“EYES ONLY 3- MGV 1. In this chapter Hamilton states that Barnes and others recommended that he visit Havana, and that the CIA Cover Staff provided him with the docu- iw, mentation for his operational alias of Edward J. Hamilton which he kept for * “the duration of the Proje”
“14-00000 4, 220 SECRET REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OK INVESTIGATIVE ACTION (Alwovn Daedesrev 2 cefv at thin form) PLEASE CORrLETE seen secrtos AND APPROrRlATS st.es 7 September 1968 TO: FROM: X CI/OPERATIONTAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION JP Oever CHIEF. IMEST ICAT.ON AND SUP”
“14-00000 -5- (ll) Special proupe to be contacted: thile sobjoot will be concerned principally vith the Local Communist party, it is not necessary for Mr. to have personal access to any special group. (5) Approximate annual incase to be attributed to coort 10,000 (includin”
“14-00000 % SECRET, Date REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION (Alvays handeatiy 1 .no of this for”) PlgASE COUFtETE EACH aze rton AND AFTFOFRIATE Bt.ANK TO: CI/OFERAT JONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION FRON: al Jeer - CHIEF. N7E5TICAT10N MNO 51 PORT DIVISION, OF”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET That CIA be authorized to initiate operational planning, including covert spotting and assessment of potential agents, for eventual sabotage Of both Cuban and American-owned sugar mills. Should this course of action prove feas ible and desirable, th”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet with the President's representative, then relations between the US and Cuba probably would be”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised again with the Special Group. The Agency’s repre sentatives agreed to this suggestion "with the strict- est proviso that no move from Guatemala could or should be made until adequate staging faci”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET Part IV Presidential Resurgence The previous section of this volume has examined the activities that occurred during the period from the early fall through November of 1960, with the . shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla warfare t”
“13-0000.0 TOP SECRET King’s initial memorandum contained no information about potential locations of transmitters, personnel security, inter-Agency coordination or costs. Almost immediately following the memorandum from Col. King to the Director, the subject of propaganda”
“hands of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery (Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any such report. • 283 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET 94. Memo of Meeting with the President, 17 Apr 60 from Gordon Gray. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project “Clean-Up Records of Gordon Gray et al, 1953-61," Box 7, 1960 Meetings with the President, Vol. II, 22 Aug 60. TS (no number”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET Source References Part IV Presidential Resurgence 1. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, pp. 13-14. 2. MR from Richard D. Drain, 29 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Meeting with DDP. S. 3. Memo of Conversation”
“10 AGA6A___ , 104-10302-10000 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 DD/PC.2-30-32 7/23/62 IExecutive Registry 62-5265 2$ July 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's For”
“informed him that there had, in fact, been some delay in obtaining the approval. 6. Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) and asked whether felt this committee in any way hampered or int”
“14-00000 CE Cav k. Y in a 24 May 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Special Group 5412 Meeting - 23 May 1963 98 1. After general discussion the North Viet Nam paper as presented by Colby was approved with the exception of Item b. State took the position that ”
“13-00000 24 February 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 20 February 1964 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone. 98 C The "Proposed Covert Funding of the Somali Parliamentary Elections" was approved by the”
“13-00000 2 but each time they were tabled for further consideration. In April 196 ecific proposal to launch propaganda balloons on 1 1963 was submitter the Special Group and on April 1963, the proposal disapproved higher authority 00 for Members of the Special Group from”
“19 A6660____ , 104-10306-10024 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 12 Jile 4202 - 28 January 1963 Speante MEMORANDUM FOR R2000 OBJECT: Cuba The Executive Committee met on Friday, January 25th, and approved the new policy ”
“13-00000 ■ SECRET EYES ONLY 28 February 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1—3 98 1. E Reconnaissanc”
“13-00000 LI Lo na v FYES - 3 - 4. IELINT Balloons 98 : Dr. Scoville gave the Group details of the operation in the Sea of Japan, employing balloons against TALL KING radars. He said ;that the results indicate that perhaps these radars are not as 7 efficient as we had th”
“13-00000 15 August 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 15 August 1963 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone. Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 1, 2 and 5.C. Dr. Whelan, Colonel Ledf”
“13-00000 Ten VP -2- Operation No. 31110: A sea rendezvous with Cuban fishermen for the purpose of establishing a ratline into Cuba. Operation No. 31112: An exfiltration operation to be . accomplished by members of the DRE using MRR-owned vessels. 3. Cuba - CIA Reques”
“asked if McNamara meant NW 66000 Docld:32281892 Page 2 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page of (1)(c) the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He”
“the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group. : Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, a”
“dwin suspected that NW 66000 Docld:32281923 Page 3 5 FILE: INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 3 of 6 the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. H”
“TOP SECRET 2 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 1 The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. 2 I would like to ask Mr. Schwarz if he would give us a 3 brief synopsis of what we intend to question our witness 4 about this morning. 5 Mr. Schwarz. The witness this ”
