“1 S ,5 47 Phone (Ares 202) $04-6000 Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know what that really means, a to instant analysis. I mean we've always done instant analysis. Mr. diGenova. I know t …”
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“1 S ,5 47 Phone (Ares 202) $04-6000 Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know what that really means, a to instant analysis. I mean we've always done instant analysis. Mr. diGenova. I know t …”
“… r you move in to take him on as double 3 or whether you move in to arrest him. 4 Mr. diGenova. And that isn’t being done today. 5 Mr. Angleton. Well, they can’t do it because they don’t have 6 Mr. Rocco and they have fired most of the personnel. One of 7 the best men we had was …”
“… nt, the controlled foreign asset transfers abroad, then there is a transfer of ! 11 * PAUL J 12 coordination and vice versa. Mr. Angleton. I'd like to inject this. There is W ARD 13 / 6 0 n 0 14 concurrent jurisdiction since the double is usually an American citizen. S …”
“… ohnson. Does the CIA have veto powers over military cerv) suoues to proposed double-agents? Mr. Miler. No, not the veto power. Mr. Angleton. Well, it never really comes up to a veto. But if we took a stand against it and supplied reasoning that Ch made sense, they would go …”
“… the Agency as 5 a whole, there was a reluctance to put this information forward End Tape 4% except when and as needed. Begin 4B 7 Mr. Angleton. And there's another point that has to be 8 raised here. That is when you get into the field of deception you are bound by certain char …”
“deceptions? Mr. Angleton. It was a paper that was pulled together 21; 22 ll by the Joint Chiefs, ourselves, and the FBI. Mr. Maxwell. And it proposes what? 23 …”
“… ea 202) 544-6000 9 d Mr. Johnson. Could you give a brief example of the CIA role in strategic deception, a specific example? to Mr. Angleton. No, I can't. I mean I could get into 4 cases but it's too vague. It's always been something that 5 has been arrived at ad hoc and it s …”
“… a filter so.that the misinformation in a sense could not flow i 10 %i back into the policy circles within the United States? 1] Mr. Angleton. Well, there wouldn't be. The kind of W ARD & PAUL I 12 channels used, there wouldn't be any f that happening. This 7 6 n 0 de 13 w …”
“in counter-intelligence? 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D. C. 20003 19 Mr. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt. There may 20 : be some overt things put out that support document that was 1given to a double who would p …”
“… the basis of the information from | 6 this agent. 7 That requires a centralized screening and control of 8 double agents. 7 9 Mr. Angleton. If you sent the information through Agent N izil 10 to KGB headquarters in Moscow, part of your testing would-be to see 11 whether yo …”
“S.E.. W ashington, D .C . 20003 19 is misinformation. 20 Mr. Miler. Not necessarily. 21 Mr. Angleton. It's not quite the same. 22 Mr. Miler. It's not quite that simple because you could: do! see reflections of it perhaps in other areas …”
“proprietary companies in the United States? Mr. Angleton. Well, there's one case that comes to mind. 22 : I can't remember the details but I think that as result of it, one of our deputy direc …”
“… fact knowledge of an operating 4 proprietary company run by a foreign intelligence service 5 within the continental United States? 6 Mr. Angleton. Offhand I can't say because the Office of 7 Security would be working with the Bureau, usually. I mean to 8 say that S&T are the most li …”
“… eign intelligence services, and either that information is wrong or we just do not understand O each other. inva • Q M V M TO Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean it's.true that there have 13 been analyses done. But the one that comes to mind is the 14 one I mentioned, was the one wh …”
“… ble to penetration in terms of 7 information, more vulnerable in terms of penetration by 8 foreign counter-intelligence services? 9 Mr. Angleton. Vulnerable in what sense? 760000 1 1 1 1 10 Mr. diGenova. Getting information about us, period, 11 which I understand is one of the ke …”
“… ything dealing with Bulgaria, et cetera. And if it's 7 justified, we give them the information. 8 Mr. dicenova. Well, I don't think, Mr. Angleton, that's ’ % 39• not what I'm getting at. We as a country are amassing properly, quote, unquote, i large amounts of information a …”
“TOP SECRET d<ns*> ^^v ier "" 64 Phone (Ares 2029344-6000 1 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think, no question, it's the 2 Soviet bloc services that represent the major threat because 5 they are really a small, they are …”
“… efense effort? 7 Is that what you're speaking of now? Their goal being 8 disruption of this country's defense effort? 6000011325 9 Mr. Angleton. Well, they have many assignments. But 10 the point is they have also the sabotage-assassination part, 11 which is totally apart from the …”
“… irect covert action against the United States, such as 21 to undermine our economy, not using other countries but 22 directly? 23 Mr. Angleton. There's beon a tremendous amount of 24 information on this. I mean, for example today the second 25 head of the Chamber of Commerce in …”
“… were 16 years in this one case, part f that mechanism and 20 who read all the files. 21 Mr. Epstein. What happens to all that? 22 Mr. Angleton. Well, that's been used by directors in 23 briefings but there’s never yet been a forum where you can 24 actually have a confrontation …”
“… e does this have to the United 10 States ? 11 Senator Schweiker. 47 out of how many? W A R D a PAUL 12 Mr. Miler. About 182, 13 Mr. Angleton. Let’s go to the scientific side on this. HU 0 14 The scientific side, in May of 1969 the central committee 15 ordered that there be a …”
“contacts in the West in the scientific exchanges. 22 Mr. Epstein. The goal being espionage or something else? 23 Mr. Angleton. Espionage. 24 Mr. Miler. Espionage and influence. How many KGB 25 officers? TOP SECRET HW-3 072”
