“… irily dismissed” this prospect (0‘Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, Donnell agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to ’’neutralize” Lumumba "as a political factor” Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 43-44): I said I would go down and I would ha …”
“… at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba” (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53). Although O’Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell: NW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 55”
“-57- Mr. O’Donnell: I told Mr . Bissell that I would be willing' to go down to neutralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody] and turn him over to the Congolese authorities, that is correct. Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that hi”
“… with Bissell: Milir Mr. O’Donnell came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell ... to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimina tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assign …”
“… peration (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9). O’Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis- cussion with Bissell, he departed, for the Congo (O’Donnell 9/11/75, pp. 45-46). * Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa- tion in any way. He did not recall why O’ …”
“… t least postponing any- thing further along that line. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 25-26). In Tweedy’s mind, O’Donnell’s eventual mission to the Congo was linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba rather than to a general plan to draw”
“Lumumba out of UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26). / (iv) i O’Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and Learned That Ka Virus Was in the Station Safe - - On October 29, the Chief of Station was informed'through the PROP channel that (Ju …”
“… Leopoldville to Director, 11/4/60) Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible" that as a new Chief of)Station he took the dispatch to the Congo of a sen …”
“88-89). When(O’Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he met with the [chief of) Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe" (O’Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). …”
“… b that it probably would have emanated'from his office. (O’Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.) Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo with 0 ‘Donnell, but ’’assumed” that he did so (Hedgman, 3/21/75, pp. 60-61). Donnell was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he …”
“assumed that its purpose was assassination: * de When O'Donnell was informed about Hedgman's testimony on the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba, he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility” (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 53). O'Donnell found nothing i …”
“-64- explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess- ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone else 'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26). O’Donnell was " …”
“… ----- - -r...... Iwrworze---------------- - Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter Ego After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formu lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence …”
“… connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus tody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19): What I wanted to use him for was ... counter-espionage[.]... I had to screen the U.S. pa …”
“… no exploration of this sense of urgency about the "operational circumstances." (b) Agent QJWIN 1960---- — ‘s --------------- Mission in the Congo: ----November-December —-------- — QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Fina …”
“Dispatch,®M^147, 11/2/60.) 022 * Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci fied mission. QJWIN’s mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CI …”
“… 9/60). The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN had been recruited earlier by (sold SLvers for use in a special operation in .the Congo [the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be run by Justin O’Donnell. (I.G. Report, p. 38.) However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testifi …”
“… O THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314), Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station, 11/30/60.) O’Donnell said that agent QJWIN’s stay in the Congo was "co- extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O’Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (O’Donnell said he left th …”
“Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army. In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN’s activities in the Congo, William K. Harvey — under whom O'Donnell had worked before being detached for assignment to the Congo — noted the success of QJWIN’s mis …”
“… lutely not" (p’Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that O'Donnell's return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QJWIN’s mission (Harvey, affidavit, p. ). Despite the indication in the Inspector General’s Report that …”
“to show that QJWIN was related to that plot. The (chief of)Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN was in the Congo working for (Justin O’Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9 …”
“… 1). I William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN’s activities in the Congo: I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN’s trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know …”
“… ith(Sidney Gottlieb) in connec tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Cottlieb’s own trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p. ). Harvey had con sulted with Oguolld Silver• about the initiation of Proj …”
“… cident where there is an explicit reference to assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station. / WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless” European/ who was 11 a forger and former bank robber” land had fought with the French …”
“… UGE approach to QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that WIROGUE was ’’dispatched on a general purpose mission” to the Congo (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would "absolutely not” have been used on an assassination mission against Lum …”
“-80- The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Lumumba’s departure and that action plans were prepared for that eventuality: DECISION Oil BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY [AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE..”
“07 -01- from UN custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba’s plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance” in track ing dow”
“-83- Group agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (M …”
“-95-. The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before the "quasi-coup" in the Congo the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu -- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after” he heard the President's statement. The …”
“… as he was not disposed of” (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see Section 7(a)(iv), infra). Finally, on September 26, the CIA scien tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in formed him that the Pres …”
“5 -107- on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a t …”
“… for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility ” that he would have issued such an instruc tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47) …”
“… r, in the Fall of 1960-before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent OS. QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by AMEE mold Silver, his supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the 03 Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff …”
“… concerning "disposing of” Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles’ cable to the Congo, Bissell’s representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an infer …”
“… ar spotting mechanism never went| that far. So far as HARVEY could recall K.J.Win was used only once in connection with an opera- tion In the Congo, which”
“… him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of PATRICE LUMUMBA. HARVEY testified that O’DONNELL told him that he had declined to …”
“… own as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by @MRN@MDS, ER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O’DONNELL: C(OLDONNELL-made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in …”
“dnll Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 59 1 quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent 2 to the Congo in the fall of 1960. 6 The Chairman, Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which 4 counsel has referred reads as follows: 5 "In recommending th …”
“… cause 16 he had moral compunctions against killing, 17 Mr. 'Donnell further testifies that he was then or 18 thereafter dispatched to the Congo, where he was informed that 893 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 19 some poison had been”
“made available - had come to the CIA 20 headquarters in the Congo. 21 Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I missed that last. 22 The Chairman. He was informed that some poison had 23 arrived at the CIA headquarte …”
“… art of Colorado.' What his orders were, what his 4 scope of authority was, what he was doing over and above well, 5 what he was doing in the Congo, what he was doing over and 6 above his Congo operations, why ' he was in Florida in 1963. front * 7 The Chairman. Well, Gary, when …”
“… you as we 7 were strolling around, the simple answer to that is yes. These consultations would take many, many different forms. 6 On the Congo, for example, the State Department 9 obviously was just as involved as practically the rest : the 10 U.S. Government and they had a Con …”
“… east f what the 22 I policy was. If we could focus our attention on the © Mr. Baron. 410 F 3035 period between the independence of the Congo in June of ‘60 25 and the announcement of the death of Lumumba in February of ‘(l. TOP SECRET N”
“… ing arrangements and so on and so forth. 22 To be frank with you, I have far less recollection al: intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that particular group than 1 did after 19-what, the beginning of TOP SECRET HW”
“… he Kennedy Administration. O 1 Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration 2 f that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were 6 . geared up. 4 : Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely. 5i Mr. Baron. Do you remember discussions with Livingstone 1 …”
“recall ving met with Livingstone Merchant on the Congo. I may have done so but I really don't recall, I had very little 1 ′0 * t TOP SECRET”
“… cussed Lumumba in the 5 S sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa- 6 tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo 7 was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the •: African situations, individual African country situations. 9 We would …”
“… ward Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by 5j saying what was the general assessment of the situation in 6 P the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you 7 il came down to. 8 : The worry in WAshington about the situation in the 9 : Congo w …”
“… n. Were these political side effects only that were being taken into account or were there also fears for American business interests in the Congo that 5 " were part of the side effects? 6 Mr. Tweedy. Insofar as my assessments were concerned. 7 " and those of the Agency and any c …”
“… frica just the way this country was. It was obviously a worry. 20003 Mr. Baron. Was it also our assumption if the Soviets moved into the Congo they would move n the side of Lumumba? S Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there”