“-11- Several days later, while warning a key Congolese leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of Station URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable, (IN 15643, Leopoldville to Director, 9/2”
“-11- Several days later, while warning a key Congolese leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of Station URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable, IN 15643, Leopoldville to Director, 9/20”
“meetings, they weren’t meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast f what the 22 I policy was. If we could focus our attention on the © Mr. Baron. 410 F 3035 period between the independence of the Congo in June of”
“of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded to recommend Lumumba’s arrest in the same cable: STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE (CIA Cab”
“ut the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the latter part of the 60's, *62, 63. Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over what ever activity the United States Government felt it needed TOP SECRET NW”
“4 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page _of _ _ Hedgeman stressed that in this period, 1960-1961, the Congo was fraught with utter confusion; he sais that what FILE: they were running was a Scotch tape and baling-wire opera- tion. As for paramilitary operations, Hedgeman said ”
“Lie M4 0 Bet 4 a e a cll . “11x? 9 £ i EXN 1960 (c o n t ’ d acta 2 Issues and Questions September 8 During brief discussion of CONGO developments, . Against LUMUMBA personally? "GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level f”
“was "JUST A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop - (Chief of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The /Chief of Station proceeded to recommend Lumumba’s arrest in the same cable: STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CON”
“-29- appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States embassy. This cable generally 'discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid' (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director .to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable a”
“-29- appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476) Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable ”
“have no recollection of any dis cussions or. decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro. 2 a On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba’s visit to Washington, I attended a m”
“Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters that they should HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES] DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).* * This”
“11 * See Section 3,supra,for discussion of CIA cable traffic indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable of taking over the government after he was deposed and that pressure to "eliminate" him did not cease.until his death. NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 354”
“Patrice Lumumba? 22 Mr. Dillon. No. 23 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the 24 coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government 25 HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 106 TOP SECRET”
“follow-up cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60). Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by Congolese le”
“signed a follow-up cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60). Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by Co”
“-4- by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters by the new Chief of Station: EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMIN”
“a D o n e iA rk a 2071 $ 4 4 4000 TOP SECRET existing conditions this should be a high priority of out 47 1 covert action, close quotes, — is that consistent with the 2 policy towards Lumumba as you recall it? 3 In other words,that Lumumba’s removal was prime objec- •A ”
“Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters that they should HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES] DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60). * * Th”
“***. A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an attempt to tap Lumumba's phones "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LUMUMBA] KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN. (CIA Cable, IN 34867, Leopoldvil”
“-6- The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable * to the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of "removing" Lumumba: IN HIGH QUARTERS ** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR- CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITAB”
“TOP SECRET 49 this fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was 97777 1 + protected by the U.N.-- 2 Mr. Tweedy. ' Yes, that is probably true. Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let’s turn to a cable dated 4 September 20, 1960, which is sent — off the record. 5 (The”
“-10- STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED we ['TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS ] TRY WORK WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI- NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION W”
“deliberations. During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro. On one occasion in late July or early August.of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba”
“-6- The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable * to the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of "removing" Lumumba: ** IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR- CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITAB”
“-13- failed to. obtain a majority vote, the "PRESSURES FOR [LUMUMBA'S] RETURN WILL BE ALMOST IRRESISTABLE" (CIA Cable, IN 33499, Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60). * Another general concern at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in the Congo and brin”
“necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that 19 4 1 0 F irs t S tre e t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 20 'consideration ’ of any particular kind of activity which 21 might contribute to getting ”
“3co.d 6.36 9b.dL. 1.<=A !‘ 1‘/ La Dillon Exhibit 3 (s) 3 25 August 1960 E MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles 1. Congo Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. D”
“crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started 20 to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably 21 would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes. 22 Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said 23 he had been dispatch”
“-4- by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters. by the new Chief of Station: EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DE”
“1960, stayed there a few weeks, and left in October, I 20 believe. And then Mr. Lmumba was killed thereafter in a totally 21 separate set of circumstances in which we had nothing to do. 22 There is some indication that a CIA officer who was asked 23 to have something to d”
“-10- STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED [TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI- NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GI”
“5 -107- on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threa.t, especially in light of reports”
“-9- to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might assassinate Lumumba: TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOODI AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. (CIA Ca”
“after his departure from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from' the Chief of)Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman re ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba’s”
“departure from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from. the Chief of Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman re ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's POLITICAL”
“35 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 TOP SECRET authorization for an assassination within the CIA? 1 Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with 2 Castro, when that came along the following year. That is 3 perfectly possible. 4 Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I”
“-86- [T]he impression that was left was . . . very bad, that this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government as a result of this sharpened' very considerably at that time. We [had] hoped to see him and, see what we could do to ”
“28 TOP SECRET Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 Management Corporation, which was a US corporation. And they 2 had signed a resources development contract in the Congo. o Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just 4 formed for that purpose or soemthing, it sounds l”
“30 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 1 don’t recall. But there were those problems down around the 2 copper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down there 3 of sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo at 4 that time. 5 Mr. Baron. Do you recall an”
“source of the station’s information (CIA Cable IN 10643), Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60). The (chief of) Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way” in Lumumba’s departure NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 79”
“that this would return Lumumba to power. The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu, two CIA officers met with a high level Congolese politician who had a close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station re ported to CIA headquarters that the politician had mad”
“37 Phone (A rea 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 1 notified by Mr. Merchant or Gordon Gray about what transpired 2 at a Special Group meeting? 3 Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job. 4 But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be 5 something that wa”
“[LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN . REQUEST YOUR VIEWS. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60.)/ . — / * For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and O’Donnell and O’Donnell’s subsequent activities in the Congo, see Section 5(a),”
“46 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 TOP SECRET 1 stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters? 2 Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that. d Mr. Baron. Dut you do recall that at that point there was 4 concern at higher levels in the State Department?over the 5 connection b”
“source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643, Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60). The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way” in Lumumba’s departure HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 326”
“-107- on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially in light of reports of a”
“-8 - 3. CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" Lumumba, Who ---- —,--- —----- - - - : as is Viewed Danger" — a "Grave --- Even * After -2 : ------- :--- - Being Deposed and Placed in UN Protective Custody On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Prem”
“"5/ .0 CI GET -E 4:daLJ UJk dlam 3 25 August 1960 E MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles 1. Congo Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described th”
“1965. Throughout the conversation, Hedgeman interspersed the most hair-raising tales of his and his daughter’s brushes with death in their dealings with unruly mutinous Congolese, rangir.g from being placed before two different firing squads during one day and his evening as”