“… 21 years I have been in Counterintelligence, first in the 22 Special Investigations, and subsequently as Chief of Operations 23 for Mr. Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff. 24 And when I left the Agency in December of '74, that was 25 my position. TOP SECRET”
“… een some changes 3 in how counterintelligence is conducted at the CIA. 4 Could you give us some understanding of those changes? 5 Mr. Angleton. I would like to defer to Mr. Miler on this, 6 if I may? 7 Mr. Miler. Yes. 8 My understanding is there have been some rather fundamen …”
“… h foreign intelligence services are conducted. 4 Mr. Johnson. But how do you respond to the criticism that 5 during your tenure and Mr. Angleton’s tenure, too tight a 6 rein was kept on counterintelligence information, and individuals 7 in the field at- the station level failed t …”
“Miler. Well, Mr. Angleton might want to qualify my 20 3 21 response, because obviously he was involved more in this than I was, but there would be the two pri …”
“… a serious 18 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 counterespionage case involving an American citizen. 19 Mr. Johnson, Mr. Angleton, do you know of any instances 1 20 where the CI Staff or higher authority within the CIA went 21 outside the Agency for approval for …”
“TOP SECRET WksI 9’ c um rn tzoz OMV) suoue 1 Mr. Angleton. Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion © 2 between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others. 3 the Attorney General. 4 M …”
“… tion i and bury the individual at the end. CD Now, it went along -- to Mr. Johnson. Did you say "bury the individual"? 1 1070 Mr. Angleton. I'm not using it in your Committee terms. O Mr. Kirbow. You'd better clear that up for the record. \ W ARD a PAUL Mr. Miler. We wou …”
“… so forth, rather than to go through the normal © 2 bureaucratic chain of command out of the CIA and ita various 5 components. 4 Mr. Angleton. With the added fact that we did not disclose 1% W3 1 5 all of the facts, nor identity. / 6 Now, this is important, because the indi …”
“… by terms of definition, is the phrase or the term "counterintelligence" interchangeable with counter- are 21 22 espionage? 23 Mr. Angleton. It can be. I think technically counter- 24 intelligence is regarded to be all forms of investigative © 25 activity, travel control, y …”
“… the products is A Phone(re counterespionage. Senator Hart of Colorado, I see. How big was the Counterintelligence Staff? iD Mr. Angleton. When? Well,-when it was in its prime it O. was around, it was 200 some odd people. After this decentraliza- tion took place, when we …”
“… ns of this, and that there was no problem pia 6 with higher authority, in Apparently your, wwduldwee O‘% 7 disagree with that. 8 Mr. Angleton. I disagree in total with that. I’m saying the 1. 9 decline in the Bureau over 20 years from when they had very high LC I 10 grade co …”
“… I would say they have not had any contact with him since 1965. Senator Hart of Colorado. Why did Hoover make that decision? C. Mr. Angleton. Well, among other things, this defector wanted to have access to ongoing and to past cases with the 00 view that he had a tremendous …”
“… is? 9 9 First, Mr. Johnson, it goes back to the business of tu ii 10 compartmentation and not advising stations. In the case Mr. 11 Angleton cited, the Paris station of the CIA was not told W ARD a PAUL 12 anything about the information, and I think this is a very good 13 ex …”
“… j o te 19 that they concluded that there was no substance to this 20 information. 21 They had to reopen the investigation -- 22 Mr. Angleton. And they also said: send it to the Army. 23 Mr. Miler. Yes, send it to the Army. 24 Now, they had to reopen the investigation when the …”
“TOP SECRET a he 000 17 it was subsequently proved that he,was a Soviet spy. I Phone (Ares 202) © Mr. Angleton. Now, that individual had performed four separate missions for Soviet intelligence since about 1938 or Ul '39. One, he had been droppe …”
“… antification, could you give us some figures for numbers of 7 6 nn © IIa 11 counterintelligence cases handled per year? • PAUL 12 Mr. Angleton. Scotty, you can. Senator Hart of Colorado. Just so we can have an idea W ARD 13 14 of the magnitude of Volume. Mr. Miler. Well, f …”
“… r Hart of Colorado. What about the number of cases 14 involving penetration, successful or otherwise, of the Agency 15 itself? 16 Mr. Angleton. Well, the basic responsibility would be 17 the Office of Security, In other words, we would work with 18 them, but it tends to be a on …”
