“… interrogated prior to Christmas 1963 resulting in the arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the net. 4. Juana Castro: als”
“he arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the net. 4. Juana Castro: als Juana Castro, younger sister of Fidel Castro, was one of the more significant CIA agent recruitments. She was a strong supporter of he …”
“… SECRET 5 SECRET operations carried out, four învolved sabotage and ten others encountered contact with Cuban forces. Thus, during 1963, the Castro Government was aware of at least 14 operations involving infiltration of Cuban coasts and harbors, and it would be logically assumed that t …”
“… OPERATIONAL PLAN • CURA 1. A. The purpose of this plan is to cutlise action te wa undertaken by the Central Intellig Agency against the Castro/ soerey *** MA st of duringand: such Longer . 935 tpozace an may be Girestessto- sor * PoTh-H"" dB. For the purpose of this plan the f …”
“… ships. huh. Economic. Political: Assist and PPOTE Seats in any feasible action to activ A2 1d ■Latin-American country supper € Yow of Castro. SELNCT . GROUP Exaluded tram automatic SENSITIVE —Soclansification downgradi ng and I1”
“… JA” 29915 *** 3—5 .Uv r"% orld race with Cuba ry izebelesicals ****** 75:* --*-*, loit the will of the Cobies *Be4, a Me* resist Castro/C 4 olds 2. Discredit lima in Orba, in te(941 % Great op here . st d else ahrt “t 3. Develop Eploit tensions between Cuba and S …”
“… f attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrills, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a.matter of policy. D, The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the ca …”
“to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened. .E. The U …”
“… s to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime. ,.l”. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CU for a maxinun effort a …”
“… ar to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba: A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World. ve. B. To the maximum extent possible, d …”
“the Castro- communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world. -4-”
“to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. 2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro . concepts, leaders, and political groups. 3, Stimulate, support and …”
“… ed extensive, favorable TV coverage of the Communist-dominated Ligas Campesinas in Northeast Brazil and that one of the most important anti-Castro operations, AMTRUNK, in which he was involved from the beginning, was disastrous for all participants. More indicative of his true beliefs, …”
“… an antidote to the excessively favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but in fact his article was largely favorable to Fidel CASTRO and to CASTRO's plans for Cuba. It is only in comparison that with MATTHEWS blatantly pro-CASTRO articles 7 SZULC's piece/can be considere …”
“… is contacts with the exile community and throughout Washington, one of the most knowledgeable people in the area of Cuban affairs, anti- CASTRO activities, and U.S. Government policy. (See CI study on Jorge VOLSKY for more information on this period.) 1. The Agency officer, Alfons …”
“… esents a picture of unreliability. It is probable that RABEL’s rootlessness and apparent unreliability applied both to his relations with CASTRO and to those with the Agency. It is quite possible, therefore, that he not only served the Agency in a”
“superficial way but that he did the same for CASTRO at various times when it suited his purposes. Without postulating this sort of dual role (one which fits very well with his previous life …”
“meTAvWA*Fist SECRET that he was a CASTRO agent from the beginning. The question that must remain unanswered is whether he betrayed the AMTRUNK Operation. He was not arrested unti …”
“… n. He smuggled weapons to Camilo Cienfuegos for. about a year and then in October 1958 he joined the Cienfuegos group. Shortly after the CASTRO victory, CASTRO called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until February 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief …”
“… as children. In addition, RABEL’s long involvement in the anti-BATISTA movement and with Camilo Cienfuegos were probably in his favor in CASTRO's view.) C. An obligation to protect the non-Communists in his department, which prevented his earlier defection, and uncertainty of his …”
“SECRET country, he could well have had questions about his reception after serving in the CASTRO government.) --- d. His resentment against the confining nature of a Communist State. (Since he never stayed in one place more than a sh …”
“… nando REY reported by 02 VASLOUCH-1. As mentioned above, these charges could well J be true; yet RABEL could have fulfilled his duties for CASTRO superficially, for his own purposes, and not necessarily have compromised his work with the Agency until he was captured. The difficulties …”
“1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles, particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved. He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA. 3. About February …”
“… RENO left Miami and took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South Carolina. CONCLUSION: MORENO apparently was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary, but his dislike for and”
“… e sense of security. It is obvious that he trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he did help leak operational details and general plans to people who helped to spread the information more widely and who, th …”
“… most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro’s hands. NEW YORK TIMES C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the opera …”
