“desertion, self-inflicted wound in * There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO’s life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the cir cumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next. II ?! TOP-SECRET”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“evacuated to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was closed, if he was there. * * The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims to be (and with a completely false life history, or one lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but no”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate. 1 363 TS No. 197124 2 Top Secret Copy 10”
“14-00000 SECRE1 the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omiss”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“zUnEAy , The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March. 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the . bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was ”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”
“a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially, confirm”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“61. f DATE June 1962 1964. 1965 April 1966 October 1966 June Completed first 1946 year at Institute of International Relations. aptember Began second - 1946 year at IIR. June Completed second With help of tem In 1947 commis : 1947 year at IIR. Com porary documents used”
“s operation is NOSENKO's real identity and personal background. There are many indications, reported TOP SECRET EYES CALY NW 65990 Docld:32375412 Page 7 18 17/BR. ( 104-10210-10015 TOP SET EYES BY 6. earlier, that he has spent time in prison and that he is not in fact a KGB offic”
“That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB]. ♦See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it. = TOP SECRET”
“had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964. Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that h”
“14-00000 a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SGD. It has not been possible to substantially”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“14-00000 .cr.r LT -11-1 intelligence information is not a significant factor in & determination of his bons sides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intellig”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“Vovs Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a ( Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not nece”
“great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 0001012 F TEL”
“the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. . The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in SECRET 00010C8 2 ? L”
“claimed he was being punished for misuse of operational documents.] In response to his interrogator ' s question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he thought the truth would not have been believed. In a voluntary statement”
“14-00000 SECRET € A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON lei. WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 7/ 6R9.P fir-nnimirl- 0001025 4* Enctetestren azit lit SECRET declassificationicf. ‘' CSungrading and .1 Ilsesmo 1 2* spot . fs d”
“NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various . claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold 1 the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual BfgdaeSeyen .6 0001048. SECRET”
“tho 7. NOSENKO’s exact statements and meaning on various specific sub- jects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled 7. 48 and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particul”
“a compulsive liar.. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for 1 effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to :* bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychoti”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as con cern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6) (2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO. (3) During the above perio”
“NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as con cern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6) (2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO. (3) During the above perio”
“basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that s”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“14-00000 new **>Titwr y eonerenew* tftoto.rtareshart €% 0*06 St* ********** ***7*0*17 "tiol-paengyoGneerz Page b. NOSENKO’s Conduct in Meetings 626 c. NOSENKO’s Behavior Under Interrogation 627 (i) Introduction 627 (ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627 (iii) Evasion, I”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“14-00000 NOSENKO was only in the Firs. Section as a Senior Case Cificer in I960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position wii loss ox both money and prestige, cor Ems reason alone, mis ianure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1930 - 1961 would raise c”
“his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2”
“April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including t”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“73. DATE June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966 October 1966 gave me shots of streptomycin every hour for two months and stopped this disease at once. After this I had check-ups for five years, was car ried on their books . until 1957. It was nothing." ■ - Mid "They offered”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“• ngthcng : >Tyan —Ay 2. a's *1-960. P. Jk"g5 Y* 0 3 ". 94 P € th st 4. 2 JIP J A. D. 447 F !*A tanue tr yh 3 I! W*: 1. et. % (L-hn't ophs. were sub cuent Loion ERSA fice and in the office of the Mi Counsellor. has reported that both were bein to”
“Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgrounds Gna-e, however, is not known to have stated specifically that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961. TUP S”
“this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments. hiytai * *”
“osexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear- cut contradictions in the story he has told us. 3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi”
“the reader • to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers ‘appropriate. The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami- : nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, " has been considered in SECRET 0001008 2”
“14-00000 SECRET "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies. non”