“… from the one defector alone, I would say there were five 21 hard leads. 22 Senator Hart of Colorado. Over what period of time? 23 Mr. Angleton. f this one defector who came out in 24 December of '61. But his leads were going back to '51, 1951. 25 Mr. diGenova. Is this the same …”
“P Da 7 STOP SECRET Co 21 ■ Phone(Area202)544-6000 1 FBI has had no contact since 1965? 2 Mr. Angleton. That’s correct. 3 Mr. diGenova. Has the Agency had any contact with him 4 since 1965? 5 Mr. Angleton. Yes, we've had it, but we've h …”
“… t woetie Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 1 asset inhibit you in any way from using the asset or the Agency © 2 from utilizing it? 3 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the infor- 4 mation that we wanted to take up with him was also related to , 5 FDI information. 6 Mr. …”
“cooperation directly 20 attributable to Mr. Hoover, to your knowledge? 21 410 First Street, S.E. Mr. Angleton. no. 22 Mr. diGenova. Was this problem ever brought to the 23 attention of the President of the United States at any time? 24 Mr. Ang …”
“… 44-6000 SECRET 23 1 General Mr. Kennedy, he had a direct meeting with him. © 2 Mr. diGenova. And what, if anything, happened? 3 Mr. Angleton. Ohly encouragement. 4 Mr. diGenova. Could you amplify on that? 5 Mr. Angleton. Well, the Attorney General handled him 6 very well in …”
“T Ia 38 )3444000 TOP SECRET 24 ___________ 1 Mr. Kirbow. How long is a man like that good for, Mr. 2 © a2 e 0 2 Angleton? I mean, by this time, or a decade from now, lot A Phone(r 5 of that information is of no longer any value to you. 4 Mr. Angleton. do …”
“… Could I interrupt just a moment? 23 You spoke in this instance of 20 file cabinets from the 24 interrogation of one defector. 25 Mr. Angleton. Yes. TOP SECRET”
“… this is the product of one hone(A 3 interrogation, what kind of volume did you put together to P 4 make workable capability? 5 Mr. Angleton. Well, the first thing was to computerize 6 everything, and the second was to break it out case by case, 7 British cases, Australian ca …”
“… ion yielded 20 file cabinets, and was wondering the 22 total volume. 23 Mr. Miler. What were the figures on the cases to read? 24 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I've already presented that 25 once, but when we were dealing with the new management and it TOP SECRET 1”
“S tre e t, S .E ., W a sh in g to n , D .C . 20003 Can you break it out that way? 19 20 Mr. Angleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but the primary thing of all is the question of penetration in the 21 U.S. Government, and then in …”
“… uld it help today if there was a separate Bureau under 3 the Attorney General for counterintelligence, separate from the 4 FBI? 5 Mr. Angleton. You are posing the same problem that the 6 RCMP in Canada had. In other words, they set up, I might add 7 because of us, because we br …”
“… there for rations and quarters. 21 Mr. Lombard. I guess what I had in mind was more the 22 British model of the Yard having % 23 Mr. Angleton. Well, the British model is the most 24 overexaggerated model in the world. I think I can quite 25 TOP SECRET NW”
“… O Mr. Lombard. Ch So your answer, in effect, would be that the counterintelligence function should stay within the Bureau. CD Mr. Angleton. That is correct. I mean, not that it's' 113 9 ideal, but in terms of the realities, in terms of the realities O it should be kept wi …”
“… ashington, D.C. 20003 in order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we've O. got to take this fellow to court now? to Mr. Angleton. That used be prevalent back in the ‘50s. To Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don't to to think that the job is …”
“… e if 2 in fact we were, which seems to give the impression that we 3 are defensively oriented, and that was your main priority. 4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that how could you have it 5 any other way? 6 If you've got a cryptonym of telegrams disappearing and 7 are in possess …”
“… 4 Mr. Johnson. Could you explain that "satisfy the 5 questionnaires?" 6 What does that phrase mean, "satisfy the questionnaires?" Mr. Angleton. The opposition wants to know, find out 8 from your sources the following questions. 1 9 Mr. Miler. In other words, the requirements t …”
