“ime is spent on direct polygraph examination than on interrogation. TOP SECRET EYES ONLY 1 : : i i ! NW 65990 Docld:32375412 Page 3 104-10210-10015 TOP C EYCO CO 2. 4 Highlights to Date 5. 03 WALD Case: The opening session was a polygraph examination conducted by Nicholas Stoiake”
“Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations.*t*om.,9o" a. Information from NOSENKO In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist IR Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, 5 . which had theretofore concerned itself with”
“KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. • !I1 : 6001079 4 SECRET OLUALT 4”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“14-00000 new **>Titwr y eonerenew* tftoto.rtareshart €% 0*06 St* ********** ***7*0*17 "tiol-paengyoGneerz Page b. NOSENKO’s Conduct in Meetings 626 c. NOSENKO’s Behavior Under Interrogation 627 (i) Introduction 627 (ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627 (iii) Evasion, I”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“• ngthcng : >Tyan —Ay 2. a's *1-960. P. Jk"g5 Y* 0 3 ". 94 P € th st 4. 2 JIP J A. D. 447 F !*A tanue tr yh 3 I! W*: 1. et. % (L-hn't ophs. were sub cuent Loion ERSA fice and in the office of the Mi Counsellor. has reported that both were bein to”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“14-00000 : -• w* e ****- ***** -* • % • CA 348. granted to him. That was the most serious defeat . the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espion age and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading”
“place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is con sidered completely acceptable. 40 00Ulcv0 S”
“after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.) 324 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”
“himself with NOSENKO’s entry into the KGB. wand SECRET T 0—OLvnet- -t-U”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that s”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“interrogations. NOSENKO’s explanations of why he re- vised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into ex TAD SECRET”
“ct that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosanko ia sensible enough to realize that undue publicity”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“and playing it effectively, 19 ( and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO- iSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors! as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, ”
“his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2”
“(Retracted.NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret C°py _”
“s operation is NOSENKO's real identity and personal background. There are many indications, reported TOP SECRET EYES CALY NW 65990 Docld:32375412 Page 7 18 17/BR. ( 104-10210-10015 TOP SET EYES BY 6. earlier, that he has spent time in prison and that he is not in fact a KGB offic”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“it I NOSENKO provided no his. Marriage tdate for the above.] cooled still further, but NOSNEKO continued to live in the apart ment. (May) •tt2”
“prior to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected to be a KGB agent.O SEVERN has not visited the United States since 1961, and he has not been interviewed by the FBI. NOSENKO’s information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in”
“14-00000 SECRET "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies. non”
“time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 • 9 SECBET i”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“desertion, self-inflicted wound in * There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO’s life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the cir cumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next. II ?! TOP-SECRET”
“great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 0001012 F TEL”
“14-00000 SECRE1 the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omiss”
“c. tec !.;s to KGB Residency ana AValiabirity “TO CPA’, Ornngseen. 1 . 1* d. Timing of 1962 Contact 752 £ ■ 7 e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753 f. The Recall Te legram 753 g. Remarks 753 w ib ia ii G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 756 1. Introduction 756 aet 2. C”
“service came from only two other individuals. Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stemmed from elaborate and apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to recon struct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO’s inability to • give any clear and consistent acc”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn’t say". or "didn’t comment" o”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially, confirm”
“place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting fron y, that it had to E have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence 55 OFODET VLu___ < .c”
“14-00000 SECRET € A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON lei. WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 7/ 6R9.P fir-nnimirl- 0001025 4* Enctetestren azit lit SECRET declassificationicf. ‘' CSungrading and .1 Ilsesmo 1 2* spot . fs d”
“of a casual encounter in the halls, * * -.. rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any u Srit A .^ ^ "* ton reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this ”
“When questioned 1 a in February 1965, NOSENKO added no new C. hat. it the -a time of the approach, he Y had not reported the KGB letter to his sape icon Enassy; he said ’ there • :! n. 2. i c: from the nic ones ort "epnonet ia tie • . Embassy. (c) inform e frer In scow price av”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“S-a-e-Yle" 9a6 783. 2,09 v P.m 74ho /Aw X.a 09.9 as TUA 4-526 Tvw -Ko- G5-S% * 0,tr Mot) E ar CR 3$943 E /:. #to BeAn PS (Ro- War.) yw :NY sr % J■ yre4 18 seme >tes. O IAs”! F 9*05 9%’ si The” A wo* t59 4/ Mate v. I- FC a KGB Sel erx t”
“Top Secret (Summary of Case) NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.2 1 69 G0”
“f 14-00'000 '‘ t or mwwirany P lse t aniney s ‘ta 1 ‘, 4 nyey; Y R Vis .eaU M i ^ bait -crabrenal NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to %- 1 1 request permission to board the vessel. % ** In February 1965, KOSENKO did not recal”