“sorry. before he left for the Congo -- he had conversation ith you end Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take lethal material to the Congo and give it to the Chie …”
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“sorry. before he left for the Congo -- he had conversation ith you end Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take lethal material to the Congo and give it to the Chie …”
“… component parts. 7 You agree now. having heard Dr. Gottlieb’s testimony, that 8 j it is true that you had asked (Dr . Gottlieb, to go to the Congo? 4S*____ --------- _9, Mr. Tweady. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes. Mr. Baron. It is also true that you know that Dr: Gottlien was to …”
“… station and instructing in their use and iving him an instruction about a mission assessing- Lumumba, that he had ie further role in the Congo ; he was to serve as”
“… we would not have expedited anything at j the risk of doing it unprofassionally. tape lb Mr. Baron. At the point that Gottlich left for the Congo 5 : after talking with you, would he have been empowered to convey 6 I to the Chief f Station that an assassination f Lumumba could 7 …”
“… Headquarters. Mr. Dawson. If we are to tie this to the cables, then. ■is there something in the cables predating nottlieh’s visit to 1 the Congo which would lead you to believe that it had previously been authorized by some words in those cables? Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawson, had …”
“TOP SECRET 24 (Area2021saa-soce 1 : after Mr. (Gottiiabjarrives in the Congo, is that correct? 2 Mr. Tweedy. This, in effect, is that (Indicating). You 1 can tell by the Chief of Station, there is no further 4 • …”
“… f Station. Mr. Baron. So then it is possible - or in it probable 'that in your instructions to Sidney Gottliebhabout his mission to the Congo you might not have explicitly mentioned the requirement that the Chief of Station return t Headquarters to econfirm his authority mov a …”
“… ligence agent. an 9 excellent intelligence agent, for the simple reason that he HUT 1 was able to make contact with groups and media in the Congo which was very difficult f non-Af ricans to reach. s, for a year r two, first-class intelligence source basically; not an action sour …”
“… l instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the U.S. position was that Mr. Lumumba must be removed from a 5 i position of authority in the Congo and that assassination was 6 not by any means the only way by which this might be accomplished. 7 : This, I think, merely reiterates th …”
“… recalling Schotroffe to Leop." 14 j When Dr .. Gottlieb^looked at this cable, he testified that this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th 16 of September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where 17 * they discussed various operational possibilities of …”
“… e, which you assume you did, is that correct? Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely, Mr. Baron. You would have known that 'Sidney Gottlieb, had left the Congo on October 5th and that the Chief of Station P C 20001 planned to continue to try to implement the operation. Mr. TWeady. Which maars …”
“… n that was discussed in the YQPROP 7 d channel was to assassinate Lumumba in view or In light of the 8 j fact that Gottlieb had gone to the Congo with materials that 1 9-1-------------1 9 were only going to ba lethal for short period of time? '10 Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says. …”
“… or approval or either approval or no approval. This [ would not have changed. 4 Mr. Baron. Because Gottlieb took lethal materials to 5 the Congo with him that had such short period of lethality. ware you not contemplating at that time that the operation 7 might well move from the …”
“… w of the entire policy of the Agency at 7 that time, as indicated in the cables of Dulles and the cables 8 from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that 9 Gottlieb and the Chief of Station would find feasible means %-- ——* 10 f carrying out an assassination mission …”
“… le of October 7th, 1960, 1! which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference to 5 J senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that 6 a reference the fact that Bissell was considering dispatching 7 Justin O’Donnell? 81. Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no ot …”
“… correct myself here. I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent that was 7 73 5"recruited by Arnolassilven and sent by Silver" to the Congo for 6 use by O’Donnell and perhaps by the Chief of Station. 'I 7 Is that consistent with your recollection? Mr . Tweedy. No, it is not …”
“… Baron. The cable continues 11 Mr. Tweedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked w a n p • PAUL to said there is no solution to the Congo long Lumumba 19'! 4* J stays 4 in a position of power or influence there. That is what 1; . that means. Mr. Baron. The cable cont …”
“… he time being we were in no 4 position to approve anything but what was discussed in the 202 cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo 6 from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search 7 for means to take care of the YQPROP planning aspects. 8 Mr. Baron. W …”
“senior case officer might be dispatched to 1 the Congo to handle the YOPROP operation. He says it is an 1- 25 i| excellent idea. Is that fair interpretation? TOP SECRET #”
“… ing opening of hunting season.” 8 , Would you take that to be a recommendation by the Chief 9jof Station, if a case officer was sent to the Congo to concen- 0itrate on the YQPROP operation, he should be provided with the ■kind of weapon that would be suited for sniper shot at inva …”
“… HAT LILL CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE THE INEVITABLE RESULT w:: AT 3E5T BE CILAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY 10 COMM UNIST I A- -. OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR TILS PRESTIGE 07 fr t AND FOR THE TERESTS or THE Taxs x* WORLD GENERALLY CONSEQUENTLY wa CONCLUDE THAT …”
“… inst CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21) 1 August 25 After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA Is this circumlocutions order for operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented, assassination from the President? An however, that his associates had expressed indication that at the least, assassina …”
