“request. CIA - IR-15 - Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes (S) The Directorate of Operations has checked Headquarters records for files referenced in HMMW 12454 20 .”
“13-00000 SECRET L September 12, 1995 WORKING PAPER Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995 Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting It was agreed that “STATIONS” would be the focus of the presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour. Marwell recommended”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Release of Information on Mexico City Teltaps 1. Protection of sources and methods and liaison equities require that references to the Mexico City Station teltap activity be excised from any documents released under the auspices of the JFK Assassi”
“13-00000 -SECRET.! SUBJECT: Release of Information on Mexico City Teltaps 1. Protection of sources and methods and liaison equities / require that references to the Mexico City Station teltap activity be excised from any documents released under the auspices of the JFK A”
“Station’s only secure surveillance asset. It is a very anall untrained unit at present, but through this project it will be developed Into a useable, valuable asset. 4. We are not passing FI/OP's comment to the field, because WH Division believes that unilateral assets should”
“14-00000 ft "I SUBJECT: Unidentified Man Seen Going into Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City in Oct 1963. Photos Taken by Mexico City Station”
“13-00000 MAY 30 ‘95 11:46AM P.3 SECRET ARRB Request for the Central Intelligence Agency, May 30, 1995 1. Please confirm the information we have for the following portions of file numbers, and provide information for those portions still in question: 19-9-8 Cuba Country ”
“RECENT MONTHS. IN APRIL 1978, THE STATION UNDERTOOK Al AUDIO OPERATION DIRECTED AT THE OFFICIAL OUT-OF-TOWN RETREAT OF A PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY IN MEXICO. SUBJECT PARTICIPATED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF A CARETAKER ■ WHO PROVIDED ACCESS TO THE TARGET INSTALLATION AND WAS SUBSEGUENTL”
“tie” sells” deus” A06SP NSW shims 600P AG25 7A 6*%to Classification: 1/p soon -Am (This form is to be used fer material extracted from CIA—controlled docume nts.) - 14 - used in the collection and distri bution of the reels and transcripts. (Ibid.) In this discussio”
“Classification: :swes, ’ee 879006 %--dwo% 1 6U6g OLUNLi (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) -52- 6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance Operations The Mexico City Station employed an operating procedure”
“14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH SECRE T/hipp 'HMMA-20393 15-69-87 Soviet Embassy (Military Attache) 15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office) 15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative) 45-61-80 Czech Embassy 45-61-81 Czech Embassy KA. B. Material Processed In N”
“13-00000 SECRET 61. We found the Registry to be a controversial matter between Headquarter and the chief of station. The newly assigned deputy chief of station, who primarily had supervisory responsibility over the chief of Registry, was making a determined effort to reduc”
“issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion arises as to the classification status of information, it could lead to complicated legal proceedings and pro”
“#:NW 65990 Date: 10-29-2021 SECRET 20 August 1978 SUBJECT: Response to IISCA Request of 25 July 1978 1. A thorough review of Agency files containing production from the LILYRIC photographic surveil- lance operation in Mexico City reveals the exis- tance of no LILYRIC logs or prod”
“13-00000 MAY 30 ‘95 11:48AM P.4 SECRET ARRB request, page 2 LISTEED-2 Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico LINEB-1 Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico LICRAVE-1 Access Agent Operating Against Soviet Target in Mexico LICUFF-1 Access A”
“Classification: ck S □ (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) -58- subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were: 14-42-37. The Amba”
“Fenway opr 14-00000 V. DISPATCH 114-19 19 .E0L1-1892 10 • *‘ *1a: e* Fi. >> Chiat, WH DNV ‘ton. NO -y-1-16 Chief, KUDLSK FROM 15*7 Chief of Station, Mexto filly i 19 July 1962 smile* ‘ Rt TO r - (OHIC W ONS Mexico Guy Station Security MASkED FOR NONG ACTION P0UB”
