“uncommon. The HTLINGUAL search further identified files because they had been the subject of Freedom of Information Act queries; however, these were not HTLINGUAL files per se, but files which contained the FOIA requester queries for HTLINGUAL information. (U) ARRB staff me”
“which were T IN AND/OR, CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO . not reported through normal CIA channels. CIA Directors 0 permitted Angleton to run several intelligence projects, many of them with the Israeli Intelligence Service. He was CD given authority by CIA to handle these projects”
“Office Memo andum graupinS Font ID 64 204 • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Wo TO FROM SUBJECT: I * A. W. CIA 0 50 JAMES ANGLETON 0 KM OLUK 8 10/6/08 CA. #8871826 1 : DATE:April 30, INFORMATHON ALL 1Classified by SP484V/KEA HEREIN is O CLASSIFIED EXCEPT WH”
“which sets forth instructions concerning the handling of information transmitted to the Bureau by Angleton, 7-26-98 CIA HA.3 wen DFGL/5,0 *OP C ASCEER PY LLP AobrY 0 2. SID /KSR 5668 HER H‘LLA_2 M8 A Nrene IN THIS DOC: MIENT EXCEPT LEE 7-8-98 It is recommended that a ”
“STANDARD FORM NO.6 Office Memorandum Entan E. • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO t DATE: June 10, 1953 P/ FROM: v.V. Keug. Tolson. Ladd — __ Nichols Belmont. C V SUBJECT: 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-- INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON AB Cless --- Glavin---”
“C3 co It is suggested that it would materially assist in the 4 handling of information received from Angle ton in the future, if' So 2 the Liaison Section could work out a procedure whereby Angleton might be referred to as a Bureau informant. This would permit the Supervi”
“13-00000 ■ MAR 31 ‘97 12:05PM P.4 4., % Questions for Follow-up DO Records Briefing April 1, 1997 1. At what point did the DDP begin to keep records of destroyed records? For example, in a Cold Warrior footnote, Tom Mangold reports that as any of Angleton’s files were d”
“13-00000 MAR 31 ‘97 12:05PM P.4 Questions for Follow-up DO Records Briefing April 1, 1997 1. At what point did the DDP begin to keep records of destroyed records? For example, in a Cold Warrior footnote, Tom Mangold reports that as any of Angleton's files were destroyed, ”
“* Memo to Mr. Belmont Re: Central Intelligence Agency, Information Received from James Angleton the Bureau,_ particularly receives from the Israeli with regard to that information which he Intelligence Service. Angleton is now furnishing the Liaison Agent blank memora”
“are 475 TOP SECRET 1061 f / ■.J. Phone (Arna 202) 54-4 that you have not then identified. We know what they passed or some of the stuff which was passed. to. Senator Mathias. ; Assuming a file was set up on that lunch two years ago -- — Mr. Angleton. The file woul”
“future mail being directed to him be transmitted to % the Director = of CIA, "Attention: James Angleton, er Angleton stated that the above request was being made with the approval of Allen Director Dulles, the Director of CIA. He further indicated that he desired ,the abo”
“relimatters, t has been the practice of Israel i//S) supervisors to clear with Angleton before disseminating information from him, outside- the Bureau.6) * 70 D In taking u p such a matter with Angleton 1 last week it 4 2 was determined that he objected to attributing info”
“disseminate any information he saw fit. This policy has continued under Allen Dulles, Since the volume of information received from Angleton has increased the Liaison Agent has endeavored to encourage Angleton to establish some uniformity in the dissemination of informat io”
“Office Mem STANDARD FORM MS. 64 TO 2 MR . •ELMONT dum UNITED ECRET / DATE: GOVERNMENT March 9, 1954 N07 Tolson --------- Ladd--------- Nichols L Belmont —— • Clegg ------ Glavin_____ Harbo --------- FROM 2 V. P. 5 10/3/39 SPYELN/KFA Cast Rosen -------- T”
“him. 20 Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA? 21 Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no. 22 Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did? 23 : Mr. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did. 24 Senator Mathias. We will follow that up. 25 TOP SECRET NW ”
“OP SECRET sedre ‘ ,2 . to n 98‘ Phone (Area 2021 $44-6000 e you were employed with the Agency, Mr. Angleton? I believe that might be a fair question. Senator Tower. In your capacity as Head of Counter- , 5 6 -intelligence, dlaRst ever come to your aEtention — did you”
“several months Angleton has been very cooperative with the Bureau, He has volunteered voluminous infor mation of interest to the Bureau and he has followed Bureau leads in an effective manner. Much of the information which Angleton has furnished appears in the raw form, that”
“e2Av3%e*. 1 CIA as to the bona fides of a defector and there's no way for 2 the government to come to a decision about it. And this really makes that point and leads to the further 4 ooint that we believe there ought to be some mechanism whereby 5 some decision can be r”
“14-00000 ' -SEP.28. 1998 3:36PM A NO. 279 P. 18 ■ SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN 2 11905, was not issued until February 1976.« In the meanwhile, advice from the Hill and the lawyers supplied the E framework. And there appeared to be hundreds, perhaps thousands of files in the A”
“1 / OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION 0 5010—106 AB Bemont U Tolson, GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum CECDET JLURG 1 DeLoach Casper _ Callahan Conrad - 4 Felt ----- TO Mr. W. C. Sullivan are7-24-98 DATE- 3/17/65 AA I C. ty. ”
“46 TOP SECRET 105 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 opened on a member of Congress, and I offered myself as a guinea pig that Arbatov lunch as a starting point. t At this point my question is on purely hypothetical poInt. 1 plan to go next week with the Senate group which is ma”
“Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 in order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we've O. got to take this fellow to court now? to Mr. Angleton. That used be prevalent back in the ‘50s. To Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don't to to ”
“20003 19 the files that were available to the Counterintelligence? 20 Mr. Miller. Yes. I was impressed by the fact that one 21 interrogation yielded 20 file cabinets, and was wondering the 22 total volume. 23 Mr. Miler. What were the figures on the cases to read? 24 M”
“expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this! coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by Litry that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he ”
“■ BY e TOP SECRET • 22 ta t woetie Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 1 asset inhibit you in any way from using the asset or the Agency © 2 from utilizing it? 3 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the infor- 4 mation that we wanted to take up with him was also”
