“13-00000-. 0 02 ■ * 6) Early agreement should be reached on the disposition of classified materials such as storage - under seal in the National Archives. The question of access should be determined by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House. - ’ . . 3. C”
“extractual obligations. The determination of that need- shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.. D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the Natio”
“13-00000 ( 75-3468 • whel DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DCT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 REVIEW STAFF 75-2051 28 JUL 19/5 The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman SC Mat furn Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515,. Dear Mr. Chai”
“13-00000 0 0 • 2. Physical and Document Security . The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the . secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be • preserved. These rules should be made known to the individuals: ■ .and agencies who will”
“13-00000, 05 00 'GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION : AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES 1. Personnel Security Clearances‘ - - . (a) Background Investigation - -.• --'- p - abide It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that”
“formulated by the Secrecy Commission: Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization, independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also posses”
“reviewers are capable of separating the national security wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should inform Congressional action in this area. 3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy. The Justice Department “strongl”
“Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP). ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel’s leadership, has a profound understanding of the intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally dem”
“system, with its limitations on classification and its emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so. 3”
“signals can be intercepted, it is possible to read the information ceing processed by the equipment. To protect against this danger, the U. S. CO:SEC Board has approved (with concurrence by all concerned agencies including the Bureau) NSA electrical standards for all electronic o”
“through inconsistent or inadvertent release. It should be the current need for protection of sources and methods. 19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being ”
“national security protected, and the intelligence services' duty to safeguard those secrets and the sources and methods that produce them. nlOO - - - • • • - • • • - -Footnotes- - - • - - - nioo. See DuVal, supra note 14, at 580-91. - • - - - - - - • - • - • - -End Footno”
“section 1.5(c). When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O. requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification tha”
“403, classified information or material originating in one . Department shall not be disseminated outside any other ‘, Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.". 4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following”
“13-00000 Introduction Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee on the subject of government secrecy. I believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee’s agenda because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Gov”
“13-00000 . . APR 04 '97 10:07AM P.24/44 PAGE 24 2 56 Md. L. Rev. 1, *20 wants to review for possible release, but it does not have the resources to do so. nl30 For more than fifty years, the Department followed a scheme of classification that might best be called "classif”
“sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding sta”
“preserving secrets. In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example, Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to "provide in writing a detailed j”
“Australian government, not P be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australia General Security - of Information ——agreement or the many other bilateral and multilateral Intelligence co- operation and information sharing agreements. • The failure to protect sensitive Australian-sour”
“subject to a classification determination under E.O. 12958, section 1.5(c). When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O. requires that foreign government information shall either retain its orig”
“government, not be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australia General Security of Information agreement or the many other bilateral and multilateral intelligence co- operation and information sharing agreements. The failure to protect sensitive Australian-sourced information ab”
“find demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence regardless of the presumption in the Executive Order. Further, with respect to intelligence sources and methods, the Act requires that they-- (1) be either currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by ”
“upon the President’s authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs. 4”
“has officially been over for several years now, we still face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day. Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges. It is only natural that any significant changes to the status”
“information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past. 4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be. A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself. ”
“withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often failing to protect genuine secrets. My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information p”
“According to official estimates, the government took 6.3 million classification actions in 1994, creating an estimated 19 million pages of information that only selected government officials can see. n125 More than 32,000 government workers are employed full-time to determine ”
“human sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholdi”
“security classified records with a view to their declassification and public disclosure, in whole or in part, at some time in the future. ’ a) Can you describe what prior experience you have had, if any, with using or examining security classified records of the Federal Gover”
“any relevant material. I have made no public statements. a) Can you describe what prior experience you have had, if any, with using or examining security classified records of the Federal Government? From 1968 to 1969 I served as an officer in the United States Army, a pos”
“13-00000 ARKD 004 -3 - categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the ■ party that seeks to exempt information from release. Because these four points are I”
“historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are: A AT X M / R T A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a O DATE1 F security clearance, a person must have a need for access U HEREIN T to the particular classified information o”
“13-00000 protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET."1 In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply’the province of “special interest” groups; it is shared throughout the general public. Reducing government secrecy t”
“13-00000 RPR 04 ‘97 10: 14AM P.43/44 PAGE 43 S6 Md. L. Rev. 1, *37 1 in all public matters is highly desirable. n210 Full disclosure is to be preferred over partial; the full truth is better than something less, and the more we know about what government has done, is doin”
“known to the public, ignorance of what has already been declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling these factors have caused trouble and will cause more trouble as the "Information Age" matures. 22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI, citing”
“13-00000 On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the interest of national s”
“intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from declassification. After Board action, the important information has been released. Illustration 9. See Exhibit G.”
“Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether information had been “properly” classified.12 Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto and it turned out that the opponents’ fears were not realized. 12See President Ford’s veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36”
“agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency. 3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls:”
“Department shall not be disseminated outside any other . Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.”. 4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full: "(3) To the extent recommended by t”
“13-00000 APR 04 ‘97 10:08AM P.28/44 •% PAGE 28 D 56 Md. L. Rev. 1, *23 nl53. See Holland, supra note 18, at 54, 56. -End Footnotes- • am Students of the assassination would benefit from opening the mass of information produced by the intelligence community's intense ef”
“13-00000 than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency decisions to keep those same documents classified. • Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have decreased to historic lows. Anecdotally, those of us who ”
“13-00000 Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the . difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act. This is part”
“to be utilized, by the United States Government. • • 00 This provision also must be modified. The first problem is that there is no limiting definition of "intelligence source of method." Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such "intelligence sources" as ne”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources 11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a larger government policy to protect human sources from public disclosure. There has also developed over the years a significant amount of case law which further impl”
“13-00000 8 communications intercepts might not be the same as those for searching the much less voluminous files of CTA stations and: headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches. The Board could try a”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources 11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a larger government policy to protect human sources from public disclosure. There has also developed over the years a significant amount of case law which further impl”
“the t receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency. ■■ JOITAnE 3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not: specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does pr”
“■ ** t ^‘ -9- ‘need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within.. Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitatin”
“are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies, but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof. Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral review). ”