“… ecure from 3 penetration yourself, and you then have to run that penetration 4 very securely and on a very compartmented basis. 5 Mr. Angleton. And there is one added proviso, then, that 6 you can only run a first rate double agent if you have a 7 source superior to him that he …”
“… do not exist for the" Bureau or for ourselves. 20 'Mr. Miler. )r for the military services, to run a lot 21 of double agents. 22 Mr. Angleton. I mean, they do not have the superior 23 source of control over double agents. 24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Why is that? 25 Mr. Angl …”
“… he double. CH Senator Hart of Colorado. But what is the prescription? Does that mean we can't do that or we aren't, or what? ON Mr. Angleton. Well, we haven't succeeded. mean, we have had Popov and Penkosky, and both of them are dead. They C were shot. Mr. Johnson. It must …”
“… terms of to penetration and in terms of knowledge and in counterintelligence. 0. 02 Mr. diGenova. The picture which both you and Mr. Angleton: to paint this new face of counterintelligence from your point of C view is a rather gloomy one because your comments seem to ON to …”
“… ent by the way you explain it? Surely the Director must have made that decision for a reason? * PAUL Do you know why? CM W ARD Mr. Angleton. Mr. Miler has known him more than -- longer. to 6n0n than I have. Would you? Mr. Miler. Yes, I’ll offer my opinion on it. ON Mr. d …”
“… 202) $44-6000 mete 1 to promote the best kind of a national program. £5^ 2 Senator Hart of Colorado.. Assume something about, Mr. 5 Angleton mentioned earlier, about the tendency to sweep mmunumt 4 penetrations under the rug in this country. 5 Has there been a pattern in the …”
“… tion that had been injected into the intelligence collecting program. ON il HE 9 Mr. Miler. Prior to the Yom Kippur war. C. Mr. Angleton. Prior to that. But the important thing is that that source who provided”
“WARDIG SH. Angleton. yotthrdn. 1 SECRE 39 Tape 4 1 1 Senator Hart of Colorado. It seems to me that you're 2 suggesting at the very least a naivete on the …”
“… i problem which you alluded to was frowned upon within the Agency. 22 What form did that take? I'd be interested to know that. 23 Mr. Angleton. Well, it took this form, that a person 24 working with Scotty who takes his military duty over there, 25 TOP SECRET NW”
“… 4 So this covered both the overt side of the House 5 Mr. Miler. The three directorates'. Intelligence, 6 operations, and S&T. 7 Mr. Angleton. And they laid out their entire thesis, 8 and we added to that to the FBI report to which I referred. 9 Afterwards I was severely criti …”
“… ar within 24 hours. They predicted the time. 4 They sent it over. It was immediately said, go back to bed. ' 5 la that correct? 6 Mr. Angleton. All I know about it is the alleged part 7 of that. I remember the Pike Report that caused a great deal of comment. I thought that the …”
“… 11 the country, r at least the CIA has lost a valuable asset. i WARD a PAUL. What happened in '73? What was the decision? : 12 Mr. Angleton. That's the decentralization, when all 76000 13 14 of these components were taken away from us, including the 15 liaison and whatnot …”
“… e have been 7 available to this country. 8 Mr. Kirbow. And it's not available today because of this 303 9 spreading of the 10 Mr. Angleton. Well, that's what they say. I mean I've 1 11 had one or more chief of intelligence who have surreptitiously 1 12 seen me since my …”
“TOP SECRET *6,0’44 Phone (Area 2023 344-6000 ON Mr. Angleton. Well, they were a hardworking group. We were understaffed. There were many things we could have to taken on and I'll give you one exa …”
“… learance. 11 Senator Hart of Colorado Could we have a Philby level in 12 penetration of our intelligence community? 6 0 0 00 & Mr. Angleton. I’m not stating that there is one, but I W ARD 13 14 have probably done more recruitment of higher level people in 15 my youth in …”
“grit vael TOP SECRET O •46 Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 . 1 Mr. Angleton. I don’t think anyone regards the lie ’ s 2 detector to be anything more than just another investigative 3 instrument. It does help in …”
“F irs t S tre e t, S.E., W ashington, O.C. 20003 19 a of everything since then. 20 1 ‘r. Angleton. There's never been any analysis ever. 21 Mr. diGenova. Is the current research set-up which CI 22 staff now has which is oriented toward …”