“FURTHER BELLIGERENT OPS, AMBIDDY-PREPARING AGGRESSIVE OPS AGAINST PRUMEN, ESPECIALLY BLOWING UP OF SPANISH, BRITISH, OR SOVIET SHIP INVOLVED 5 . . ■ 4 :/ PBRUMEN TRADE. THIS BEING DONE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE ODYOKE. AT SANE /TIME AIR ATTACK BEING PLANNED AGAINST CUBA FOR 2s OR 26”
“26 APRIL.) 50. ,5. - EDMENT REMAINING MAGU PENDING REPLY - PY-4.hA a Aew ******RSSWSSTCT89 6. SINCE OBVIOUS UNPREDICTABLE, SERIOUS AND FAR REACHING LOCAL _GeleSeasE****A***SS-******EA09* CONSEQUENCES CAN FLOW FRON ANY STAGE IMPLEMENTATION REF ACTION, REQUEST COMMENT RE ANY”
“A FEE A REVIEW OF • BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD FOR CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. 1 * 3. PURPOSE IS TO GET RICO TO EXPRESS VIEWS IN WRITING ON CUBAN 2 (CONTINUED) • ‘ i COCDRATNo ofricraS• cfouP 1 AUTHENTICATING MUASOO OMtCU SECRET Enake des tisa astemaie Qrricta: (Gsciasutaaten”
“FASCIST-MINDED GENERALS’ WHO SEEK TO DIVERT WOR8LD ATTENTION FROM THE ATROCITIES AND ARBITRARINESS THERE.’9 "GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET. CHIEF OF STATE OF CHILE. SAID CHILE WOULD LIBERATE RELEASE ALL ITS PRISONERS IF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA. DATE : ORG: UNIT: EXT: •• eecee”
“-55 I CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN 97I32 HGRET wnenpruteatin)" NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS -3/556,052 PAGE 3 (D) SEVERAL GROUPS, INCLUDING UMC (UNIDADES MILITARES CUBANAS), e (COMANDOS LIBRES DE cuba) And A SECTION OF MRR CONSIDER THAT ONLY A GNERAL INVASION W”
“tous isl Cuban Intelligen by coder messages which he Thibited NW 66000-Docld:32273332 Page 9 SECRET As reported by PART-1532(IN 8 2939) on 4 Jumices, based in meeting w/ Expira, the problem seen by Pasis is that "The AMLASH anche to wide and Jack new friend of whom we learn seems”
“1 2969/10-11-928. AM E01m01 WESTERN UNION corca LlmE ! PRESS MESSAGE WP MARSHALL PRESIDENT TIME FILEO MIAMI, Nov.25/661966 NGV 25 PM 5 05 * * * * * w ititiu n e y *6ot _., * e r o v o ti* ACENCE FRANCE PRESSE wox CO NE-rOaK DAYLETTER colsCr- 61700 AIRAMA PROTIS”
“14-00000 E45I2 SONAL RrcoRD --- Exterlas of Remarks May HO, 1970 eote-demon-ffel’nn or fomevle s2 "** * ras set ****** * ens P-l * e thec Pre-t* dir tee hetwon and ti resigre taters.asmonal dispenses HrvAn % and nt & 32. co Corthe On C.-€ *.” s *s 2,7 27.1944228 ea Cite ertri”
“ON NICARAGUA'S SUPPORT. **** 7. 5. SUBSEQUENTLY, AS AN ADDITIONAL CONDITION, SCHICK SAID THAT IF PRESIDENT KENNEDY APPROVES, AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE SENT TO CENTRAL AMERICA TO COORDINATE THIS EFFORT. 31) . S. FIEL DISSL : STATE (MIAMI). , - R C.. i O. END OF ME”
“WOULD BE FEW SUCCESSFUL AND DRAMATIC RESISTANCE ACTS EITHER BY INSIDE GROUPS OR R 5oRj 1 FROM OUTSIDE. C C O 2. WHILE PROPAGANDA CANNOT CHANGE BASIC PSYCH ATMOSPHERE INSIDE P Y HOEPFULLY CAN PARTIALLY COUNTER IMPACT MENOYO CASE BY RE-DIRECTING :CUBAN AUDIENCE ATENTION TO LONG-T”
“certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time 231 with their Maritime fleet,such as it was. These boatsks ’ powered with Dogobo^^^fi We simply went to the 25 i people and told them asked them to cooperate with us, which - NW 50955 DocId: 32203851 Page 38 CARET”
“FREE. NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG CARRIED AFP REPORT FROM SANTIAGO, 24 SEPTEMBER, THAT GENERAL PINOCHET, CHIEF OF CHILMEAN JUNTA, HAD SAID NEITHER CUBA NOR SOVIET UNION HAD RESPONDED TO CHILEAN CHALLENGE OF 011 SEPTEMBER TO DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: esssaccenicen coomomatimo Kao ”
“g. SUPPORT FOR THE CRUSADE AGA INST CASTRO," MONTES SA to THAT CUBAN 2 WLE8 IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. TOGETHER WITH DOMINICAN BIL TARY )L 2306020 291092 82)0 661137 001- 299292 50%20300 ? 35 0000 0085114 SECRET T1W:E2 9073 VOF350-0069893 ‘* oo sor 0990600 928 41”
“MOB Oct 12 may UA -8 EBI Cat CN N. Cuban Exiles & Soldier of Fortune Hughes Cleres Pl#1 ots #2 1AMEASAKurob Connect i o Ruby Cromectionsn 7 Osumed K/ Catalogue Jan Morry 68 Aluventry Kevin S Tem/Ed Boon 12//2 $18/ ming:AreasNalisye yInterest 4.3. TiHouse Public ”
“PROBLEM OF WORKING AGAINST THE CUBAN TARGET EMPHASIZING OUR INTEREST IK INCREASE. oPLRA- Bar TIUNS AGAINST D3I PERSONNEL. WHILE THE SMABOVE OFFICERS EXHIBITED A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IT WAS APPARENT THEY HAD LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TARGET. THEY pin ASK SECRET RYBAT TELE”
