“TOP LVIEI CADF. 29 1 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.. 2 Mr. Klein. You also testified before this Committee that 3 in accord with the orders from Moscow that there was technical 4 surveillance, and you told us in detail about how they tapped 5 his phone and they would record i”
“of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concre”
“detected and there would be a scandal. Performance Characteristics of the Microphones According to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero, but the microphone system was deteriorating. The KGB could do nothing about it becau”
“had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is”
“information to the U.S. after his defection C R and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in- Moscow, microphone systems In the embassies, etc. Based on 7 NOSENKO’s Information the American Embassy found ma”
“the end of the meeting, KOVSHUK gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing fur- ther on the locations of microphones in the chancery building, and much of his information concerning the quality and value ”
“KGB person is considered to be a person who works at this place, as an officer, and every body else involved is somehow related to the KGB but not KGB persons themselves. During a later debriefing by CIA. clarified her • sourcing of this information. All of it except that c”
“due to, first, normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the installation of secure rooms and the implementation of more stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of electroni”
“14-00000 ill cEiAL , --old 658. the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned, and the Military Attache’s planning of trips wh”
“780. (Reported to the FBI on There seems to be unanimous opinion among the • 27 March 1964) KGB chiefse. that NOSENKO... could do the KGB a trementous amount of harm." NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) The discoveries in the chancery led. to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the . north wing roof, there we”
“dis covered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the Chancery of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The cable to this microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several inches under the outside surface of the east face of the Chancery. This major cable run consi”
“’liaste ar.of -Aash.A I anas Top Secret (Annex A) 20 May 1964. According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer rervas,adPSEWENYE TABEBE Way4F6Y, K € rARts: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, a”
“embassies in Moscow, Aside from the American Embassy (see p. 225), he furnished the greatest detail on the microphones in the West German Embassy. NOSENKO’s Information The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy in Moscow, with the exception of the American an”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced a handwritten note which he asserted listed all the micro phones in the Embassy which were operative in the years 1960-1961. NOSENKO explained that ”
“of the 100- of tne Ame rlean Embassy that it is impossible to find h m, even with special-purpose Instru ments." GOLITSYN, who de fec led in late 1961, reported the exis tence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor and said that many frorr had been instal”
“-eg 249. system varied from very clear to zero; he said in 1964 that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or A two they [the microphones) will be completely inoperative."* Although the microphones produced a great deal of politi cal intelligence, NOSENKO sai”
“13-00000 Top Secret I (Annex A) 20 May 1964...: According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer K 1: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 4D microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Em”
“a 271. NOSENKO: No. No. This is something that themembers of the KGB) Eighth Directorate [responsible for communications and ciphers] should concern them selves with, the ones who work in OTU. This doesn’t concern us in the American Department, in the U.S. Embassy Sectio”
“oraste*s*ier,h: was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said _IIRIRtavi*te:eliewnot-iyn’s t . • Mlretteem he was detestable. NOSENKO told the A”
“sensitive classi fied materials. From December 1963 to date it was indi cated that no classified telegrams have been dictated , *As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963 he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy microphones. One reason ”
“14-00000 when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to”
“devices were ever installed in the north wing (as distinct Apo from the, chancery) prior to the Embassy's occupancy of the building in 1962. In his first meetings with CIA in Geneva he described how he, knew. When it was decided to permit idedes the Embassy to construct the n”
“14-00000 199* 659a. b. Remarks KOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic opera- tions against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely. His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones, as well as the existence, nature, and purpose ”
“phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes." "This side good." Et cetera. Question: In all this time that you read all this material, there must have been something that impressed you as extremely valuable. NOSENKO: Extremely valuable—nothing. A little was in- teresting from FREER”
“periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is something in the back of the Embassy on this Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in front of the Embassy, too. .Question: And it is for listening in? NOSENKO: No, it’s in order to deprive you of working with stationary equi”
“4 268. After being toldby CIA on 31 January 1965, that a lead cable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I personally can assure you that nothing was done in that right wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. There was nothing done there, so it must have been somet”
“the First Section to cover microphones in the.United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which .0001208 48 ”
“do? They tell us categorically and directly—KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second Special Department responsible for this, tells us that soon we will not have anything there. There are a great number of microphones there, but they don't work. I know that there are a”
“14-00000 22 . Alt k “ Paga : aditadaikoawh (iv) Information from NOSENKO 554 (v) Information from SAME00%SOURCE 557 (vi) Information from PitZA sensitive 559 dource BT1299 source ulsiiticithaa (vii) Information from EXeakE anmemmm 561- (viii) Information fro”
“which was of foreign‘ or Baltic republic make, and let him listen through the earphones to what was being recorded from a room under surveillance. Source claimed that he could hear all the sounds in the room, that of.i-in running water, etc. AKSENOV switched from room to room”
“the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valu able direction-finding equipment from the American Intelli- gence officers... & It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were reporting a well-known event, because”
“14-00000 was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to locate and remove the microphone system to which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late December 1961 - early January 1962. ■A few general comments in regard to the GI information fur nished by N”
“importance. KOVSHUK decided to relinquish, tempor- arily, monitoring of Embassy apartments. He continued the \monitoring of the code room, despite the limited value of the information obtained. At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK gave or NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retain”
“To provide specific technical details concerning electronic oper ations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that: - NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called "Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy communications and at other times that”
“usually within twenty-four hours returned the reports to the Second Special Department. In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV reviewed the reports. The Second Special Department prepared sterile abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts which disguised”
“of re cruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several in- stances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed. The KGB’s principal interest in control rather than recruit- Bent has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and”
“*onginr*e*--e (flerr./A0 TOP SECRET 260. (d) Amount, Type, and Value of Production Evaluations of the quality of production have been given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned with the microphones in the chancery building. NOSENKO's Statements- 11 June 1962:”
“14-00000 10- SECRET 657. 4. Technical .Operations Against the U.S. Embamgy a. Discussion 242 in reporting on KGB 248-269), NOSENKO microphones in the U.S. Embassy (Pages or five points," said adding in 1962 that there were at that time "four were heard, They later in”
“1 4-00000 when FEDCSEYEV succeeded XL TPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went ”
“material. She went to KLYPIN. Some- times she left them with me.” A protocol signed by KOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of ny duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give to appropriate case officers the prod”
“Embassy. NOSENKO 's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the ■ Embassy Derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to’ appropriate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversa tions. Also, in his capacity ”
“-00000 t>a&»f&*ei»tK^^ €*fps trims TOP SECRET *~«’***»*^ fang.: ***% 255. that a report or reports concerning the results of audio- surveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been misplaced: While GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chief of the American De- partment ordered all ”
“me....Only three people know that we are listening 'to you. Even within the Second Chief Directo rate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening, to you.” NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which he received the audio intercept reports and whether these”
“-.9 248. g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy : (i) Introduction NOSENKO had three basic pieces of information on KGB audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Em bassy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the chancery building, the absenc”
“derives from his special responsibilities in this period; from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NO SENKO said, he learned only that audio installations existed. Ci i) Microphones in the Chancery Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important informa”
“14-00000 1962, which is approx: ely four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department. The matter of review by NCSENKO of OTU reports from r; icro- phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been imentioned in this summary. ”
“Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION. January 1960-January 1962) ■ "I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryp ”
“?reports. There was nothing in these reports which was of interest or useful to the KGB. "From the microphone in the Army Attache’s office I remember that the service attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They”
“14-00000 1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department. The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from micro phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. P”