“14-00000 CLASSIFICATION 10 DISPATCH SECRET PRO , POSIC1 PROCESSING ACTION mirnge fom ICEUNG accou USD Chicf, Wi Division xx ; w ***** MQUIRED If O one guntitito M ROVARTIES DISM Chief, HR Division: Chief, KUDESK CAR OCE INDEXING FROM ABSTRACT Chief of Station,”
“sly designated by Mr. Gary Cornwell as being of interest to the HSCA. Mr. Edwin Lopez, of the HSCA - if, was also present, but did not have access to the Mexico City Station material. 2. Mr. Blakey was furnished the following sanitized portions of the Station history which he rea”
“14-00000 Canav oozatir vaiso WD NO DISPATCH SECRET KU BARK ONLY HNNA-14045 coellay 1257 TO maoquadiit rutpooloe" Chief, WH Division INFO 50-6-74/3 DATE FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City November 1959 ----------------- ------------------- 21------ SUN/FC: LUEMPT”
“13-00000 MAR 18 '97 06:53PM P.3 SECRET Question # 5: We have been working to identify all technical and surveillance operations in and on the Cuban and Soviet consulates and embassies in Mexico City between September 1 and December !, 1963. How can we frame a search query”
“ARE THOSE WITHIN THESE RANKS WHO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE MEXICANS SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON. STATION BELIEVES THAT ANY EXPOSURE (WHETHER OLD OR NEW) AT THIS STAGE OF THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP (A NEW REGIME IS COMING TO POWER) WOULD ”
“000 (SST CKICN PROCESSING ACTION DISPATCH SECRET MAEKID FOR INDISING ■ e e n iy ic o Chief of Station, Mexico City XX No ICIUNC EQUIRID Chief of Station, JMWAVE Jonty QuAHStO DIS* can nin-t INDEUNG FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division MICROFILM ‘WB"LIONION AchI”
“opez, of the HSCA If, was also present, but did not have access to the Mexico City Station material. 2. Mr. Blakey was furnished the following sanitized portions of the Station history which he read in my presence: a. Volume I, Chapter II (C) Station Expansion and Joint Operation”
“7AP . @mR pp or Classification: B a ova Visvhte ij (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled ■ documents.) -13- which was in a separate building from the Embassy, was located on the corner cf Francisco Marquez and Zamora.7/. The CIA surveillanc”
“previously mentioned in connection with Soviet operations, resulted from an approach six years ago 24 from President Lopes Mateos. After considerable discussions, the a , operation was approved, providing the Mexican Government would 1a- 29, 34 clude Soviet and Satellite targ”
“aying at the target suite. his mite is not coupink by Tito or bis staft during their stay in Mexico. B. Ca 8 October 1963, PARMEN vaa requested by the Station to arrange a costing with LIVUD/22 and an LCTTEE counter. The meeting took place at the LISNOOR safchouse on the evening ”
“DE CUBAN AND SOVIET EMBASSIES DO WHILE IN MEXICO? IDENTIFY ALL LOCAL CUBAN CONSULATE EMPLOYEES с. D. HSCA CONFUSED BY INABILITY TO LINK PHOTOGRAPHS OF PERSONS VISITING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES TO TELETAPS, HSCA HAS BEEN INFORMED THROUGH INTERVIEWS THAT THERE WERE FIVE TELETAPS ”
“anti-Commien should occur in Mexico. 4. DIAZ Ordas has asked ne through CAS whether I would have any objection if the information we furnished him were made public should an appropriate occasion arise in the future. He said there would be no mention of the U.S. Govt and that”
“ends clipped transcripts to the Station ready for 201 files. 4. Exploitation of LIENVOY Information. HMMW-11831 dated 6 August 1963 indicated that Headquarters was not well informed on the way the Mexico Station exploits operational leads from LIENVOY. The outside staff agent, Ar”
“-0A6600--------- . '[104-10301-100101 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SECRET with a limited number of people. We believe the direction of the station is of high caliber, but not all the station effort is carefully directed ”
“th ist intimate knowledge. We further recommended that maximum discrimination be used 1h determin ing material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the e filing be reduced. We further recomi be reduced. ded that . overtir made voluntarily when”
“14-00000 CEREX -- 1) ollowin, the daily movements of LITOK personnel; 11) providing and cen.irain; the identities or LIPRICK sta ers and their visitors (some or whom were PBPREErs); lii) verifying the relative rank and position as well as the specific intelligence servic”
“13-00000 221173 A w&wtsa 1-141 (e tc by) YOSH Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City’s station's operations 1 dee one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency? 3 : 6 Mr. Scelso. It was then. That is; the variety and - prober 9 E the National, Archives ”
