“I cfciL of 1.11 inter/killerd : 0.11 - iff ive and vift teai r-ion and with- % *....... t. 3. ceil rerations: ter/diller T’cams will operate .in tive order areas and villaer complexes in order to operate directly nitlin the population against and within ■ which _ .anist”
“of appropriate U.S. combat olomento and/or logiotical support, the wido variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; ■ o ■ *0 SECRET 2 HY 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 31”
“1 9:0441 ESC 6 Tis-st er n.rl umist terrorist ilva:: 0 lan. cutralizatiou of Cortaunist Terrorist Threat in anailan: iSKfflK The scope of this program encompasses a .!t:l1,, five se operation as follows: Phase 1 Planning, preparation, Cente inase II Selection per”
“1 340 / ,19 1 $ /1.0 fr*. SSNJer. 3. G 5. dectivel 6. I re rap Title 6 C. Suowe 6 6 tation and Manager ent 10 12 tent ■a 12 Nt 10-2 ‘ising" 9 *, ’_ nations 13 * :: linning, C’roniration --aflne%w*tnarsRutols in : tallation of Training Cer ,■.'r”
“mounting of a sabotage program at the earliest possible moment. Coincidentally, planning and thought should be given to the topics of cover, recruitment, training and establishment of those facilities necessary for a ‘ rapid expansion of the group if a full scale operational ”
“of Phase FItt a.ill this be three tror: tt-llin, tore PC: 1 : ant , Sniper 8 rating: i) cuni st terrorise t.4 rto of Phase III (and of a contas) and follow- - in, rrcomendaticn: or the MBDC T&E Cratt, the Supreme Coaw and will save tro options. • .(a) Organize the tuire”
“4t SECRET G/ -5- wer effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, indicating no difficulty in placing the photoe in leading newspspers. 28. Establish Network of OSIS Sub-posts. The GVN has agreed to the establishment of virtually any number of USIS sub-posts t”
“Coordination, communications channels and liaison requirements will be established. In this regard, Ji = it is antici pated ' th at a period of from two to three wee ks will S 1 - be required for this initial planning and the establishment of basic and detailed joint oper”
“weeks from mid-November into January — the number of troops that should be or could be trained, the facilities that would be available for training sites (possibly in third countries or in the United - 202 - TOP SECRET”
“The expansion of operations where feasible. Bob Amory should be asked to designate one of his best men to centralize the intelligence collection and evaluation. The Defense Department should designate the section chief for underground and guerilla activities. MSCK0 EYES ON”
“that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE: * For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section infra; on the ’’Executive Action Capability.” NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 71”
“effort, with the consequence that the coverage of military matters was wide-spread and continuous. Despite the fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W (much of it from totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience), such was the detail and volume”
“U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies 1 that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; OR SECRET 2 NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 46”
“of the Firs ' Platoon. The second Platoon deploys in the 18th week and conducts Phase III operations as described in Paragraph D above.-- Commencing with the 14th week, the Third Provisional RTG SO H/K Pltn. is organized commencing training the 18th week, and Phase III opera”
“demolition, and inzivi ) uinment ,re Cez.l - II - icnt aining. I "elect ion of Pers el The JSOPC will, durin; the 4th and 5th week select 1 total of 80 ‘i-,‘1/ qualified and Motivated personnel. Students ncecuted into the sniper program will 4. selected from • volunteer”
“units ins.hai land this regard, the Sni n. Team should be — drawn if it .ill: le from the ten previ aly trained sniper persons) .’I esently on duty it the slack lanther Division in . 1 ietneo. ■ personnel were trained in tlse: U. 3th Division Sniper rninin. Frocra# in the ”
“choser tart Hal :or red ian! tt in 4 t. ■.• thflan : 1. vit : giz from wake 105 to 2o,cholojical eration 6 C-N41 funter/Filler operations in conjunction with xh znd bl’p units, or with MrG Mobile Training Units must include Provision for comprehensive psychological o”
“Id Ue enjc n =P rohi hi te d from itste any .<4 at tracti t. whatsoever. ;_ •urili entitional palitse , (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, * dtl, 3nd "t i " personnel voted follow closely so i/ic activities en conduct with their :5nr counterparts. continuous evaluation of: to activit”
“13-00000 f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee. E. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miami to brief trainer on his assignment. h. Quarter trainer in training site. 1. Advise FRD representative to purc”
“tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated. SOURCE: STAFF: Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960 Bob Kelley FILE: DATE: June 29, 1975”
“- DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WCH WILL EFFECTIVELY DIS- . ASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES—PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY AND EFFECT COVER -RETAINS O”
“Phase IV - Lva 1 uat ion The NCTTT Program will be subject to close and contin- uing evaluation Ly a MRDC Test and. Evaluation Team organized 1 and fielded by the JSOPG. Comprehensive records and test data will be gathered and analyzed in order to amend operational con- cen”
“services activities. 2. Operational Tasks: a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.”