“Js TOP SECRET 43 0009-rt (zoz rerv) suoud 1 By the same token, it induced people to bring their cases in 2 to us for analysis. They came to see us many times to see 3 the defectors, the stable of defectors that we had for 4 interrogation. 5 So that alone was a tre”
“ould never 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 over many months and on several occasions. really agr ee to it because he insisted on the importance of retaining it where it was. Mr. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israe”
“loose if th ey sta yed af ter th at point. Then unfort unately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move th e I sra”
“TOP SECRET 0 5 64 Phone (A16a 2021 344-6000 ceratin about. 1 Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant 2 Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and 3 committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approxi- 4 mately 400,000 documents t”
“Counterintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence advised the FBI on 3/26/75 that he appeared beforen Agency (CIA), - the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and in response to questions— advised SSC he only had secondhand and fragmentary information • concerning (Israeli capab”
“1 ee TOP SECRET - w Phone (ArM 2021 544-6000 ‘ 60 which we could pursue abroad or something, I’m a little bit D confused by the question because it's outside — the investigation of such a thing is outside the purview of the CIA unless it is ,' abroad, unless it ”
“NNA $ : Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 OF SECRET 35 Mr. Angleton, I have heard that, but I haven’tlooked at the dossier for the last ten years. He came to our attention 5 basically in connection with the leaks in the Bay of Pigs. 4 Senator Tower. Will you go back to the Szulc-”
“there was not delivered by the 18 CIA, or anyone to his knowledge any fissionable material such 4 1 0 F ir s t S tr e e t, S .C ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 19 as plutonium or ther material." 20 Mr. Angleton. I don't follow that at all. 2J Mr. Aaron. Did you ”
“efore it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I w as g oi ng t o m ake two basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I”
“Washington, D.C. 20003 19 were 16 years in this one case, part f that mechanism and 20 who read all the files. 21 Mr. Epstein. What happens to all that? 22 Mr. Angleton. Well, that's been used by directors in 23 briefings but there’s never yet been a forum where you can”
“it a ws tee TOP SECRET i ) e202) 344-6000 . 1 Mr. Miller. What kind of volume did you put together in © 2 se your years in this activity? If this is the product of one hone(A 3 interrogation, what kind of volume did you put together to P 4 make workable capab”
“ord Library TOP SECRET O LIBRARY NW 66000 Docld:32105805 Page 11 LDA 1 2 2 e nd ea vor ed to ope n u p the Israeli account to a better relation- ship with our other Near Eastern activities. We debated this 3 We could never 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 over many months and on severa”
“understand them. 23 Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what 24 period of time? 25 Mr. Angleton. From the beginning until December, the TOP SECRET 1”
“Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 19 to handle some unknown American is a cipher expert, and therefore 20 you look among who are the code clerks. 21 Mr. diGenova. I'd like to - 22 Mr. Miller. Could I interrupt just a moment? 23 You spoke in this instance of 20 file c”
“Phone (Ares 2021 544 1 that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the • f 2 intelligence community, of a counter-intelligence nature, 3 I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in 4 high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody, to ”
“TOP SICRE N0 back of my mind was the fact that we had problems with N 1 2 the Israelis in the nuclear field. 5 Mr. Aaron. What problems were those? 4 Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive problems. And 5 I don't think that they really shed any light on things that 6 you”
“in counter-intelligence? 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D. C. 20003 19 Mr. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt. There may 20 : be some overt things put out that support document that was 1given to a double who would pass it to KGB. But if the man 22 is regarded t”
“TOP SECRET WksI 9’ c um rn tzoz OMV) suoue 1 Mr. Angleton. Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion © 2 between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others. 3 the Attorney General. 4 Mr. Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is this a typical 5 procedure for a”
“ately the Seymour Hirsh article o f D ecember 22nd came to our attention before it was actual ly pub lished, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two bas ic decisions. I w as g oi ng to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put”
“Mr. Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while you 22 maykese it as contracting officers and all that, there Was% 23 very little reduced to writing. And it is a custom of 24 intelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And / there have been very few directors to my ”
““wrweais ‘e TOP SECRET F33 ■19; 2 Phone (A rea 2021 $44-6000 PROCEEDINGS - e c o ie s © W Senator Hart of Colorado. Gentlemen, let's go ahead and 0I be sworn and get under way if you don't mind. Do you swear the testimony you're about to give will be ON the ”
“9 MW )IM TOP SECRET level that the defector in question was probably a provoca 2 O a2 e 0 C tion, and the Bureau ceased contact with that individual, and A Phone(r I would say they have not had any contact with him since 1965. Senator Hart of Colorado. Why did H”
“stayed after that point. Then unfortu na tely the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came 1.5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 25 Photocopy fr om Gerald Ford Library T OP SECRET to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton u p a nd said that I ”
“S tre e t, S .E ., W a sh in g to n , D .C . 20003 Can you break it out that way? 19 20 Mr. Angleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but the primary thing of all is the question of penetration in the 21 U.S. Government, and then in allied governments. That would be ”
“490 P SECRET 108 so 1 Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to try to rehabilitate the Agency,in particular in counterintelli- gence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating, what things in particular would you do? 4 _Mr. Angleton. My feeling is that ”