“supports their efforts. (NSA 3/0/Z-CLD/T104-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 98 -11- TOP SECRET DINAR 10/PV”
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“supports their efforts. (NSA 3/0/Z-CLD/T104-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 98 -11- TOP SECRET DINAR 10/PV”
“is taken to avoid exposing the U.S. support; and that he considered that the collateral, independent groups were not safeguarding it; so wa are losing the now as you (U.S. Agencies) deal with each of these groups. Are we must not lose, we must win. oran-T Stead i”
“INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW. % . ". 3. ' CONTINUE TO INFOF’S DISSIDENT ELSEKTS OF r.. . SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. IN CASE OF OVZE1H20.! OF IRUJ1LLO--WXE1M R OR NOT IlliTIATID EI PRO- U.S. GROUP—THE PRC-.S. CFCIIP SHOULD TROM.TLY .Ah VA JFFOT.T 10 CONSTITUTE 1 ITSELF AS REASONABL”
“extremely patient with ACSI until such time- as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Haj. Watlington”
“must remain anoeyasis for fear of reprisals on their families at how from those this country who wish work voluntarily for the caui freedom abroad, from toe Aariean people at large, and overnsent agencies >, in the American tradition. ve all possible .a private citizens enga”
“from that area. He noted that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board and read to the Board the me”
“connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a. contrived one - to backstop the operations. 2 PTO (13 SETA CLCA 71 PROPERTY 0 THE WHITE HOUSE U . HW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 20-”
“country as evidenced by the regime’s own admissions and the reports of refugees. NW 50955 DocId: 32276192 Page 29 SECRET b.”
“problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity. "Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He said that CIA cou”
“stated that his analysis of the meeting was that the President would continue to approve smaller FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help”
“key country there must be a central op- erational capacity and thority e’ith direct lines to the levels of action in Washington. --------- —eyt 0-46A4%* NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 15”
“c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 3 CLASSIFtU TOP SECRET SPCNL-IANDHNG- NOEARN”
“shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that 25 June -proposed latest version, chargesincorporating by DoD.”
“nchcduled for the following weekend and they expected trouble from militant separatists, etc. In other words, they were not too loppy that we asked for support und then did not use it. 2. Looking back over various records, ve find that this situation is not entirely 10 Wa d”
“ABOUT BEING AX MAN FOR THE 5 COMMANDO BECAUSE HE HASE to ASSURANCE THAT THE GDRC WILL P *- IM TO CARRY OUT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM.*”
“clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, a”
“obtained for arms And ammunition resupply missions to the Meos. It ‘ was agreed that this was matter for consultation between the Department £ State and CLA, and need not be referred to the Group for decision. 4 1 NW 50955 DocId:32204599 Page 3”
“"Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular SOURCE: STAFF: FILE: ECRET DATE:”
“of communist takeover then decision will be made in Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FY NW 50955—Dacld:32423505 Page-95 TOP SECRET 235 T”
“-51- self-preservation type of an impulse,on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this. Then let’s make the military establish- ment serve the country in a much bigger way than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It’s usually the organization that”
“-51- self-preservation type of an impulse on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this.. Then let’s make the military establish ment serve the country in a much bigger way . than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It's usually the organization ”
“14-00000 the Department in the hope of getting a better deal directly with us. This in the more my Depression since if the British "swcotness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit — then the State Department hed Letter bo got into lire ”
“on the changes for an internally inspired revolt become increasingly more remote. Barring a major political schism in which major elements of the security forces are split, there is little promise of an internally sparked revolt of suf ficient magnitude to permit the U. S. t”
“no chance for success of en 5 4 armed movement. “It was agreed that even though the Committee 4 3. 3 2 2 1 1 Lrnge 1 triveis s.e wi-sot. teonvelns ord SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM - tele-t-ci-at STATE -QtA JAAMY NAVY INA AID OCA FBI #3 CINCSO #- USIA I*We (Niote. Fold du”
“as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations. -6 - NW88296.Docld:32989628 Page 1803 "-”
