“… placed had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO’s conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he re turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva. 3 Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation NOSENKO sai …”
“… officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in 1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference, On the basis of NOSENKO’s favorable report afterwards, he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return. In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Aria …”
“Top Secret (SEVENTH .DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) I Yu.I. GUK : ' Implying ' that their friendship was of long standing; NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a s. .few drinks. As a”
“… uperiors that he was a Russian and had pro bably believed him to be an intelligence officer. Comment: According to an [official British report, when NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions and the secretary reported the contact to her superiors she was withdrawn immediat …”
“Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964; Comment : (Continued) involvement with American tourist agents in 1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department’s American Section. Under interrogation NOSE”
“Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) 10 When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, NOSENKO’s name as the handling officer was entered .in the single-volume case file, although NOSKOV ac companied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings wi”
“woSVENCHANSKIY's background is such as to have prevented his being interviewed on the basis of the information NOSENKO provided.: ( NOSENKO did not refer to his association M with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described it only after referring to the written notes he bro”
“Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN. directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents, who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted, to recruit SLESINGER,6but since no evidence was developed, ”
“14-00000 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964) Comment: (Continued) _ 06 In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previou”
“D6 :: Comment: KOTEN’s arrest on charges of homosexual activities were publicized at the time in a report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist which was carried in the New-York Times. In an interview with representatives of the Department of …”
“… t (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the a American Department to write a report on what other possibilities existed. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches. GRIBANOV then as …”
“Intelligence.• He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and• KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye. N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate fo”
“hours but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN .06,29 300 TS No. 197124 0001571 Top Secret VBR C°py --- —”
“… station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a document was prepared requesting permission to hold 9him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was …”
“… nd signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second declarations were reported to MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor. .GRIBANOV …”
“Information Residence in the USSR Prior to OSWALD’s arrival in the USSR, he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief: Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient importance to justify any special inter”
“… um cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information w …”
“remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry, as a permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned th”
“questioning of his neighbors and, associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD's threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its hands of him" and that even though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent," KGB Headquarters intere”
“reported the in quiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO. 305 0001576 TS No. 197124 4 - Top Secret Copy 10”
“Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Director”
“Head- quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt”
“there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD’s stay there, as well as an explanation of the meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally read the explanation from Minsk concernin”
“… dence, OSWALD's request for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require, the Washington Residency to report the matter to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of OSWALD's communicati …”
“KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft copies of documents he had handled in the Embassy Section. In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were intended for …”
“action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the news and was quite cool about the matt”
“… s, plus two copies of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The S' longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report, dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A, and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs against S …”
“… stationed ] in Moscow, Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A. RAMSEY, and George WINTERS. Other documents included were an agent’s report of her relationship with WINTERS, a summary 1 of LANGELLE’s activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet citizens whose letters to the …”
“Top Secret, "■ 21 (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) C -The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO; -The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO’s in-place spotting ”
“14-00000, Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964) Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSEIKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace". He also asked about exfiltration plans. On 31 January NOSENKO reported the resul”
“… ourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge, of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KG …”
“… evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO’s fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together wit …”
“… his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one of the Seventh Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy …”
“Top Secret 0 (ANNEX B) U 06 'Comment: BARTHELEMY was a CIA contact whose intelligence connections were assumed to have been compromised during his visits to the USSR. He reported his * contacts with LAINE to CIA. BARTHELEMY"s name 06 appeared in the KGB document on Western”
“Top Secret (Annex B) 06 BINDER, Peter (Continued) NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher. Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer Coworking against BINDER, and the Chief of the A”
“1 4-00000 Top Secret (Annex B) Comment: (Continued)• 1 states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or July 1962, while BINDER was on leave. leave.06 •Except for dating the recruitment attempt 060 X in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO’s fragmentary information coincides ”
“1917, the son of an 29 emigre and an employee of the Four Winds24 agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen days in 1962. in 1962 t He left the Four Winds agencyl travel abroad, and he now works for . 29 29 Hermes Travel of California), Interviewed by the FBI, BUNDAR”
“Top Secret (Annex B) .) Comment: (Continued) ** 06BUNDARIN and parents associate with CPUSA members and participate in CP front organiza-w :tion activities. solid NOSENKO’s information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1”
“Yugoslavia, CFAIN, an "American consul" stationed ---------- visited Moscow in 1959. During that visit he encountered NOSENKO’s agent, VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that 0001639 407 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 1U Copy 7/BR”
“4-00000 Top Secret (Annex B) 06 FAIN, Thomas (Continued) DFAIN was a homosexual There was insufficient time during OFAIN’s visit to arrange his entrapment. D'S FAIR] was assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the KGB planned at that time to entrap him with a homose”
“Top Secret (Annex B) Comment: One Professor Michael GINSBERG reported to U.S. officials in Helsinki in August 1956 that he had been the target of a Soviet recruitment attempt earlier in Moscow. His contact has been identified by CIA as a KGB officer whom 06 GINSBERG accor”
“HARMSTONE’s DG homosexual as well as heterosexual activities. When confronted Ohowever, HARMSTONE refused to collaborate with the KGB. OHARMSTONE reported the approach to American officials, but asserted that he was involved just in heterosexual compromise NOSENKO reviewed ”
“Top Secret (Annex B) 06 HARMSTONE, Richard (Continued) while in intimate relations with a Soviet girl. Because the KGB concluded that HARMSTONE had not reported the homo-66 sexual compromise, it was planned to attempt t recruit him .again later, when he was transferred e”
“… ON did not again visit the USSR. I Comment: 08,06 USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON? was inter- viewed on 30 October 1963 regarding a report that he had been arrested in Yugos lavia in 1 1954 as a result of his sexual activities. 06 HUSTON served in Yugoslavia for eight years- …”
“Top Secret (Annex B) JAFFE, Sam]0bkn ANOSENKO’s Information 06 JAFFE ,an ABC correspondent in Moscow, is an active KGB agent who was cultivated and recruited by V.A. KUSKOV. 1 In 1963, while in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asked Ameri can Department Embassy Section ”
“… ad, which’ presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in the Seventh Department, had not been established. CIA did not learn of NOSENKO's report on. [KAZAN-(j^ KOMAREK until the latter was arrested in Czechoslovakia in 1966, by which time NOSENKO's interrogation had been suspended …”
“Top Secret (Annex B) Comment? In 1963 OMELICH reported his earlier contacts with Soviet officials at Squaw Valley. He denied that he had ever met KGB officers later, or that any meeting arrangements were made for Switzerland, although he admitted "he may have given the im”
“Top Secret (Annex B) _O6 Comment : RASK, a former CIA contact who visited the USSR several times, reported the KGB recruitment -7NOSENKOin’s 1961. approach information was limited to that contained in written notes he brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not relate the ca”
“Top Secret (Annex B) o4 ROSS, Johanna NOSENKO’s Information .The former governess to the American Ambassador’s family 1 : who now (in 1964) teaches at the American school] in Moscow D was recruited by the KGB on the basis of sexual involvements. 08 The case was handled”
“74.00 Top Secret (Annex B) Mo, Lw Comment: (Continued)' - In January 1959 she was approached in Riga by MV a KGB officer who confronted her with incrimi- Mnating photographs and solicited her cooperation in providing information on the U.S. Embassy. Sher immediately r”