“… a conspiracy among.. Pold: high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup dretat which will oust both Castro and eoeepeooegeie-e-—RHsrwswssraoronMHBBi DESENSINZE Bant <7 SPEC ye Kobi: bashu J por CSA 43-43- 4 9= 6”
“… of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro …”
“… when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista, In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activitie …”
“… 10105980-A989 0000020 Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK con 409000DR092, fidante during Castro’s takeover. (MENDEZ ’ has an apart ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under- ground activities. He has a daughter who wo …”
“… ational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime. age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject a. Jorge VALS, ages holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently o …”
“who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to XAW9200I0)in 14eX699 196 …”
“… act. Lester RODRIGUEZ, age date(610E- ey-nellav 40s, married, 30s early former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as headtofs one of the military zones within Havana province. Even …”
“… as obtained from AMLEO-3 on the AMTRUNKS: A. Jose REVELLON A-3 first heard of REVELLON when he Rolando CUBELA in A-3 did not work After the Castro the University of”
“irst heard of REVELLON when he Rolando CUBELA in A-3 did not work After the Castro the University of was a Captain in the REbel army serving with the Escambry area fighting against Batista. directly with REVELLON during th …”
“… tive of this. A-3 considers GUIN to be a good friend, a good person, a family man, and one who kept his hands clean in the aftermath of the Castro victory not participating in "war crimes" trials, persecutions, and had no contact with the G-2. GUIN served with A-3 in the hills in the g …”
“… ION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963. DATE: 01/01/1900 PAGES: 13 SUBJECTS: BAY OF PIGS CUBA PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATION CASTRO, FIDEL DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER CLASSIFICATION : SECRET RESTRICTIONS : 1B RELEASED WITH DELETIONS CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC DATE …”
“… Miami to direct opposition activities and to provide future Cuban leadership and a propaganda campaign designed to rally op- : position to Castro in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. 2. Some of the actions initiated during 1960-61 continued following the defeat of the Agency suppor …”
“… another example of an operation which continued after the Bay of Pigs. It was established in the Spring of 1960 as a component of the anti-Castro propaganda campaign. It continued in this role until its termination in 1968. 3. Following the Bay of Pigs and in response to administratio …”
“… Organizations: CIA provided monetary support and guidance to a number of Cuban exile organizations in the Miami area who disseminated anti-Castro propa- ganda. Some of these organizations came into existence through Cuban exile initiative, but they became largely dependent on CIA to c …”
“… opaganda purposes. UDCL leaders attended the IX Central American and Caribbean Games at Kingston, Jamaica in August 1962, disseminated anti-Castro propaganda and were in part responsible for the defection of ten Cuban athletes. A similar operation was launched at the II Ibero-American …”
“… n of several thousand copies to Latin American and European youth contacts. Purpose of bulletin was to furnish information on the effect of Castro-Communist policies on Cuban youth. NW 65924 Docld:32356933 Page 5 4 SECRET SECRET d. Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE);”
“… turned to hemispheric propaganda operations. DRE sponsored students were placed. in Latin American universities where they carried on anti-Castro activi- ties. This so-called student project also engaged in such activities as drumming up support for the U.S. position at the 1962 Punto …”
“… ORDC leaders were sent on trips throughout Latin America to maintain contact with hemi- sphere labor leaders and to sample attitudes toward Castro. FORDC also maintained contact with international labor organizations. f. Unidad Revolucionaria (UR):”
“… supported several prominent exiles who prepared propa- ganda materials. Zig Zag Libre was a successful satire magazine in Cuba prior to the Castro regime. The Agency supported its former editor who published an edition for mailing into Cuba. In the 1963 period it was considered an effe …”
“… interrogated prior to Christmas 1963 resulting in the arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the net. 4. Juana Castro:”
“in the arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the net. 4. Juana Castro: Juana Castro, younger sister of Fidel Castro, was one of the more significant CIA agent recruitments. She was a strong supporter of her br …”
“… 2 SECRET SECRET operations carried out, four învolved sabotage and ten others encountered contact with Cuban forces. Thus, during 1963, the Castro Government was aware of at least 14 operations involving infiltration of Cuban coasts and harbors, and it would be logically assumed that t …”
“… l was destroyed and no enemy opposition was encountered. The mill was a main producer of : railroad ties. Its loss was felt, and noted in a Castro speech, when a hurricane destroyed most of the railroad's lines in part of Cuba several weeks later.”
“… f attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrills, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy. D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for ; the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus -9 relatively intact and with …”