“or obtained Source #1 through conversation. There are discrepancies between what Source #2 and 5898710989--47693007, have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has CAP --URCT : cladan Lui : (-4r2iag id A”
“or obtained Source #1 through conversation. There are discrepancies between what Source #2 and 5898710989--47693007, have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has CAP --URCT : cladan Lui : (-4r2iag id A”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”
“(Retracted.NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret C°py _”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“14-00000 SECRE1 the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omiss”
“time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 • 9 SECBET i”
“given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts 19 0001097 SECRET y .r.. :59 % •/** ISA”
“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“1 4-00000 SECRET IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO * -eo*p: 0. 0001112 -SECRET :Exctacez r. art:motte - Conopraling and o rowsenu y. 4 *2 1 , - )■ ilixo U b ill gin W 26 26 a t”
“d again in detail. The new data we obtained tend to confirm that this is a serious part of NOSENKO's : TOP SECRET EYES ONLY NW 65990 Docld:32375412 Page 4 104-10210-10015 TOP SEGRET 3.”
“14-00000 supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the' questions, but it is the only method possible at this time. ”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“14-00000 we SECRET A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL, TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 620:2 1 . Excluded frem aslomatic 0001025 SECRE declassification downgrading and!”
“The : matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first,be made on the respon- cu sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above. 0001166 :6 SECRE % 9aa”
“13-00000 O ranchay Re: NOSENKO Having Reniewell Buy 451 note several. Reports, identified as E author not compl e tel y - We D Conclusions & Comments in ite Case of is in Box 45,(ile JuninI.(ThisNosenho"(as) Sal8ic JReport) -264 pgs. Foiser (Il Lasheen released in V”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 0001012 F TEL”
“1 4-00000 • -.* supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at thi”
“observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area. 4 The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be 6001237 examined and can be cited as follows. G5ol? 1 Excludes t szimmatic ”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“zUnEAy , The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March. 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the . bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was ”
“control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. CROur 1 13 iron urllamatie, REODET ,che nd ‘ 0001079 OLUALI”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“osexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear- cut contradictions in the story he has told us. 3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi”
“NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.) 0001410 140 4/BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ------------”
“the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. . The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in SECRET 00010C8 2 ? L”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been sareerenimenineemserve seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of 3 N rM o w n ? S 0001”
“nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the- Second Chief Directorate. § % 363 TS No. 197124 I • wtrvo-ieruesi Top Secret Copy 10 as”
“purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn’t say". or "didn’t comment" o”
“14-00000 SECRET € A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON lei. WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? 7/ 6R9.P fir-nnimirl- 0001025 4* Enctetestren azit lit SECRET declassificationicf. ‘' CSungrading and .1 Ilsesmo 1 2* spot . fs d”
“after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.) 324 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy”
“outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not 0001194 34 !1 5/BR”
“previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character ized in the previous summary as singular apd it was stated that NOSENKO 0001207 47 QFPDFT OLUILE mar”
“previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character- ized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO 0001207 47”
“of a casual encounter in the halls, * * -.. rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any u Srit A .^ ^ "* ton reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this ”
“T4-00000 LV1 "LV 691. few new details of importance on the American correspondents. NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and acti ”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”
“summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive 12 000 076/2”
“1 4-00000 P W R ! ^ y w , '^ First Section, First Depar ent. s inform On Was pepornegsy.ver-nerecegg furnished to NOSENKO pri arily because of his friend 2 with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENXO learned of certain v. de casts or was”
“that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this 4 6001046 28 SECRET”
“current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual 6 0001C48 ”
“particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that 0001197 37”
“outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not 0001194 34”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”