“… with Sidney Gottlieb in connec tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned to him either QJWIN' s activities in the Congo or Gottlieb s own trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p. ). Harvey had con- suited with Arnold Silver about the initiation of Project …”
“… cident where there is an explicit reference to assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station. ’. ’ . WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European, who was 18 a forger and former bank robber'.' and had fought with the F …”
“… UGE approach to QJWIN (Bissell,. 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would "absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against Lum …”
“-80- The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Lumumba’s departure and that action plans were prepared for that eventuality: DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE SHORTLY. STATION ' EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY [AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE..”
“-81- from UN custody and' that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba’s plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he, consulted with. Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track- ing down”
“-83- Group agreed that planning for the Congo would hot necessarily rube out "consideration” of any particular kind of ac tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (M …”
“… ry of State C. Douglas Dillon. While Lumumba was in Washing ton, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to the newly formed Govern ment of the Congo (New York Times, 7/28/60, p. ). According to Dillon, the impression that Lumumba left with the Government officials was that of an irra …”
“… at came across to me as an order for the assassina- tion of Lumumba who was then at the center of political, ■conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no dis cussion; the meeting simply moved on. I remember- my sense of that moment' quite clearly because the President’s state …”
“… he NSC meetings attended by Johnson, testimony about those meetings, and the series of events that pre ceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassina- tion. In the Summer of 1960, there were four NSC meetings where de velopments in the Congo were discussed at …”
“-95- *The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before the "quasi-coup" in the Congo the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard the President's statement. The on …”
“… as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see Section 7(a)(iv), infra). Finally, on September 26, the CIA scien tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in formed him that the Pres …”
“-96- the discussion of U.S. policy toward the Congo. In the course of his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations troops in the Congo was necessary to prevent Sovie …”
“… r starting a fight. Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State s feeling, but that the Secretary General and Mr. Lodge doubted whether, if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the UN, the UN could stay in. In response, the President stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this e …”
“… ba. But the statement does indicate extreme Presidential concern focused on Lumumba: The President was so disturbed by the situation in the Congo that he was willing to risk a fight with the Soviet Union and he felt that Lumumba was the "one man" who was responsible for this situa …”
“… y other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the President's statement-—records only a brief, general discussion of developments in the Congo (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60). As part of Allen Dulles' introductory intelligence briefing on world events, the Memorandum related his remarks o …”
“… o know' were present." (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.) ** The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal with the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5). By comparison, the August 18 meeting required an NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 345”
“… n the course of his briefing Dulles expressed his continuing concern over, the amount of personnel and equipment that was being sent to the Congo by the Soviet Union, primarily to aid Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5). Dulles concluded this part of his briefing with an observatio …”
“Lumumba at one of these meetings. First, an extraordinarily lengthy (fifteen pages) summary of discussion on the Congo and related policy problems in Africa, indicating that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60, pp. 1-15). N …”
“-102- Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security Council responsible for planning covert operations. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer who served as Secretary to the Group, began the meeting by outlining the CIA operations that had been undertaken in "mounting ”
“of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Spe …”
“-107- on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a t …”
“-108- I have examined the memorandum (which I prepared) summarizing the discussion of the Congo at the September 21, 1960 meeting of the NSC. I recall the ■ discussion and believe it is accurately and adequately summarized in the me …”
“… ld mean that" assassination- would, have been one acceptable means of "disposing of" Lumumba, although he felt that "getting him out [of the Congo] or locking him up" would have been a preferable disposition of Lumumba at that point since he was * NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, …”
“… acknowledged that during this.period Lumumba continued to be viewed by the United States as a potential threat and a volatile . force in the Congo: He had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started to talk to a battalion of the …”
“… t of his testimony on the subject, Gordon Gray acknowledged that he did not have a clear, independent recollec tion of Lumumba's role in the Congo (Gray, 7/9/75, PP - 25-26). HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 356”
“… for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,' p. 47) …”
“… the iridi- vidual. (Bundy, p. 7). * For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he had requested a CIA officer to go to the Congo to "make plans and develop the capability for an assassination attempt against Lumumba - if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55). :’ ** Bun …”
“… ver, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on whic …”
“… eived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quick ly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination. The effort'to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965. The plans to assassinate Cas …”
“… the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back- grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo. B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves 1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination We cannot condone the use of a …”
“… if we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy". A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a pa …”
“… ncerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb 'about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an i …”
“shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination.*/ . The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their official duties or status, or their political views, actions,, or statements. Thus, for example, a conspiracy”
“… TING SUMMARY rtens 'Congo Chief of Station.. 3/31/27 BC INTERVIEW WITH: REGARDING! Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo. DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 20, 1975 - 12:30-3:30 p.m. - Room 608, Carroll Arms ■ PRESENT: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron …”
“… Frederick Baron DATE : August 20, 1975 SUBJECT: Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo Staff Members Present: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron The following is a summary of the contents of an interview conduct …”
“-2 - After his return to the Congo, probably in early September, COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words, "someone I would recognize would appear to …”
“… eb told him that there was to be no connec- tion with the United States if the biological agents were to be employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the pro …”
“… s copy of ,cables on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy. COS …”
“-6- COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in the context of his (COS's) feeling: "Thank God I never had to use it. 11 COS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bisse …”
“… ers by sending cables, but never pushed it." COS said that he asked-0'Donnell to clear with him any major actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that O’Donnell, was in the Congo from September until approximately Christmas. LUMUMBA's ESCAPE COS said that Lumumba's …”
“… ps to points that he would have to pass on this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the Congolese." COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect that Lumumba might start an uprising against 'white devils.’ But / HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 10 5”
“… to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines (then Chief of Station in Rome) for a briefing session on events in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. COS remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's escape and of the situ …”
“came to the Congo before Lumumba’s death. COS thought that he must have come later. COS said, however, that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would h …”
“-10- COS did not recall agent QJWIN. He did recall that O’Donnell may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him. He said, however, that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the Congo in the fall of 1960, he must have known of QJ …”
“… a was ___ chopathic, not in a well-balanced mental state. 'After his it we wondered whether there was any way.of changing the scenery the Congo." Dillon' said the subject was raised in the general -ext of "eliminating Lumumba", but the”
“3 Mobutu appeared to be the effective power . in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not dis posed of. However, I do not …”
“… rom the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination: Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave”
“… ive Secretary’ of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and …”
“… ve Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the.. United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and no …”
“Statementsby James S. Lay, Jr. J To Frederick D. Baron on September 8,1975 0 the Iivas nationalthe Executive Security Secu tan Council D0 of ttuaughaut 1960. My summer address Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Vagicia is22851 1 I am unable, after all these yeais land as E”