“a SCHNEIDER REPORT Page I. Summary 1 II. The President’s Initial General Instruction 6 and Background A. September 15 White House Meeting 6 B. Background: Tracks I and II 8 C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15 III. CIA’s Implementation of Track II 17 A. Evol”
“-2- In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assis- 0: tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its activities. Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) off”
“-9- a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers; Db. - Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, .3 and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup;*(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970) c. Inform those coup-minded officers that t”
“testified that pressure was Stet "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi- Stet mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant... .Jus”
“ANT OR A ki’F: SCHNEIDER REPORT Page 1; Summary 1 II. The President's Initial General Instruction 6 and Background A. September 15 White House Meeting 6 B. Background: Tracks I and II 8 C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15 III. CIA's Implementation of Track II ”
“^geti1r*t -■1%:.‘*.: 0:‘hi: SCHNEIDER REPORT Page I. Summary 1 A II. The President’s Initial General Instruction 6 and Background A. September 15 White House Meeting 6 B. Background: Tracks I and II 8 C.. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15 III. CIA’s Implemen”
“-19- a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers; "3b. Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation,' and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to 7 FN DOETNO y; give a pretext for a coup; *(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970) SAY UT c. Inform those coup-mi”
“will prob ably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism...You may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel, that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence ser”
“-2- In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assis- tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its activities. Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) offici”
“- 10a - 81g PAL B. ri bility of meaningful- military intervention in political situation. He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this ’cold-blooded assessment ' is that opportunities for further significant USG action with the Chilean military are nonexistent." ”
“of General Schneider (all I of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows: 1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from coming to power was to foment a coup d’”
“memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneid”
“memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, F* it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader ship of the. Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schn”
“.45 -29- (1.1 IV.' CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup A. The Chilean Conspirators Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General * who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before”
“instructions that that order should, 19 1 go directly to some subordinate officials in CIA and should be : 20 done without advising the official channels. And- it is thought: 21 that they were directed against a General Schneider, who was 22 a top official in the Chilean ”
“Her TOL# -3- A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers, both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and to kidnap General .Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy”
“- 10a - 23 R’ •81IN ler, + 37 71 01 # n bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation. He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action with the Chilean military ar”
“military, embodied by General % Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. * Government would support ”
“themselves ac cordingly. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5) By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction. On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert/met with the Army LE. 0 solon”
“.4 288 7 • 4 -31- * U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6) Three days later the Chief of Station told Genem 06/08 chommoiker, of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu- tion and is willing to support it in any manner short”
“-29- „f 25 sa ** TA IV.' CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup A. The CChilean Conspirators Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General * who had led the "Taenazo" insurrection a year b”
“the Army Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.* * As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military off”
“Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, €‘ it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader- ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider,”
“of General Schneider (all of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows: 1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from coming to power was to foment a coup d'et”
“t* % U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6) Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu- [" tion and is willing to support it in 'any manner short of outri”
“appointment of General Valenzuela as chief of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile Task Force to make the following initial judgment: With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack”
“he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should Allende assume office. Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to powe”
“appointment of General Prats to| as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Va] uel of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken,, Task Force to make the following initial judgment: With only 24 hours remaining before the Congre runoff, a coup climat”
“* U.Si’policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6) Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander of the Carabineros that '’the U.S. Government favors a military solu- tion and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright ”
“had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should Allende assume office. Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power w”
“pects involved should a Chilean military coup, be organized now with U.S. assistance, and 2) the pros and cons and problems and pros pects involved in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition to Allende. (CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Act”
“pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant....Just continual pressure.... ”
“move and organized themselves ac cordingly. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile,". July 15, 1975, p. 5) By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction. On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with th”
“Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main tain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future. 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger’s note that the Agency should continue keeping the pres sure on ”
“by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. * Government would support a coup both before an”
“the Navyc 08 late in the evening of October 18 and con- sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.* * As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers—Valenzuela, et. al.— rath”
“SCHNEIDER REPORT T I. Summary 3 MILA : i 1On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.* Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a joint session of its ”
“-29- •IV. LXB V CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup A. The Chilean Conspirators Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General * who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. F”
“military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. * Government would support a ”
“-27- The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover” CIA officerjin Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Wa”
“% -36- D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux’s Ensabes fu-led on October 17. There ^responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 Oct”
“pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I.mean it was just constant, constant.. .Just continual pressure... I”
“to move and organized themselves ac cordingly. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5) By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction. On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with ”
“-14- of .State U. Alexis Johnson: 2. ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been force”
“-14- of State U. Alexis Johnson: 2. ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available •4 to you that if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been for”
“Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.* * As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to •promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers—Valenzue”
“-27- The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Wa”
“-38- That same day. General Valenzuela informed/Colonel Wimert that he. General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General, were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of Ge”
“-27- The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Wa”
“-38- ,That same day. General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he. General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of”