“14-00000 or specuw* INTRODUCTION The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi- zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt ”
“14-00000 e .TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction :II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967 Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? B. Is the Claimed”
“14-00000 y • TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since .30 October 1967 III. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? 1 B. Is the”
“1 4-00000 SEUKE: PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been g”
“14-00000 orpye onbnbl 1 October 196S MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security 7 FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich 1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with c”
“14-00000 SECRET PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been gi”
“14-00000 643 € January 1975 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media. 2. NOSENKO was in the United States u”
“152 HT C 5/ ., 00 DNLY * CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . WASHINGTON 25, D.C 19! ■ , OffICE Of DEPUTY DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELUGENCE CM Man de . : 12 February 1964 HENORANDUN FOR: teexed c United States Intelligence Board Members. SUsJctsi.m Yuri Ivanovich NOSENK”
“1 1-00000 1U/ 05294 .• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25 0 C 9 OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUCENCE 12 February 1964 NEORANDUN FOR: United Statas Intelligence Board Members SUBJECT: ‘‘. Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This memorandum refers to the Stat”
“iques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi s first pha se has enabled us to confirm our analyses of key aspects of this case. More important is the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive. areas and this is worrying him be”
“14-00000 SECRET SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case sin”
“14-00000 187 til ,EYES CNLY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, O C. OFFICE or DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUCENCE 1 12 February 1964 NEORANDUN FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members SUSJSCT1 . Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This memorandum refers to the”
“14-00000 SECRET ,sornt-nritt-wD-nodMSM ANA LY TICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi trary but realisti”
“1 Top Secret 21 Introduction 81 The judgment of NOSENKO’s bona fides entailed the distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence information assembled in connection with his case, including the product of,his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of KGB operations ”
“English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic. The following relevant ques”
“14-00000 * A January 1975 269 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media. 2. NOSENKO was in the United States ”
“14-00000 - .titd UNL1 • ’C-NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY /% WASHINGTON 25. D. C. (3, OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE 12 February 1964 NEHORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members SUBJECT Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO - .1. This memorandum refers to”
“14-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO / In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency’s legal basis for i”
“14-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO / In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency’s legal basis for i”
“IF". .: u-v.— 1 October 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff SUBJECT . : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich / 1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director .of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclus”
“14-00000 if ( 10th January 1975 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media. 2. NOSENKO was in the United States”
“14-00000 / . extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation — compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual of group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of t”
“14-00000 andvi—■ *3 Pol ( « ElEdU Y Euro 0) 11 February 1954 MEMORANDUM FOR: *r. McGeorge Buady SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides addi- tional background as well as”
“14-00000 SECRET to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko’s true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth ”
“14-00000 f D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section. E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervi”
“nt of the KGB; 2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information. PROCEDURE Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's compr”
“ntroduction On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nose nko, a Soviet official temporarily assi gned to Gene va, contacted an American Foreign Service Officer in a move that was eventually to lead to Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of events that is unequaled in co”
“30000 QEODET oLUNLI ANALY TICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi trary but realistic list of areas cons”
“originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom ho had come in con”
“pertinent ques tions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to [my] direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volun teered to American Intelligence. “Subject, who before and t”
“direction. 2. Other areas of strong reaction refer to Subject's suspected contact with th e KGB whi le in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 and to Abidian and the Pushkin Street drop (key factor in the PENKOVSKIY compromise). Subject became very upset at questioning on this subject and ref”
“Top Secret [ (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB”
“14-00000 • . nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Se”
“1 4-00000 cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO’s above claims are impugned by fact or probability. or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is ”
“to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presenta tion which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anyt”
“14-00000 TSP. C. ET 0/0300 LYE) une. : 9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, 0.0 ., OFFICE of DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 4 . - Jo it February 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: 3 United States Intelligence Board Members. h’IM V.Tcohr, ": - *4 : :: - -7 • SUB”
“14-00000 SFPSC7 0uvf. 02 046 : Ay-ceavo i Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and r”
“14-00000 )/.‘/a Yur i 1 y_I vanovi ch NOSENKO IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily con fined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years. BACKGROUND NOSENKO firs”
“14-00000 7 V: NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would”
“4-00000 C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi- zation reasonably commensurate wit”
“17. Case Of course. Officer: NOSENKO: Never in my life I will go in contact (with CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life. I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know this matter. When it was abroad it was fine, but when you decided to meet him in Moscow... You wa”
“14-00000 he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.) In 1962 -1963 a number o”
“questioning continued until mid-Novem- ber 1964. After further consultations with the FBI, a new round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interro gators and by interrogation teams consistin”
“14-900 C ( 611. 49. °% .6 c. Psychological Interrogation: For fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history, from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGB. The main purposes were to ”
“The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN’s defection, the date of ABIDIAN’s visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSO- LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all ti”
“14-00000 ■ ■ TOP SECRET , . EYES ON.Y- 11 February 1354 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGoorga Bundy SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This monorandun refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides addi tional background as well as informati”
“er 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. After a break, it will resume on 25 October. 2. Our aims in this phase of the interrogation have been limiteds in view of the possibility of losing access to NOSENKO, we have sought (a) to strengthen our basic report, now in”
“14-00000 nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides. a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section”
“14-00000 pg © G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Of er Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the au3 W.th Permission to Speak Freely to C A . Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NCSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions”
“have to explain ", me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't re- fuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on”