“SECRET 11 : Phone (A rea 202) 5 4 4 6 0 0 0 -part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided; he did a number of things. 5i Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of 5 Fidel Castro was”
“t TOP SECRET 20 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 that the question of assassination occurred. And, Mr. Rusk 2 said, did you think anyone would bring that up at a town meeting? And by that I gather he meant that these meetings 4 had large attendance from all different groups an”
“TOP SECRET ■22 1 actions were discussed in the Special Group. And as your Committee pursues its studies of covert action it will find I; that that group is the nodal point for policy decisions, good। ; : or bad, well or badly handled. And that was quite a small 5: group”
“upward from the Agency or the Defense Intelligence 23 Services, which would come to the Special Group. 24 And the other was when the President had an interest-- 25 and I did have an interest from time to time in these TOP SECRET NW 50955 Docld:”
“s TOP SECRET e ta * 10,5 36 Phone (A/u 202) 544-6000 1 Mr. Bundy. I would certainly be clear on that, Mr. () 2 Chairman, I thought you were asking whether there, was a 3 further requirement that it go from the Special Group 4 Augmented to the Special Group., And I h”
“TOP SECRET 12 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 Mr. Baron. Where was this? What was the forum in which 2 the presentation was made. 5 Mr. Halley. This was a meeting with President Kennedy and 4 other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particula: 5 meeting. 6 Mr”
“hie t ft. w 0 9 Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 TOP SECRET 14 1 attended by me in which Mr. McCone was talking to individuals 2 like Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who was a member of that 5 group. 4 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone 5 by any p”
“20 done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed 21 upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, the three-man 22 group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things 23 and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is, 24 the Special Grou”
“‘s 1 li 17 8 ■7 TOP SECRET .9 3 26 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 the control of money and so forth was vested in the Task Force Commander, Mr. Harvey. CI Therefore, I never dealt with this three-man group as a body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various ”
“12 sous ovs tror onryt voting 1 Mr. Schwars. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin, 2 this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject 3 Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President. 4 Would you read into the record the second paragraph? & ”
“SECRET ; 13 46-scas Mr. Goodwin. The delivery of the arms was not made prior 79 1 s22 0 2 to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to n o A e(re 3 January 20th. a Pv 4 Senator Schwaiker. Was when, again? Was what date? 5 Mr. Goodwin. The auth”
“straight-forward action", was he referring to assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was . objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P) 2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960, that "he hoped that agency peop”
“King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI. Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961. PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS President Eisenhower Gray was the President's liaison to the intelligence community and the National Security Council (including the Specia”
“meetings. Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance, by deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the. Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas. Gray said th”
“-5- TRUJILLO "I am sure there was no discussion with EISENHOWER about the assassination of TRUJILLO." "I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group. The DCI should have taken a suggested cours”
“p (Augmented) and "Operation Mongoose." Control over covert operations conducted by the CIA during : the period 1959 to 1965 was exercised by the Special Group, a subcommittee of the National Security Council composed of the Presi- dent's Assistant for National Security Affairs, ”
“e chief criterion for submission of programs and activities to the Special Group. Also, the Director NW 66000 Docld:32423491 Page 4 2 of Central Intelligence would submit programs or activities to the Special Group if unusually large sums of money were involved, de- fined as $25,”
“… 1963, but also, and equally important, we did not keep adequate records of just what projects (and in what detail) were discussed with the Special Group.2/”
“adequate records of just what projects (and in what detail) were discussed with the Special Group.2/ 1/Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, Subject: "Policy Coordination 2/Ibid. of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967 NW 6600 …”
“action programs. CIA clandestine and covert action annexes to U.S. Country Internal Defense Plans.3/ The 1963 instruction also dealt with cases requiring resub- mission to the Special Group. This was required where there was a need for a new policy determination or to reaffirm th”
“nting the Operational Plan Approved at the Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 16 March 1962 1. Action: This memorandum contains the conclusions reached as a result of the reassessment of the MONGOOSE operational plan, conducted pursuant to your oral instructions to Mr. H”
“ng the objectives of any proposed activity, whether or not it wo uld accomplish these aims, its l ik elihood of success and in general whether or not it would be "proper" and in the American interest. In addition, the Special Group had the responsibility for framing covert operat”
“… 1963, but also, and equally important, we did not keep adequate records of just what projects (and in what detail) were discussed with the Special Group.2/ 1/Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, Subject: "Policy Coordination 2/Ibid. of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967 NW 6600 …”
“action programs involving direct or indirect action to influence or support political parties, group s, or specific polit ic al leaders, including operations which us e labor, youth, students, and influential military organizations as political pressure groups. Economic action pr”