“… r for ZUJUS, according to NOSENKO. The previous summary states (page 183) that ZUJUS, during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN, " who. visited the American House with someone from t …”
“… met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO. Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO re ported that she was queried about her passport at American House …”
“14-00000 It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO did not know enough about ZUJUS or his background to have exercised any supervision in the development of ZUJUS. Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regarding ZUJUS, the fact is that NOSENKO ”
“14-00000 ( and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on the trip from Helsinki to Moscow. JENNER, after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the …”
“14-00000 ( It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as . JENNER, Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated”
“… he day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matte- are accordingly possibl …”
“14-00000 W - - Cent th ( NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness ofat least some involvement of IVANOVA with MORONE. He has fur- nished information on a developing operation against Marine guard GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of”
“… NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However, whether he report …”
“14-00000 ( A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically s”
“… ip can be ascribed to ignorance. but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB. Second, NOSENKO had not reported that ZWANG was involved in the currency operations of Pietr …”
“14-00000 There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their effor”
“14-00000 House. It was further noted that GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunken- ness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apart ment and that she had claimed pregnancy. As t”
“14-00000 1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department. The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from micro phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. P”
“14-00000 arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department. (b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene MAHONEY was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA offi”
“… exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case. Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba”
“NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, % it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE, that it had to have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the, presence C001215 55”
“14-00000 ) VC, ( has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where JOHNSON stayed.”
“14-00000 relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concern- ing his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indic”
“contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to 0001225 8 SEPRET”
“14-00000 0 Lut i-41 George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959”
“14-00000 QEADET OLUnLi As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep ancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be consi”
“… American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA. Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to …”
“14-00000 ouvrai Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows: (a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision”
“… of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963. (d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961. (e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre …”
“14-00000 * SECRET Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document. The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out o …”
“broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no ,means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use / of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point |where the track had been "lost". In addit”
“ant or his associates (whose independent, previous threats were of greater potential enbarrassment); C. affect the reputations and the security of our personnel at Madrid and Paris. 2. Action: In view of the foregoing, the allegations. A. should be put in proper perspective 1.e.,”
“, at the same time, treated so as to avoid attributing to them more importance than they deserve; c. should be kept in mind as examples of other charges which may be tandied about and reported by the AMLASH group to other governmental agencies or to other governments or to news m”
“rify doubts and then, when necessary, terminate those who are working for us but are not worthwhile; (4) tighten up our own operational and security procedures in connection with the AMLASH group. 3. Preliminary Analysis: As pointed out in a preliminary analysis of the AMLASH com”
“d are in contact with the two ende." The following comments are keyed to matters raised by ESPINOSA: A. The AMLASH conspiracy As detailed by MADR-3715 (IN 28634) on 6 April 1965, QUSPORT-1 reporting on a meeting of the ANLASH group, including AMTHIP-1 mentioned the following sign”
“924 Docld:32370694 Page 3 0003866 0003667 PAGE COPY NO. 5 of 119 ATED SPAG : REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED "the AMLASH circle is wide and each new friend of whom we learn seems to have knowledge of the plan." I believe that the problem is a more serious and basic one. As indicated in p”
“… that the questionable decision to put Maureen in touch with the AMLASH group was made without the knowledge of STOCEFOOD.) ESPINOSA did not report any criticism of the KUBARKers at Paris bat it is evident that the AMLASH group knows more about them than we might wish. What is new and o …”
“65924 Docld:32370694 Page 4 SECRET 0003867. 0003668 PAGE COPY NO. 6 of 119 ( REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED C. Criticism of the Nadrid Station Criticism of the Madrid Station by the ALASH group is not new, ASLASH-2 and -3 were in Madrid and wanted direct contact, but the Station has had”
“tified her as QUSWIFT-7 and has reported that no staffer frou the Station ever had contact with her. 4. Further involvement of ESPINOSA: On 10 June ODENVI notified AUBARK at New York that ALASH-2 had telephoned ESPINOSA to ask whether he had succeeded in contacting "the proper pe”
“Top Secret CONTENTS g PAGE IV KGB ENTRY (ca. 1953) 61 Date of Entry 62 Role of General KOBULOV 64 Eligibility: 67 Processing for Entry, 68 Initial Service 70 Other Aspects Relevant to KGB Service 72 Summary and Conclusion> 74 V 06SECTION OF.(ca. AMERICAN EMBASSY AME”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO’s defection, he reported that he had received a cable from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to Moscow to participate in a KGB conference on : foreign touri”
“had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964. Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that h”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United® States solely for the reasons he had originally given. These interrogations were suspended on 5 March 1965.06. 'Questioning”
“… hether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct" , at the end of the final page. With one exception, he”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) look foolish, but he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have”
“ta:4 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) th Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Twenty-five of this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after NOSENKO’s information was received. In fifteen other instances NOSENKO’s information has been corrobora”
“Ministry, and a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, 1! see below). In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other KGB foreign agents, yet to be identified. NOSENKO’s infor- mation about the KGB electronic attack on the German Embassy in Moscow was confirmed by subse”
“… s on 11 June 1962 passed to CIA a■ list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a preliminary report on NOSENKO’s information, on the basis of which the twenty-man list was) reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect. Full 0001301 30 TS …”
“4-00000 Top Secret B (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) Comment : (Continued) details of NOSENKO’s information were passed to British authorities on 20 August, and on 12 September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly confessed. VASSALL’s confession confirmed what NOSEN”
“embassies in Moscow, Aside from the American Embassy (see p. 225), he furnished the greatest detail on the microphones in the West German Embassy. NOSENKO’s Information The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy in Moscow, with the exception of the American an”
“63 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) conversations as well as passages of a book he was writing on the Soviet Union... NOSENKO learned of the KGB microphones either from O.So BUBNOV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate 1S Third (Austria and Germany) Depar”
“while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that ''something is going wrong with this operation". Comment: "ANDREY" was identified as former U.S. Army Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as a code "machine mechanic while assigned to the office of the U.S. Military Attache in the ”
“Top Secret (FOUNDATION OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what had happened. She reported that SMITH was in a state of desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as i”
“… will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN -believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters. GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied only misinformation to the KGB, but when the …”
“14-00000 11 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) 0 which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruit ment, as was alleged in the study.• Comment; Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead). Embassy Sec”