“or operate on the perimeters of insurgent. base area systems. 2 Insurgent combat units in avoiding prolonged ;combat may use escape routes that will subject them ideally to ambush by Hunter/Killer Teams. In this, the classic principals of "the hammer and anvil operation" wil”
“4-00000 Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------”
“17 %, SECRET -2- shipment had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence and again urged that more such snitments should be stepped ve in the future. Rogers then briefly discussed the SINNP.a operation and asked NAUNG-1 if he didn’t think this area for ”
“drafts. Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting: —Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, 7 ), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. Mr. Hurwitch: ”
“the out standingly successful U. S, 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of he Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla o”
“Orqani zation and nagemente - (See Figure 2) ecause of the importance wh ich STORICS, Inc. Lt 5 to •ropostod progrue, tie ill keep close top manage- 1 rent cognizance of this project. The responsible officer (Pr. er w11) is e Director and Vice President of SIONICS and will”
“meetings are always hold at nights. All movement in : and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Acenta is done" in ears ostensiblyoined by the base agents, except in the case of. LIV CEY, where the agents are too old to drive. One of the local 1- amenta is usually u”
“keptcurrent, especial, in view of the & 0 tober deadline. State and Defense announced that they had now set: the counter insurgency doctrine papers to everyone in the field. Ine - +*■ suggestion that it was time for a progress report i ■ he South Vielma’n intelligence capabil”
“political action activities; intell, collection; military training of officers and enlisted men via current DOD program; counter-insurgency training; waVL”
“each of you for the Tuesday meeting: Mr. Harvey: Intelli V’olitical (splitting the regime, , I honomic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilita Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the Mr. Hurwitch: Steterd Objectives, Political, and Economic. Als”
“with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDJAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDJAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the 0001169 9”
“OPERAT ION OF THESE FAC IL IT IES. . D. PROVIDING-DESIGN ENGINEERING Preus FOR AN EMERGENCY COMMUNE- CAT TONS SYSTEM, AS WELL AS THE PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION, A.N5 CHECK-OUT OF THE SYSTEMS E. FOR WISHING PRE-FABRICATED MODUL A? STR UCTURES TO BE USED AS INTERIM”
“Political Warfare .... . 21. Economic Warfare ..... 22. Sabotage....................... .... 23. Counter-sabotage................. '24. Resistance Force Activities 25. Guerrilla Warfare .......... 26. Evasion & Escape • • 27. Weapons ............. 28. Demolitions.........”
“14-00000 9, • SECRET PAGE, THREE 16 January 1000-1200 Mission Briefings - A Management Control REUTEMAN DECONBAIDD 7400-1800 Commando Raids 1900-2300 Analysis of an Infiltration (Operation ZAMKA, None-ni. Case History) 17 January ,1000-1200 Management of Maritime Ass”
“and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high- level reconnaissance of denied areas. Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means 3. Proposed "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK 98 Mr. Jorgensen ”
“understanding can be clearly made that this is in : fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big ‘input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters 2 to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in .the given concrete conditions”
“933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, •5 FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED To MEET SECRET at”
“cleared with. . appropriate civilian end military officials, with whom high level liaison is maintained in the field. . 4. A major criterion of OPC activities is that they not be directly attributable to the U.S. government. Hence they fall into tyo classes: a. Those conduc”
“eng Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested. 5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make man”
“forgiven that we have , not yet provided full case loads to ten active NOC officers, most of whom arrived at about the same time a year and a half ago. We are trying hard to produce new sources, while at the same time reducing the excessive number of NOC officers.. If "lack o”
“)4-00000 % NCTTT MAPGENE scAr ACT DAWEE iDIN. TEDCATY 1 & EMLSFERUIG VAXM\NO. • "RASA” ! Jon SPTGLA: OPERATIONS mods ftoil LIAISON AS Rip WITH: PLANNING GROUP RT ARMY SIONICS SCAF - MliTui" ~OTHERS RT AIR FORCE fir. :1. Werbell (To be 1 (Th be As Req:! st RT ”
“13-00000 / AKNSX B It is the judgement of the Coordinator that this annex covering intelligence and covert actions should be submitted separately after the Executive Committee reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological program and the attributable activities set fo”
“OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP Potential. 9, SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET* HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER SECRET”
“projects of increasing complexity and importance will be assigned to those wishing to specialize in this work. SECURITY It is obvious what a great advantage a a can gain over our enemies by proper information about their plans and activities. It is equally true that much of ”
“14-00000 1 tral American nverneento-e) t. 1 12c:2 Livit J .120 not 1 .: I27 ICU- ll r IT be assisted o? a 1411 ananer 9OU erts chosen from tin wide cognizant nowledge of counterinsurgency experts throughout the fires ould ve assisted when necessary by ajor deneral Haro”
“'individual operations. 21 For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would 22 review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and " might 23 say we think that the Station has overextended itself this 24 month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the 2”
“14-00 SECRET -2- 5. Your staff must be organized to permit close contact with team members so as to assure control over them and at the same time provide full security for the existence of your organi- zation. It must also provide security for the planning of all activit”