“14-00000 SECRET 1 November 1958 — 1 SUBJECT: American C-118 Aircraft Downed in Soviet Azerbaijan 27 June 1958 by Soviet MIO-17's On 27 Jons 1958, a C-118 cargo plane, assigned to the U. S. Air a Force in Wiesbaden, was fired on and forced down near Gendarkh, Soviet A”
“capabilities of the Navy and the Air Force. The General Dynamics proposal resulted in minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate mission of the Navy and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial, savings 311 NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 153”
“14-00000 WATTACHMENT.A f THE YOMIURI 52 AG 6. )’ Wodnese r. 27 . 1 1.n0'f Roror 0000Code 3OS 91098y Pad 3 1 255 DS 3LGuU 000 A0O@T0 @DxOl A. ‘The four deserters from the US aircraft carrier Intrepid who made a dramatic tele- givision appearance Monday in Moscow ar”
“restrictions to Iden K. Most of the pilots were required to remain out in the field to meet operational needs. Also only one 8-26 was available in Iden K which”
“14-00000 ATTACHMENT. •‘ THEYOMIURI 22% Wednesday (5 she %7100 O 4 -ge-ye deyeud • u40 19dV Deserters P0Re De. 0 AA % LOL I 000010 Daler 57(00] BLaele Ambo /*1 R‘M The four deserters from the US aircraft carrier Intrepid who made a dramatic tele- vision appeara”
“To.assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of 'the proposals in the areas of techni”
“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS .RUFF IDEALIST E NOU Presumably Mr. Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181. In any case, the paper he requested and the Board memorandum already requested by the DD/I were combined. Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, we”
“See Volume I of this. history, Air Operations. - 113 - TOP SECRET”
“c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints. I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions, about the rea”
“14-00000 16 pter describes some battle problems jets from were allowed a recor iss Over (p. 227). President authoris cover from Boxer, but the time was fouled up and the Brig a down before cover arrived (p. 230) 6tXinanoning : • s IP. SECRET EYES ONLY”
“The Air Force Council, chaired by the. Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice .Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be ”
“September photography had resulted in a CIA study dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September. -10- Photocop”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET EIDER - CHESS Attachment To: SC-01836-78 SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78, OLC 78-1573 General Background: Detachment C advance party of security and communication personnel departed the U.S. for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1”
“cancelled because of weather. The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mis sio”
“problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached. Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump. The DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small % as we had hoped for, it was being worked on. ”
“Navy. "(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period. 2 HW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 123”
“concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact,. Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was prema”
“CONTINUATION OF : J & C hB T DISPATCH IRYBA? EUT-1-004, 11 January 1962 8. The eisdor uf ALMARK maintaining in the European area at least one :1el installation having 02818206 It personnel representing wodly mpetencies necessary4 U4 intelligence unierlakinga been recu.firme”
“7. UAR-Yemen- a. The Saudis told our embassy Egypt in Jidda yesterday that a -Saudi vil lage near the Yemeni border was at tacked Thursday by Egyptian aircraft. b. It was the second time this month that Yemeni-based Egyptian air craft have struck across the border into ”
“the on the high seas. Floating base Northern Fleet. Some of the ships would be vulnerable in TOP SECRET TRINE Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68”
“hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send. a U.S. warship on this route. The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's positio”
“Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single ”
“Teheran to await the turnover of the American fliers at Astara. The fliers were turned over on 7 July 1958, were immediately flown to Wiesbaden, Germany where an initial joint CIA-AF debriefing of them was begun, and where initial press interviews were held, following careful”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET rather than in direct action programs against Cuba, representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter- intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire a vessel which for its acquisition, operational maintenance, crew, including incentive bonu”
“- last Thursday's Checklist have docked and departed. C 1Just thx Some of them brought in rotational troops and all of them took out Soviet personnel. we cannot strike a 8hr408 OT firm balance on the basis of the evidence we now have, but it is possible that as many Sovi”
“14-00000 1 ( 1- SC-02164-58 7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the: presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point <has not been determined because of insufficient data. 8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilit”
