“… l or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment. -Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. "ABIDIAN was developin …”
“… AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) -All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).. : -Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing …”
“… ut not office room numbers.] ABIDIAN’s office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e.. secure 1 wis-cyloz office areas). NOSENKO said that a report from an agent (identity not recalled) indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN’s office door which said "Security Office", [There * wa …”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) -Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of surveillance and other operational activity carried out by various KGB units. NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. Even if he were absent when su”
“… one to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent ! had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollect …”
“a Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Except for the American woman with whom ABIDJAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO knew none of ABIDIAN’s close American friends in Moscow nor his close friends and professional contacts among fore”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment : NOSENKO's information is substantially correct, that no letters were mailed for one and a half years after LANGELLE’s expulsion, and that ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including ones to the Ba”
“.1 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN’s clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN”
“Americans entered the bookstore, but shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked around the corner, where he entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a few s”
“… details of the hallway,.except that there wasa radiator there. . ■As ABIDIAN’s case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN’s file. (This case file’ NOSENKO turned over to his succes …”
“… g the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections. NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post …”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a full TH L D E X year after the time reported by NOSENKO. As NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy Economic”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) nor filed the initial surveillance report of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street site. If he transferred to the Seventh Department two days after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed …”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) that ABIDIAN’s travel in the Soviet Union would have had, to 5: been approved by the KGB, and that the responsible case officer would have issued orders for his surveillance out- side of Moscow and would hav”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the restricted areas. "the seventh through the tenth floors", were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest in these offices. [The secure area barred”
“witness and to certify .the destruction of classified documents. If NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure, he has never indicated it in any context.] In 1960-1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either knew the location of all offices and personnel within the Embassy or he c”
“… ho was' an agent of BELOGLAZOV .stole a' bag of papers from the Naval Attache office. The torn and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval. Attaches' observation of ships and factories on a trip to Leningrad. The report. was only of routine interest to the KGB.. The …”
“Embassy. NOSENKO 's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the ■ Embassy Derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to’ appropriate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversa tions. Also, in his capacity ”
“Top Secret 1 (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962) J 1 NOSENKO's Information Handling, of Monitor Reports According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB personnel, all in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor re”
“usually within twenty-four hours returned the reports to the Second Special Department. In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV reviewed the reports. The Second Special Department prepared sterile abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts which disguised”
“… that audio reception was good from the military code room, but that the occupants rarely spoke, When one of them was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers. Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room a …”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) "I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which ”
“?reports. There was nothing in these reports which was of interest or useful to the KGB. "From the microphone in the Army Attache’s office I remember that the service attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They”
“… aphs." Results of Technical and Physical Search woneo lNOSENKO’s information [no action had been taken as a result of GOLITSYN’s earlier report that there was a micro phone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister Counsellor] was, as far as it went, confirmed by a search of …”
“chancery in spring 1964. According to the USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery …”
“… an audio system. ;\ Damage Estimates. With reference to the damage caused by the audio penetra- tion, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetra tion, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage …”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION- January 1960-January 1962) Audio Operations Against American Embassy: Summary"and Conclusion. Given that NOSENKO‘s information about microphones in the ■ chancery has been confirmed, that information’s significance remains the extent ”
“purpose he risked keeping a highly € sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subordinates (GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which , promp”
“… tual instance. In the single case in which he asserted that he relied onA1 information procured from microphones, KEYSERS" failure to 06 report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error. - Conclusion From the foregoing it is concluded that, NOSENKO’s claims to the co …”
“monitoring reports. Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. He has consistentl”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) "ANDREY’S" help that the KGB were able to read, State Depart-1 ment and ciphers. [At the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow:. a single code room was shared by State Department and I / .military code clerks. As th”
“… SENKO recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working nd specifically against KLOSSON. He never read any agent or A2 06 surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in 06 any clandestine activity. NOSENKO was unaware of KLOSSON’s% job in the Embassy, whether his fami …”
“… ters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. Additionally, from a KGB micro- phone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip. 0 Comment: WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his Washington overt assignment as a …”
“… INTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Af fairs. In addition he was overheard from a KGB microphone dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned V from a field trip. Comment; WINTERS was a CIA officer. CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB. Stanley BR …”
“-00000 Top Secret AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION — January 1960-January 19.62) 06 FRIPPEL NOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the 29American Express Company during the 1960-1961 period, as he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Depart- ment. (See p”
“Top Secret . (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas for Havana on 19 November. According to flight manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and ”
“name of Horace G. LUNT.& NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic linguist of that name had been reported to him in Moscow by VOLKOV or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual. When MVR officers confirmed that this LUNT was a Slavic specialist, 0 NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against”
“remained in a MVR office where he could be reached by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed further assistance. NOSENKO learned from the MVR officers involved that the recruitment had been successful, and that LUNT had agreed to meet them again on the following day. ”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) 1 Promotion and Transfer to the <Seventh Department (January 1962) NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department resulted from GRIBANOV’s wish to promote him from Deputy Chief of the Embassy Sec”
“Top Secret F J CHAPTER VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ^January 1962 to January 1964/ Comment; By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist agent program in the USSR. The information cb- tained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, in c”
“spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section’s activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season. He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye to their recr”
“after his return to Moscow in June he claimed he recruited Horst BRAUNS 06 Entrapment of ^.E. JOHNSON 06 NOSENKO’s Information NOSENKO first referred to @oHNSON] in Geneva in 1962, when he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been used in the homosexual ent”
“important information and he lived too far from the • KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient con- $.-tact. • 06 Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON ; : % mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter,”
“… tor and a militiaman, KGB offi cers burst in on the trio. Photographs of the incident had been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report- describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and [JOHNSON D( was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO had arriv …”
“promise not to criticize the Soviet Union in the future. The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the 06 Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that h”
“)4-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) 06 Information JOHNSON’s ----- —--- f** According to a statement given to the FBI, prior to his 06 Moscow visit to the USSR JOHNSON had written a church authority, in requesting permission to preach ”
“… a OV commitment not to criticize the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States. On 8 January JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that he had been recontacted by the "Police Chief" who reminded him of his pledge and showed him incriminating photographs alleged ly t …”
“Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) 06 Comment: : Interviewed by the FBI in June 1964, JONES (the sponsor of the annual PresidentialnyN "prayer breakfast" in Washington) confirmed the substance of NOSENKO’s information but denied sexual intimacies”
“… ttle details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent] by KGB officers; who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV 'liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and …”
“delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer. Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United •States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at- tended the 1945 Conferenc”