“discussed and it was agreed that in view of the fact that preparations would take at least three months, these preparations should proceed and the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have been perfected.”
“no chance for success of en 5 4 armed movement. “It was agreed that even though the Committee 4 3. 3 2 2 1 1 Lrnge 1 triveis s.e wi-sot. teonvelns ord SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM - tele-t-ci-at STATE -QtA JAAMY NAVY INA AID OCA FBI #3 CINCSO #- USIA I*We (Niote. Fold du”
“only fair to warn that there might be a resumption of Moscow negotiations at a later date perhaps August — and that these resumed nego- tiations might in turn call for postponements. (Mr. Bundy did not call and the operations have been postponed until approximately the 15th ”
“Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. Thus suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same time as taking positive stand rat”
“additional actions - 5 7. Plans for Immediate Future L ----------- - 98 , Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time : that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, Lafamet <”
“the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational.task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular ”
“background and have morepolicy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required mac Vitkolnf-s*NFhwa-norhamkwixshAims..rasdlksvehansulhArse e m r 8 *-233”
“should not reach any agreement in regards to the exchange with the Diplomats. i-memenr--- :...... * ----- - .............. ...”
“GALEE. 4. RE 2B SAID HE AND GREEK GOVT WELL AWARE PPOBLEM AND OPPOSED TO THIS SHIPPING. EXPLAINED CONTINUATION DUE GPEEK SHIP OWNERS SECRET *3 S”
“background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required. 8 - - f.. * a s^d &”
“disorders. There is no proof that APRA has been involved in anything but legititmate strike activity. Suspension of constitutional guarantees would enable the junta to strike at APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled elections next June. (SECRET) SOURCE” EMB L”
“resoonsibiliti 21. . 28 which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented Part of our problem with this decision is, as hn: been 13 I stated and noted non ryf !•)■-» rrntimgt: of former lTr ie against the background of tiro pre: ent situation. ‘le rest of”
“Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable. JEC Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Acting Director SFONET EYES LIY”
“nchcduled for the following weekend and they expected trouble from militant separatists, etc. In other words, they were not too loppy that we asked for support und then did not use it. 2. Looking back over various records, ve find that this situation is not entirely 10 Wa d”
“c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. 3 CLASSIFtU TOP SECRET SPCNL-IANDHNG- NOEARN”
“with the delegation. --..***. TOP SECRET”
“A-1 AS THEY HAVE IN PAST. -LNAGON COMMENTED IT WAS THEIR UNDER STANDING THAT WHEN TWO : C MORE U.S. COVERNMENT ACENCIES.HAVE AN INTEREST IN THEY - SAME IND IV IDUAL THAT FRROWNS RULE IN THE MAR COTICS SOURCE RECISTSY WAS MERELY TO ADVISE THE INTERESTED PARTIE S CF THE - C5”
“tantive sugges- tions (these are noted in ink). CIA and USIA have concurred. State, however, has obj ected on the grounds that certain actions have been t aken with respect to the Alerting System without suffi cient a uthority.. Another meeting of th e Subcomm”
“composition, it appears unlikely that the League as presently composed would be useful operationally. JOHN H. RICHA RUSOM Chief, SE ce: C/PP C/IO/PP IO/PP (Mr. Durkee) General Counsel”
“FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE V.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION has OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON S. EC R E T”
“background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required. 8 sect...”
“NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAXING PLACE - BETWEEP LIRING AAD FOREIGN MINISTRY. Set *a”
“handed to the designated representatives for their en lightenment. I think you will agree with me that the paper is poorly drafted and needs considerable pointing up in various - 59 - TOP SECRET”
“ABOUT BEING AX MAN FOR THE 5 COMMANDO BECAUSE HE HASE to ASSURANCE THAT THE GDRC WILL P *- IM TO CARRY OUT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM.*”
“clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, a”
“/ PAGE TWO « SE 100-NEW DRAWAL OF ALL U. S. MILITARY FORCES FROM INDO CHINA. THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE NATURE OF THE SPONSORING ■ COMMITTEE OTHER THAN TO STATE THAT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE A GROUP OF WOMEN ORIENTED TOWARD ANARCHISTIC BELIEFS WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC AFFILIA”
“MERCHANT MARINE IN SAME STATE DUE G-2 HARASSMENT OF CREWS AND POOR CONDITION OF SHIPS. THESE. (AND OTHER POINTS INCLUDING PARA 2 REED INCLUDED IN PREPARED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING (7. € STATEMENT WHICH HANDED PRESS REPS. CONFERENCE OFFICERS MET IN PRIVATE WITH VOA REP TO TAPE”
“obtained for arms And ammunition resupply missions to the Meos. It ‘ was agreed that this was matter for consultation between the Department £ State and CLA, and need not be referred to the Group for decision. 4 1 NW 50955 DocId:32204599 Page 3”
“further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required. 8 1”
“been sent <.. to all USIB- Ad Hoc members, the NSC and the White House. “er= ws" 2 _AMFIDEM TIAL”
“mentions the lack of an agreement between the Agency and the French barring unilateral operations in France (Item 4 below) is potentially an additionally damaging, blow to liaison relationships. (Page 100, lines 10-14.) „0 CONFIDENTIAL CIl (5/mc)”
“of communist takeover then decision will be made in Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FY NW 50955—Dacld:32423505 Page-95 TOP SECRET 235 T”
“understand. 1 If there is anything new I'll phone you promptly. (Only other pertinent portions conc ern fac t t hat Amb BAZAROV held a conferenc e wit h appare nt ly mo st membe rs of his staff at 1 730 hrs 22 Nov. ) MEXI 70”
“r cums of stability, and to retomimties of disidents to remove ikea, void romain, reover, a Cura :.: would, om for tim to cow, ס אוracterized wsנסבלס על מנ than progre, you we would have to commit ourselves to very ס ויגגעבןanoxic and other assistanco. NW 66000 Docld:32204457 Pag”
“extremely patient with ACSI until such time- as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Haj. Watlington”
“since July may be about to come unstuck. We have a report that one of the less savory members of the group, air force Colonel Freiles, will try to take over full control this weekend. We are not sure of the reliability of this report, but Freiles is known to have been making”
“INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW. % . ". 3. ' CONTINUE TO INFOF’S DISSIDENT ELSEKTS OF r.. . SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. IN CASE OF OVZE1H20.! OF IRUJ1LLO--WXE1M R OR NOT IlliTIATID EI PRO- U.S. GROUP—THE PRC-.S. CFCIIP SHOULD TROM.TLY .Ah VA JFFOT.T 10 CONSTITUTE 1 ITSELF AS REASONABL”
“ntact Report. C/ял and I felt that we did not have as yot sufficient data to make any commitmentes C instructed me to advise Ray thats (a) Either the KRF should submit a detailed plan which we would consider and on the basis of which we would then decide whether to be of assistan”
“but, at the same time, treated so as to avoid attributing to them more importance than they deserve; C. should be kept in mind as examples of other charges which may be bandied about and reported by the AMLASH group to other governmental agencies or to other governments or to new”
“this issue is settled, CIA-9 may be close to completion. Michelle”
“AND THE SUBSTaNCE OF THE DAY’S DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THE SE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY. THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN SECRET (”
“questions >s : . and e will ake break now and pick up again before the ful * l 0 * Streets wasting.. Committee and Executive Session this afternoon. Thank u try much for your patience in going through then- documents one by one. It has eer extremely helpful to us. (W”
“inevitably bring about a confronta- \ tion with the US. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 69”
“control of the government. a. Review of Political Action Projects Mr, Bandy stated that because of the special sessitivity of - programs involving covert support ta political parties and leaders in friendly countries, Egher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed T”
“instructed our officers co these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet , officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of - the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. A”
“operation for some months and should be continued to be handled in the same way. He further felt that tribal operations of this type should be done covertly. d. In regard to Annex C, Intelligence Operations, the targets 1, 2, and 3 were approved and the Committee agreed to M”
“y meet eting of Congress. V says yes, I've hemd that the one who is chief here terminated his trip a nd c am”
“papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light EYES ONLY Km”
“13-00000 hexineoilombiaidbroibneem 4 -3- 98 that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commit- ments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military strength to mount an attack on Pakistan. It was agreed that State and Defense should draft ”
“negotiated right to reproduce their documentation for use by our officers. During this demarche, similar threats were made to end the liaison relationship with their intelligence service. . SECRET ■ 3”