“BRUSSELS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS A NEW PURCHASE AND THESE PLANES WAVE NOT BEEN DELIVERED.) (FIELD COMMENT : NO OTHER DETAILS KNOWN.) 2. FIELD DISSEMI STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT FIND OF MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL Mtn ARMY/AGSI NAVY AR J65 SECBEP NSA NIC UNA ”
“USSR, occurred on 20 June 1957, however, this mission did not originate or recover at Atsugi. The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight. This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments, was”
“14-00000 SC-02164-58 —7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the 99 7 / presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point j 1has not been determined because of insufficient data. J 8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilitie”
“personnel at Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to housing, recreational, and eating facilities limited to the years 1959 through 1962. We have not identified any relationship between Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1. On the subject of housing, we have ”
“complex. Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command Post Was established. 128/ 138 - TOP SECRET”
“"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war. "(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with”
“to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited? . The entire group would later be returned to a stag ing area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation. - 158 - TOP SECRET”
“14-00000 I ur JEUKE 1 — CIUEX — Cdeb) } ■ SC-02164-58 -7. Confusion and track loss seamed to he related to the 987 presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point has not been determined because of insufficient data. 6 / 8. The question of radars for”
“Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a.joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the Source Selection. Board preferred the Boeing:submission. The qualified% • 13 HW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 134”
“field to fly in right seat to observe tactics and gain more experience before moving to left seat as PIC. h. Iden H - Had limited experience, however, he was very inter- rated and applied himself to the task of checking out in the B-26%. He was very helpful in reproducing pow”
“13-00000 a• 7. UAR-Yemen- a. The Saudis told our embassy Egypt in Jidda yesterday that a Saudi vil lage near the Yemeni border was at tacked Thursday by Egyptian aircraft. j b. It was the second time this ‘month that Yemeni-based Egyptian air craft have struck across t”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET - EIDER CHESS During the deployment of Detachment C it performed approximately 86 operational missions, of these only 43 originated and recovered at Atsugi. 1. Any and all information pertaining to the take- offs and landings of the U-2 at Atsugi, Jap”
“Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people, unit sized groups. And no decisions had been • reached at that time. It was only that 201 - TOP SECRET”
“nF are r1 - FVFC OaVa.I ON V 7 TACKLE ’ Mr. Dullen stated thet while he wanted to open discussion ef this matter at this meeting, he Gidnot expect a final decision tote' made until the next meeting. Mr. Bundy noted the previous reserva tions of the Site Department and th”
“TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST a- sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet interests. The original contracts for Indonesia had been roughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq. They included 14 SA-2 sites, 12 KOMARs, 26 TU-16s (12 equipped with ai”
“will provide some antisubmarine reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5 capability in the ocean approaches TOP SECRET TRINE Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68”
“developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my inte”
“13-00000 rL TOP SECRET DINAR Area of Main Map 7- Bering Sea OAne* A ? Klyuchi de Impact Wx BERING Area tX Y SEA ■M-. 52 56 A r SE.1 'IF % Launch Position KOMANDORSRIYE is. — 8 April 0K110 x ■ j Impact Pointh pg - at : 1 Ballistic Missile Sulimurines @ Pe”
“rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high. The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.”
“Subsystem and Aerospace.Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had.an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera bility at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system. For deceleration,, it uses dive bra”
“enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves. 4 NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 125”
“Also he was very rough with the airplane in pitch control. On ILS approaches he would vary the manifold pressure from 12" to 30" to try and stay on the glide slope. On short field landing and take- off after about six of them he started approaching the procedures I was trying”
“13-00000 . B AS - « H gum wad God fod WEG CW wed ;c. Design requirements call for the delivery of a 1,600-pound / warhead to a maximum range of 300 / miles with a CEP slightly in excess / of half a mile. A conventional war- / head would not make military sense / under th”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET - EDER HESS SC-02164-58 2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a s”