 2. I told Blakey that I was not in a position to unilaterally modify the agreement that he and I had with Nosenko. The testimony was recorded only because of the special personal arr”
“e that the transcriber came without CONFIDENTIAL NW 65924 Docld:32370228 Page 2 21574 : CONFIDEN LAL announcing his intention and that the tapes were not available simply because Gmirkin was not available as no advance arrangements had been made; however, this is speculation. Bla”
“at we might do. Blakey asked me to get word back to the HSCA chief clerk, Miss Elizabeth Berning. 3. I arranged through CI Staff and LA Division, after discussion with Mr. Sednaoui, to have a cable sent to Gmirkin. He and Nosenko were scheduled to arrive at their next stop Wednes”
“… 32 of Bagley's prepared statement and page 25, line 16 of his testimony. Substitute "allied service" for "French intelligence." Typewritten Report Page 52, line 5. Change "CIA Staff" to "CI Staff." Page 71, line 25 and Page 72, line 1. Delete "or the Soviet military intelligence." This …”
“… :32370538 Page 4 3 I understand from your conversation with Rodger that you would. welcome a letter from the Agency, on this section of the report, for inclusion with it in the final report. Could we have more details? It is understood that this is the last paper we will see that has n …”
“… d not mentioned it. I understand from your conversation with Rodger that you would welcome a letter from the Agency, on this section of the report, for inclusion with it in the final report. Could we have more details? Very truly yours, NW 65924 Docld:32370547 Page 5”
“it in the final report. Could we have more details? Very truly yours, NW 65924 Docld:32370547 Page 5 S. D. Breckinridge Principal Coordinator, HSCA 5”
“… ncountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph interview. Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily redu …”
“… electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No. Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes., Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKPV, in 1962 in Geneva? Yes. …”
“IRD#67491 Page 61 Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contact - with |JENNER) on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.• Are you intentionally withholding any information c …”
“… (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature …”
“14-00000 oLui1 V. second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also 'the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant. + In Sovietsk the work was not interested and ”
“… The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for •'cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).# I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962. I was appointe …”
“… at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a '’recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the fu …”
“… YN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report- ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the James) STORSBERG case and de …”
“14-00000 Scvuuu ( During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE. It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR”
“with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual G001153 6 SHFORFI OLORt”
“with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDJAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDJAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the 0001169 9”
“00000 First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surv”
“… tion, First Department, for any material period of time after / 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he r …”
“date of the visit or relateit to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report. NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDJAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post …”
“14-00000 there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event. one thing is clear -- since he may well have transferred out of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1”
“responsibility actually . entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone inter cepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone repo”
“14-00000 case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chief was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States Embassy as received by the section. As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO this was c”
“would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form. In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security …”
“… n of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomati …”
“attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First 18 0001178”
“against code clerks, did not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for report ing on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally 19 0001179 or C”
“14-00000 ( was not that of a code clerk. NOSENKO has during current interviews related how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the microphone in the Military code room at the United States Embassy that KEYSERS either was not a”
“… hat, "In the single case in which he /NOSENKO/ assert ed that he relied on information pro cured from microphones (KEYSERS’ failure to report 0 receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error." While the official record shows that KEYSERS did indeed report receipt of th …”