“4s TOP SECRET ise 69 Phone (Area 2030344-6000 igsh 1 Mr. Angleton. In 1961, 1000 of those had been pulled 2 together. There was a briefing given by the general staff to 3 high KGB people regarding the fi …”
“powers were involved in covert action against the election 20 process in this country? 21 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there's no question that 22 influence has been brought to bear. , 4 1 0 F irst S tr 23 Mr. Inderfurth. How? 24 Mr. E …”
“… 2 agents, I mean they had established contact at political levels 5 in this country. 4 Mr. Epstein. How about campaign financing? 5 Mr. Angleton. I don't think it figures unless it would 6 be the CP. 7 But just to add one last point to this question of the 8 threat, it is my view, …”
“… But 6 the machinery here is not of such nature that you can get 7 into these matters. 8 Mr. Epstein. Are they disseminated? 1££ 9 Mr. Angleton. We’re not going to disseminate. These v 10 are matters that should go to the Secretary of State. They 11 shouldn't he going up, throug …”
“Secret documents -- 21 Mr. Angleton. We don't have the document. I'm stating 22 he read those documents in Moscow. 23 Mr. Epstein. But the report that he read, was that …”
“… ou have just 8 picked up is a double agent or not. 9 I listened to the man who has done this all his adult 10 life at the Agency, Mr. Angleton, and he never made it clear 11 just how you ever are sure that you have a bona fide. t 12 And then his follow-on said basically the sam …”
“differences of opinion as to the 2] bona fides of a defector could be discussed and potentially : 22 reconciled. 23 Mr. Angleton testified and spoke at length in other ■ 24 forums with us about the fact that when — that at present there 25 really is no way that th …”
“… in a jail some place is probably not a 9 useful way, to proceed, and in fact, this is the kind of 10 recommendation that comes from Mr. Angleton and seems to be 11 supported by other people, even his successor at the Agenca. 12 Mr. Kirbow. Do we have any place in our findings tha …”
“Book V, p. 25 Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cable …”
“… h 1974 par.B Notes Contact w, L. Houston re mahen/ Giancana Houston said ine only Agency officials "aware 7 details were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Roccal and hunself. Lyle Miller MFR 10 Oct 13 re meeting w, Scott Armst. ne hi interview y 3 10/3/73 + interest in Ram Assoc. WI CIA …”
“… dering assassination. (61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/ Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED] (62) April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..;." [DESTRO …”
“… ly Hart Additionally,. Hartman researched DeMohrenschildt’s relationship to the Oswalds. Rocca reported his research staff's findings to Angleton; Rocca " * had no contact with Helms.Rocca”
“pages). Letter to Dulles from Sherman Hoar (three pages). Annex to Nov. 29, 1963 Diary. (one page). Memorandum for Mr. James Angleton, Subject: Letter from Mr. Jose Colon, from AWD, Dec. 6, 1963 (one page). Memoranda for Lee Rankin, from Allen W. Dulles January 30, 1964 (4 …”
“… on list Letter to Dulles from Sherman Hoar (three pages). On list Annex to Nov 29, 1963 Diary. (one page). on list Memorandum for Mr. James Angleton, Subject: Letter from Mr. Jose Colon, from AWD, Dec. 6, 1963 (one page). or list Memoranda for Lee Rankin, from Allen W. Dulles January 30, …”
“… th us to he lp on the tr ans i- tion of the whole counter intelligence program. Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that case were t hat I had had some professional differences in the organizati”
“man, and the facts of that case were t hat I had had some professional differences in the organizati on with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher de …”
“… en unfortunate ly th e S eymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make tw o basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account fr om his cont rol and I was going to pu …”
“… th us to help on the transi- tion of the whole counter intelligence pro gr am. Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That w as the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that case we re that I had had some professional differenc es i n the organization with Mr. Angleton a …”
“I had had some professional differenc es i n the organization with Mr. Angleton as t o the way th e counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher …”
“… 3 14 over many months and on several occasions. really agr ee to it because he insisted on the importance of retaining it where it was. Mr. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israeili who were involved in it. I believed t …”
“published, and so I brou gh t Mr. Angleton up and said that I was goin g to make two basic de ci si ons. I was going to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to p …”
“… with us to help on the transi- tion of the whole counter intelligence program. Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman , a”
“program. Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman , a nd the facts of that case were that I had had some professional di ffe rences in the organization with Mr. Angleton …”
“… with us to help on the transi- tion of the whole counter intelligence program. Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairm an, an d t he”
“Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairm an, an d t he facts of that case were that I had had some professional differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton a …”
“… 13 14 over many months and on several occasions. really agree to it because he insisted on the importance of retaining it where it was. Mr. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israeili who were involved in it. I believed t …”
“… Then unfort unately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move th e I sraeli account from his control and I was going to put …”
“… s to h elp on the transi- tion of the whole c oun ter in tel lig enc e program. Chairman Church. Why did he retire? Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that case were that I had had some professional differences in the organization with Mr. Angle ton as …”