“in your para. a.) 4. The remedy which is being developed as a consequence of this investigation is the re-definition of the responsibilities of CEA and authorities of NCFE and the development of new procedures for the conduct of relations between NCFE and CIA. These definitio”
“IAREI 15. The structure which would mne at the crite. nggusted in this memorandum would be as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general clesronca authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment Io”
“purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on beha 1f ol any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not su”
“This training should be undertaken in safe houses by detail- of qualified instructors from covert ■ training for basic indoctrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks and specialized radio training by Commo, and this office. 5. Recommendations" Pendi”
“sion is standing by to appear for a non-operational briefing covering organization, mission, etc. FR 2. Attached hereto is a Senate Select Committee document entitled "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" which represents the Committee's own ground rules. 3. According to this attachme”
“SECRET IC 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this ■.I memorandum would e as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general .clearance authiruty over all clandestine activity. This. • right be effectuated on the British model by the ap”
“officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board. 7”
“-6- . relating to that investigation was destroyed upon its completion.* A final deficiency in the evidence stems from the 12 doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed from the world and performed in such a way that if they were discovered, the role of ”
“SECRET SENGTI/r *1 L ldetR ’Ys 5. That counterintelligence designees abroad work under the nominal command of Chiefs of Stations but that they engage in counterintelligence work full time and that they have privacy channels of communications with the Headquarters count”
“NA-HSM* F14 :83 ‘rember 27 because it has -bracketed portion that we might considerably do away with. That's page 40. v। The bracketed portion navs that the NSC would approve /7. all counter-intelligence activities of the CIA in the United *3 States and- it spells ou”
“legal consideration necessary to esiablish a binding contract). However, in this case, if the agreement was modified to indicate that it merely reduced to writing understandings which had been previously agreed to by the Board, we would have a strong argument the agreement was”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“ould so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances where continuin g CIA p ursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau s discharge of its in te”
“requests from any committees of the - O M Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the M U T White House. At the present time, the consensus of those A IED persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release 2 ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN - ”
“a par bers. ticular message. Where the Review Board had voted to release the location of a particu j. CIA domestic facilities. lar CIA installation, the Review Board also voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and i. Review Board guidelines. The Review field report prefi”
“SECREI 9. the uighot of €9 Conerols’ revnst ia Algerl?. pe$*ezo-by noted with amnueemznt that the top floor van ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to ascora entrance that night to the CIA offices cely with difficulty.) . CLA 10 moparently d”
“interpre- THE ORIGINAL 4 tation, blographicel data, foreis rcadcast monitoring. vert collec- tion, maps, etc. There might I In addition a Joint Intelligence Board ‘1 with representatives from all th intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White Houe chairman”
“consult with higher authorities in CIA, but that when they do, those responsible in IO Division will be fully informed* (2) That NCFE clearly understands with whom they are to deal in CIA and that those with whom they deal on a regular basis are responsible officials entitle”
“ment entitled "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" which represents the Committee's own ground rules. 3. According to this attachment, witnesses or interviewees will fall into two categories: a. b. : Those discussing information on the structure and functions of CIA plus substantive ”
“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordt- nate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now ca”
“sion is standing by to appear for a non-operational briefing covering organization, mission, etc. 2. Attached hereto is a Senate Select Committee document entitled "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" which represents the Committee's own ground rules. 3. According to this attachment,”
“w • ‘I Hio hiding places for res hiililitv on accountability But I think creation of a separate unit here and consolidation 5 i would enhance accountability rather than make it more difficult. 1 We have .found out in our look at the Kennedy assassination r ! and I think ”
“acknowledges most of its domestic facilities. ii. Commentary. Once the Review Board When the Review Board did vote to postpone voted to release the location of a particular the location of CIA domestic facilities, it CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA required the CIA ”
“confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain • within its legislative charter. ' I am arranging for the published * transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific. direction made ”
“historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected. 13. (U) The above federal statutes and case law show a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who provide intelli”
“SECRET 00 - 2- Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more, .limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intell”
“classified writings of non-CIA personnel given access to CIA information, to allow the DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods. The regulation would be signed by the DCI, and then the Board would be briefed on their responsibilities and obligations under the regulation”
“litical leaders, including operations which use labor, youth, students, a nd influe nt ial mi litary organizations as political pressure groups. Economic action programs designed to influence governments to support U.S. national policy objectives, or to prevent Bloc countries fro”
“the capabilities and limitations of clandestine action must be studying and devising how such actions • can be undertaken effectively. With respect to policy approval, the General Counsel went on to say: Both in developing ideas or plans for action it is in cumbent upon t”
“uding operations which use labor, youth, students, a nd influential military organizati ons as po li tical pressure groups. Economic action programs designed to influence governments to support U.S. national policy objectives, or to prevent Bloc countries from obtaining some stra”
“30A • 7* /• 50 N 1n Reply, Plcuse Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 File No. 40 February 7, 1966 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATIONS IK THE UNITED STATES % 6i / . ■ ■ ■ (1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any .foreign official in the United States without ”
“6 P. Authority to Investigate Agency Personnel Nine CIA Memos (Classified) Q* Authority of Director to Protect Sources & Methods 22 CIA Memos (Classified), R. Authority of the Director in Use of Classified Funds . 23 CIA Memos (Classified) S. Arrangements with Other Gov”
“notes, * reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever on the Committee to Investi gate Assassinations (CTIA) or any person associated with it in any . way.. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but”
“-7- and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures; --establishing effective injunctive recourse. through the Attorney General, for protection ! of all intelligence sources and methods; --providing for in camera judicial review of material revealing i”
“electronic, chanical or other means, as well as conversations with third . ° - - „keohs and the use of informants. ' t%: 12. - All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes,‘ reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting? any surveillance of any ki”
“representatives. 3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include: ’ - - a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency cons”
“the Commission's cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies artic ulat ed two which particulαλης enabl the Agency to control th e flow of information the CIA could originated by it. In this way check the possibility of revealing its sources and m”
“----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------”
“Administra and ICA MOF THE presently do..: * I t: ■ : 4) / second semi -independent agency would be set up, again .bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi-ci :note with the operations agency. This agency would be charged :. a with responsibility f”
“APPENDIX A PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has • been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will .assume responsibilities, for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing a”
“overflights are now approved by the Special Group and subsequently by the President. He said that this same procedure applies to peripheral flights although to a lesser de- gree. He terminated this part of the discussion by stating that in his opinion "all covert action progr”
“but the Committee will be allowed . to examine these Sections at FBIHQ. Section 36, dealing with espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“surveillance THAT HE writ KNOW WHITER ME CAN AND SHOULD CONTACT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES, methods, the details of their implementation, AND THAT NIX VIL CLEAR ANT ACTIVE USE WE HAKE or KIN VIM THE and the product produced by them where the ODENNY RIP. OEWy RISE KNOWS HE IS cona TO ”
“historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected. 13 . (U) The above federal statutes and case law show a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who provide intell”
“l oc countries from obtai ning some strate gic politico- economic advantage in countries or areas of importance to U.S. global strat eg y. Paramilitary acti on programs. CIA clandestine and covert action annexes to U.S. Country Internal Defense Plans.3/ The 1963 instruction also ”
“information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee. 5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are: (a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all mem”
“13-00000 « _* 09 up for the development of collection assets. The disseminations by the N.S.A also serve as an effective means of checking selected information and activity that has been provided by other sources of information. The NSA also collaborates in the dissemina”