“- /- Anf SEUREI 0002313 remeet of an evolution in Lee Prosocatm Bxatl in 63 fmpucepten. Cotto Cuba 8 USSR fin Bay of MunleCinis, Mory with the dicy y US Pig s. Cuban proguer. 11 empri s the i g e SS C Fi instead n al cInRepor t has operatedi l e ctd I. acteras vija”
“0 3 Fa) 14-00000 D13•rA ) Jw1 J erta de Al lo saca del pozo, comp j do trapo. lado vocero The New 1 os que piden en Nor- 3 s de La Habana, sca * a Organization de Es- • * 0J 1 d on mande a la capital * PACTO CON LOS • gurte de los euales it Wall Street", sino que”
“approval and immediate initiation: ’ / / Go Intensify to Msd®® degree possible intelligence . and ■ ©@uaceria€@llig@nee GOVGFOgG of Cuba; Do Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with cho original aims of the 26 July ■ Movemant and who believe C”
“• the Russians to question the purpose of, windoms. in, and personnel rink involved heir presence in Cuba.. 1 ;7”
“OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66,SUPPORTS CONTINUATION OF HIT- AND-RUN RA IDS ON CUBAN MA INLAND I N ORDER/MA I NTAI N MORALE OF RESISTANCE FORCES IN CUBA.. CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS SECRET NOWEIGH DISSBI”
“Government intentions vis a-vis — 099959 other than what can be deduced from the events of the 5290 AMBI ?"ooGing day - As an example, official American reaction to, . Con bldening repercussions of a limited ABWORLD success in talding Cuba was simply unpredictable. ANYUM-19 ”
“some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress) li the -losses' 'suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the k fate of political prisoners in Cuba. ' When 'completed,, these. pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity. s 11, throughout the area. > . *,"”
“DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOCUMENT DATE: 19 MAY 1964 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA. ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN LEADER I ISHIPS GEStA hot tvon 1 "Nolly hate. 24 ’4”
“13-00000 DE or his companion Che Guevarra, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disaupeerence of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present Government. cc: DDCI JcKing Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Kecbael ”
“the Castroites of their respective countries, and they are en " Mes*v*co*.e whentasisi* namh**eddaddant gaged in fractional work to un'ermine Castro's designs and put their old comrades t back in the leadership of the Cuban Party. cecartdon”
“yetoevighbeleasNSwerteAfantesuie*wel-nalDAie slit-ii WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT CONTINUE ACTIVITIES FOR KUBARK. IN GENERAL BELIEVE AMLEGS WILLING COOPERATE THIS EFFORT ONLY IF THEY CONVINCED IT PART OF "FI NAL EFFORT OVERTHROW CASTRO. CAMLEGS 12 AND 29 EXPRESSED GENERAL DISIL”
“inevitable. 19/ In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of Havana indicated to the Amconsul that: He though [t] US Government could profitably send person of confidence. - 12 - TOP SECRET”
“13-00000 Sifel -2- D. Unleto we were indefinitely to occupy Cisc militarily. tis caly solves the ten prablea 1 necessarily the CCoSg CJS 05 0 Cubca leadcrohtp willing to ood coptbio of covosaling the country along lines exceptable to the Cuban roople and along 16000 cons”
“ANFAUNA-25 a u y *rs o *-9 2 a AT THIS TIME, commo LINK VAS AMCUTLER-2 TO AMFAUNA-27 TO MFAUNA-25, sited acuLe-2 out TOUCH THERE NO REPEAT a w w nBU ’ H ^ y M ^ f f l t NO MAY SECURELY FIND OUT DETAILS A-25 CURRENT SITUATION OR FOR A-25 TO COMmICATE WITH WAVE. jot 8. CU”
“aims or munitions, because there was nothing the Cubans ULO.-: i GLWL”
“14-00000 to 68 SECRIT RYSAT TELLPSCCA PnoFaSJl NALLY PERTINANI .ULJT1, 3 AX DMPRE 2 AS Xo:IO THLIA BUCIAL.C. r; 055T1o‘INS THSE i.1 Y 1E- . VEALET THAT SMABOVE NAD:FORTY T9 FIFTY MEN 15 IHEin COUNTER SUBVERSIVE SECTION 1: MOOTREAL BUT THAT ONLY TEN PERCENT 05 THEIS”
“diuninuido la repression de las actividades nacieron en nuestro pals, cuya unua mision es 1a de armadas de los patriotas contra Fidel Castro desde los Judas, que delatan cuciques esfuerzo d: los grupos Estados Unidos. de action por her lleger a Cuba »u mens-je de solids Las ag”
“publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive ine activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restric- 8tions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed : Tak to obtain, . to. the greatest extent possible, 'multilateral approval of”
“with regard to the aggression plan against Cuba." TOP SECRET M”
“Cubans. -y, A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban government officials and in the Western community in Eavana A. has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent ,.sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of lithe population. Such acts,”
“palpable do la oportunidad existente para los pauses libres de la Amerj ca en los actuales momentos debido al fracaso do la za fra cubana. |Seria sumamente eflea : para Colombia o] explorer las posibilida des existentes en esos tres morcades de inmedlato pues seguramente se po”
“encourage the - relationship in hopes of acquiring scua political informations” - from LOGUNOV. The Finnish Ambassador also **tdllcd/f*t/duting CAfb*/6p*fng/dt/ stated in hie telephone conversation with V/2 in Miami that he had requested that the SLOUCHES installation be elev”
“STORY 26 SEPT AND ANTAFFY-1 PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVERAGE 29 NSEKArotnhintlain, SEPT. BELIEVE ADDITONAL PUBLICITY THESE FACTS ESPECIALLY ABROAD WILL FURTHER EXACERBATE AT LEAST CUBA/ CANADA TRADE. RELEASE AND CLIP FORWARDED HQS. ALSO ****** AIRMAILING PARIS, POUCHING OTTAWA.”
“- MARXIST- LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD HIS ENEMIE S. The -24 8 5. HE SAID TE ) CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO HAD PLANS PREPARED eORIG: A%a UNIT; EXT: WH/ 0 CT-Y 22.Sep.23 RECORD‘COPY 15-124 - 52 coosoinatiwo orneaw CL****carom REPRODUCTION By OTHER THAN THE I”
“CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN 44195 TDCS -3/532,860 PAGE 2 3. BRITISH COMMENTS. A. THE IMPRESSION DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 DOES NOT TowHOm?! Batile AGREE ENTIRELY WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES BUT IT IS AN INTERESTING POINT OF VIEW. B. SOURCE SAYS THAT CUBA”
“14-00000 ,S’BOBRAS En GUANTANAMO 11 1 Viene de la primer? that . 1 ondenado a presentarse inmed3 I tamente, es interpreted en Lest ILLA /. ington como "que su especialidid en desembarco V en combate son En los ultimos afet, el Departansento de Estado norteame- necasario”
“ano, €52 toros loa merrados nacions- Jandouislados en este forina a les ro que proven el ease de agresies sidente Jotin F. Kennedy, exigiendo que “pongs terming • era ses nes as madas contra el Connnente Estados Unidos, que constituven le ‘y retire todan lan »'nl«4b aciones nor”
“14-00000 I 17 -Tol TO 1 FROM: DIRECTOR CONFI hMl W . PILE RID COPY PAGE SEVEN ro IHFO CITE DIR 89022 D. RAISE QUESTION WHO CAN NOW CONSIDER HIMSELF SAFE WHEN CASTRO IS TURNING AGAINST EIS MOST LOYAL FRIENDS. SIMILARLY, CASTRO HAS LASHED OUT AGAINST COMMUNIST CHIN”
“Govern-, ND ment, hoping that the US will intervene. b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain in- formation to ”
“ies & flight mamfests. Cabad p.11) Jalso had surveillance - Mam of its Jwhich provided to the CIA ہو and givedeng The Menaultimbus oun at the singed, obligughs 3 passants and. copies of passenge fists Cabit pilt). Additionally, ting operdim. (Lienvoy) against the Cuban a Jilighme”
“the initiative and will soon control the entire counter-revolut onary movement in Cuba. John D, Peters SECS'" /”
“1= ^re- 4 I 0 ya 00 31 gampared do berayroache3 0 11/22/81 Ry CIA Cuba - "lieu. ( st fe Stir WMT CT i pro o n terest to —- Duren ee ASEN: -/ 7 e1 t go MIL. 0 % 0 * Ne 1 EK nA JY0 *7 6 Rosy et. x w,G. :AVA Im 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 684”
“Havana of Fidel Castro will be our doctrine," and said that it was desired to obtain the signatures exedee of the whole population of Cuba to show that everyone was behind thin doctrine. He then said in response to a question regarding what would happen to those who did not s”
“treaty. The- . terrorists loved it: Castro and the Americans getting ; Koshoue”
“fashion, we need a comploto reassessment of the vulnerability of his regime — the degree of popular support, the probably declining position of the Cuban economy and its impact on the Cuban people, tho efficiency of his police state, the posci- bilitiec of underground org”