“# 14-00000 CIA had seven different microphones in the Cuban Embassy, one hidden in a leg of the coffee table in the Ambassador’s office. Like most audio operations, this one produced a lot of chaff, but it also yielded bits of operational information showing connections be”
“protection case at the U. S. Embassy in Mexico. Appropriate U. S. agencies were advised of Subject's contact with the Soviet Embassy. 5. Liaison, During this reporting period there were no meetings between the Chief of Station KUBARK and LITENSOR; however, regular contact w”
“14-00000 1 tezPatw 9V8D CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH SECRET HINA-19729 Category station files receive the clips pertaining to Soviet commercial. activities, propaganda activities, Soviet contacts, etc. Very often, a single clipping may have to be copied to be sent to the fi”
“effect, the whole history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the digraph and protecting the root - specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is familiar with the decision to release almost all LI-cry”
“-UAR Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person un known) f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly precessed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open. g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central) 1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)”
“liaison operation; LA4cdwi*- = 21 had taps on 30 lines. If it was. not the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have been. Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four o”
“office Campos (travel agency) 1spare e) Uristoteles 80) UAR Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person un known) 29 f) (Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly is processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open. n24 g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Em”
“13-00000 Classification: ibd "Wane.. (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) -58- subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were: 1”
“justification for its views, cit ing the fact that the above-mentioned FBI walk-in was not shielded when led into the back garden which LICALLA overlooks. We have no evidence that Soviet interest is any threat to the operation; rather it may be assumed that they accept the s”
“Classification: 20 0 D -0 Go-me 5 Sats 0 (This form is to be used for material extracted . from CIA—-controlled documents.) • -55-' bring conversations of interest or importance to Mr. Manell’s attention.197/ Mr. Manell was also responsible for reporting the informatio”
“/63. Transcript from Cuban Embassy, 9/27/63. Transcripts from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63, 9/28/63, 10/ 1/63 and 10/3/63. Undated Draft of 1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab F, "Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)." هر : Write-up: Wallace B. Rowton meeting with LIRI”
“Through its technical coverage of the Soviet Embassy, 24 the station has been able to spot and, through subsequent action, to thwart a number of such Americans, several or whom might have done untold damage to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. 20 In this respect, ”
“/3, to James Angleton, C/CI, 12/24/63. Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 15979 11/18/60. Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61. Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMΜΑ 20054, 10/18/62. Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to ΗΜΜΑ. 22387,”
“therefore, could not provide any files. CIA - 13 - Mexico City Back-channel Communications (U) The DO provided a classified response explaining that these types of communications are usually administrative matters, e.g., they contain sensitive personnel information and th”
“14-00000 4s” 5. Seeking approval of Station Mexico City for the release of the total report seeEs violate the concept of Headquarters control of operational information. Would It not be more appropriate to ask Station's opinions only in areas of doubt in the matter of sou”
“nd Luis Jimemez de ASUA) HMM-20835, 5 March 1963 (Confersation Sacha VOLMAN) - Juan Jose AREVALO and ΗΜΜΑ-21059,8 April 1963 (Judith FERRETO Segura) HMM-7160, 9 April 1963 (Whereabouts of Juan Jose AREVALO) ΗΜΜΑ-21087, 16 April 1963 (Judith FERRETO Segura) ΗΜΜΑ-21338, 10 May 1963”