“… Page 12 and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this . It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which Docld:32423488 might contribute to getting rid …”
“… dly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to …”
“… al Security meeting, Mr. Dulles said: "A-recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. ***Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was—not disposed of and-remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of."’ Abilene SOURCE: _ Pr …”
“… the necessity for very straight-forward action" in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember LUMUMBA’s position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking with Eisenhower about LUMUMBA. However, Gray does remember that "we were anti-LUMUMBA and wa …”
“… , member of Policy Planning Council Chronology of Events Summer, 1960 Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that discussion, President EISENHOWER said something I can no longer remember his words — that came across to me a …”
“… the indi- : vidual. (Bundy, p. 7).- For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative he had requested a CIA officer to go to. the Congo to "make plans and develop the capability" for an assassination attempt against Lumumba,- if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55). * Bundy …”
“… er, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent■ QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on whi …”
“… ived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quick ly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination. The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965. The plans to assassinate Ca …”
“… the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back- grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo. B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves 1. The United. States Should Not_Engage. in Assassination, We cannot condone the use of …”
“… we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy". A second document which represents an attitude which we , find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA’s Africa Division recommended a par …”
“… oncerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles’ cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of. poison to the Congo can be read to support an i …”
“shown that, officials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination.*/: The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus, for example, a conspiracy ”
“… roprietary income is in the form of "cross-orders," from CIA and other Government Agencies.. For example, the CIA paramilitary project in the Congo”
“… come from commercial operations, had been generated by a covert war. In turn, these operations had their echoes in Agency air support for the Congo, Cuba, and other areas. Looking toward the future, will new air proprietaries be established? The CIA thinks NW .509.5.5 DocId: 32423532 …”
“… America’s doorstep. Events in the Dominican. Republic .appeared to offer more such opportunities, for the Russians and their .■allies.; The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic. center of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist pene- -tration there wa …”
“… rice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire). In the Fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by OFF 1 CALLER …”
“… Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive Assignment 15 (b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi nation of Lumumba: September 1960 .. 18 • (c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That President Eisenhower Had O …”
“… l Whether the Assassination Operation Had Moved from Planning to Implementation But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to Send Poisons to the Congo 48 5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination ’Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the Congo ....... …”
“Arrived in the Congo and Learned That a Virus Was in the Station Safe 60 (v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Aut …”
“… ase which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba? Second, how high in the United States government was the source of authorization for …”
“… of 1960, there was a great deal of concern at the highest levels in the United States government ■ about the role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.* Lumumba, who served briefly as Premier of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm by United States foreign policymakers be …”
“… e names of many geographical units and governmental institutions have changed. For instance, the nation formerly known as the Republic of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city, Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville. For the sake of clarity in dealing w …”
“-3 - Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its own independenc …”
“Lumumba's political strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers of the Eisenhower Administration. ** This concern was nurtured * Report of the Commission o …”
“… icates that the- CIA was aware that there was some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but that the moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and refused to consider assassination. On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended .a meeting of the Special Group …”
“… as a threat, at least until early December when he was captured by Mobutu's troops and im prisoned. During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised' and aided Congolese contacts known to have any intent to kill Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic proces …”
“… S REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST... (CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to Director, 9/15/60.) On September 17, another, CIA operative in the Congo.met. with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some Congolese …”
“… IN 33499, Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60). * Another general concern at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in the Congo and bring Lumumba to power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director to Leopoldville, 10/17/60). Similarly, throughout this period Lumumba was view …”