“14-00000 ^ ^^j TOP SECRET "22*9**49 .7 st ^‘'•^•■^ ’ •> The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO February 1967 TOP SECRET 1”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”
“14-00000 SECRET H. IS THERE ANY EVSAENCE 7 THE CONTACTS CF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1950 TH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE "RGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR .OR RGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFE”
“14-00000 SECRET "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies. non”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“and playing it effectively, 19 ( and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO- iSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors! as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, ”
“14-00000 .cr.r LT -11-1 intelligence information is not a significant factor in & determination of his bons sides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intellig”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MIS”
“14-00000 F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGS DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY11 IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB? I ca? 1 :Exc^J fra ctm| i 0001078 SECRET 1 si 1”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“SECRET C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964? GROUP 1 - 0001050 SECRET Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification”
“osexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear- cut contradictions in the story he has told us. 3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“14-00000 ORODET *1 SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IX NOSENKO CASE SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to .zd NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO ”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. • !I1 : 6001079 4 SECRET OLUALT 4”
“Western Intelligence, even if the . 1 - information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, "inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his 0 . having provided such i”
“zUnEAy , The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March. 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the . bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was ”
“That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB]. ♦See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it. = TOP SECRET”
“have been purposefully misleading American Intelligence for their own or KGB purposes. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, and some or all of them have participated in a KGB conspiracy to support the bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGB-controlled source. These possibilities”
“14-00000 SECRE1 the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omiss”
“14-00000 SECRET t B.---- - THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE? he ti^5? cutomatic) 0001042 SECRET declassification J”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.) 324 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“1 4-00000 rherntrispuinsy **02i (2% WK -curst CPCENIRES 1 October 1968 CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTTS IN THE CASE OF € YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO wolT FEeitswS % %”
“14-00000 OLURLI intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence inter”
“A % S % 49 ia 1 • s* CA stee* 3 1 ' tim e LUMI ■ CONTENTS L TESTIMONY OF: PAGE ' 3 YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO Resumed 2 4 : Il • 1 6 8 9 ! 10 EVX H I BI T S Marked Received 11 JFK F-2 ■ 10 JFK F-3 11 12 13 JFK F-4 18 14 JFK F-5 24 15 JFK F-6 32 16”
“(Retracted.NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret C°py _”
“the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. . The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in SECRET 00010C8 2 ? L”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”
“*% TOP-SECRET 5 605. 'wod T34xdt 6 Bo .% 2. Reports by Psychologist 8. Psychological Testing Results A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions rai”
“c. tec !.;s to KGB Residency ana AValiabirity “TO CPA’, Ornngseen. 1 . 1* d. Timing of 1962 Contact 752 £ ■ 7 e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753 f. The Recall Te legram 753 g. Remarks 753 w ib ia ii G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 756 1. Introduction 756 aet 2. C”
“1 4-00000 SECRET-- , / D. L IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA ( 'CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABBY COMMENSURATE -M L WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER? e-eu?1 0001059 SECRET . Excludes •.- - - „, ILowngre.rns - 1grclas”
“T4-00000 LV1 "LV 691. few new details of importance on the American correspondents. NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and acti ”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“14-00000 SECRET E. GAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/ OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSEN KO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 0001C65 UROUP 1 5 Excluded fro”
“s operation is NOSENKO's real identity and personal background. There are many indications, reported TOP SECRET EYES CALY NW 65990 Docld:32375412 Page 7 18 17/BR. ( 104-10210-10015 TOP SET EYES BY 6. earlier, that he has spent time in prison and that he is not in fact a KGB offic”
“1 4-00000 SECRET B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED 9. C..P■ Exziutsd w* 31m SECRET daclassifi :at‘ca 0001131”
“NOSENKO regarding approximately (875) KGB officers, 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals. 2 0001122 O Con—• ozGntl”
“1 4-00000 J^ 1 • Mi 1 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in. March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel 1 report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes, are cons”
“had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964. Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that h”
“V TOP SECRET 11 IV. NEW CASES AND NEW OR CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION 74 Information set forth above regarding the cases discussed in the CIA paper has clearly indicated that the current series of interrogations of NOSENKO in 1967 and. 1968 have been much more thorough and ha”