“( ( 9 (06 1 0 A TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY -4- 10/30/63 such as removal of key personalities or relay of information. In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be eit”
“the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational.task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular ”
“been sent <.. to all USIB- Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House. “er= ws" 2 _AMFIDEM TIAL”
“weeks (and again we might not, depending on who answers the ques- tion over there). But the SAC can not freeze the situation for three weeks. Second, the SAC needs a positive answer-a "do this" and "don't do that" answer, specific, to the point, and susceptible of being translate”
“According to a military informant most of the armament has not been delivered, but is expected in the country before the end of the year. • end - 19 44 52. 1 1 a •0*1 U YES C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L $ YES The denomination of this document is limited to civilian emplo”
“because of the fact that I had 23 overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and 24 economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it was 25 HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 59 TOP SECRET”
“A-1 AS THEY HAVE IN PAST. -LNAGON COMMENTED IT WAS THEIR UNDER STANDING THAT WHEN TWO : C MORE U.S. COVERNMENT ACENCIES.HAVE AN INTEREST IN THEY - SAME IND IV IDUAL THAT FRROWNS RULE IN THE MAR COTICS SOURCE RECISTSY WAS MERELY TO ADVISE THE INTERESTED PARTIE S CF THE - C5”
“URAN that no info from her is published or leaked, that all info from her is cabled to Washington im mediately through COS and that her arrest and her statements is not spread”
“country except in coordination with the local government. Therefore., even though you assure us that General SOMOZA knows and approves this activity, we would have to have a direct re- quest from him before we could cooperate with you in any kind of an official capacity." Thi”
“evidenced by the regime’s own admissions and .. * the reports of refugese. NW 50955 DocId: 32424708 Page 16 SECRET b. ls”
“States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We mus”
“rale and capabilities; the extent of internal support for and discontent with the regime, etc., etc. 4. I also spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities which the Ray organisation planned to engage in and the assets and capabilities which they have or can acquire to”
“AND THE SUBSTaNCE OF THE DAY’S DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THE SE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY. THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN SECRET (”
“Let's go back on the record. 22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, t me Senator, /’ Paragraph A -- I am no' ure whether his interpretation of 24 i instructions, r at least in specifics, seems to be clear. 2s ! lle says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms ”
“rale and capabilities; the extent of internal support for and discontent with the regime, etc., etc. 4. I also spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities which the Ray organization planned to engage in and the assets and capabilities which they have or can acquire to”
“rage of a diplomatic establishmen t. NW 65994 Docld:32989561 Page 6 CO.TEGIAL Ty : ( CONFIDENTIAL Th e Attorney General 1 1.”
“or whether the internal security forces* itch are *.1 very fragmented among the mi 1 it ry and the states and what have you p. whether these interna 1 socuri by forces all re lice are just on tlic Ur nvvn life may ve . /y:;1 1 iL t’i ?H t -I? TOP SECRET v. trt: " P 1/”
“13-00000 CONCLUSION Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it appears that the U. S. should immediately undertake to implement this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change th”
“notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular SOURCE: STAFF: FILE: E1,Ne 7i DATE:”
“citizens under the conditions referred to. Personally, I feel this obligation is a broader one which ex tends to this Government ss well. Last Thursday when we were discussing this question in New York, Joe Grew was much interested and said he would be glad to assist In an”
“FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE V.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION has OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON S. EC R E T”
“3, LIAISONS WI TH DIM AND DISIP CONTINUE AS BEF ORE- IF ANYTHING, ODDLY WE ARE GETTING A LITtLE MORE OUT OF THESE Associations Than BEFORE The FLAP. AMBASSADOR’S INSTRUCTIONS ON LIAISON before He LEFT ON CONSULTATION Visit WERE "BUSINESS AS US HAL SU-AU AL AND LET THEM MA”
“1 NY 185-229 / There follows the results of the interviews conducted with the UN Security Force: % / I” « a / # -12- io. NW 88296 Docld:32989574 Page 77. ! • 1”
“millions of American citizens who support it, , RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United . States and in American Institutions". - 10 -”
“association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence gathering. SOURCE: Dawson”