“requests from any committees of the - O M Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the M U T White House. At the present time, the consensus of those A IED persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release 2 ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN - ”
“13-00000 CON FIDENTIAL B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and main”
“SECRET analysis, for FBI personnel. • In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Cur”
“IAREI 15. The structure which would mne at the crite. nggusted in this memorandum would be as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general clesronca authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment Io”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or at tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa tive on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff ”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency shouldEoVa nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the yesra since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte ef the world. A number of governments 111! in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 0% overthrow •”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly. I cl . 1 ° * : % Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all W. S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual fi”
“iIn volume the most material and according to CIA analysts p most of that information. a large proportion of that is keyed to their report an’ yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carrie d out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a s”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“KI SECRET SuE SANEI2ED 1 06RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked I”
“by the U. S. Government if they were presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government. CIA Personnel Under State Cover The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various allowa”
“14-00000 other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation. White House Relations We are concerned about Agency relationships with the White House insofar as handling of intelligence matters i”
“ould so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances where continuin g CIA p ursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau s discharge of its in te”
“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 178-10004-10115 REPORT' TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission: In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique ”
“of U.S. Intelligence. What clandestine perations are being carried out in the name of America? Is the CIA INTELLIGENCE paring to entangle us in another war similar to the Indochina War? REPORT "hat information is going into Federal, State, local and private data cols on innoc”
“4-00000 SEUNLT Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated. Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an importan”
“memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. " AR THE ORIGINAL Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many IBR parts the world. A number of governments still la power know”
“SECRET IC 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this ■.I memorandum would e as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general .clearance authiruty over all clandestine activity. This. • right be effectuated on the British model by the ap”
“~.3W CEARET OLORLI " '(Z) Mail Coverage. 'Another much needed intelli-ns gence tool is mail coverage.. • Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our represen- tatives should confer and exami”
“congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that, would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further more, we were under i”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yot. to the yeare since, CIA has, to effect, ‘made’ policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even bean targets of CIA attempts at overthrow”
“SECRET 14-00000 Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera- tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated. Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important”
“INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 19 f___ 21 jaw an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. "Cixthe n got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation. Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluate”
“IC. .to” 8. (the other 2200 BTC presumably under military OF er —State official cover). Oridnally the us of State Departs r for CIA personnel W38 supposed 3 trictly limited as The Dulles-Correa- ackson report stated 1948, e CIA should not use State Departtuent cover is a ”
“G. c.-vd € ( •* Mr. William E. Colby Page Four June 26, 1975 for the use of each such technique? How was the use of each such technique authorized, reviewed, and con trolled, internally and externally? What was the effectiveness of each such technique in achieving the”
“13-00000 ... / * PUBLICATIONS JOIN THE COUNTER-SPY INTELLIGENCE REPORT CARIS publishes a bi-weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT and a uaterly named COUNTERSPY featuring various articles examining 'he structures and operations of U.S. Intelligence. In addition, CARIC -***% jub ishes”
“contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on : a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the ”
“13-00000 1 Guidelines for Providing Information to Congressional Oversight Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Security Services These guidelines take into account tlie fact that foreign intelligence and security services, when acting in connection witli the Agency’s o”
“listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are GAS personnel of the 31 officers listed on engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chils, 11 are CAS. Un”
“0 SECRET from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for 'the inclusion- of this information.in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of there th”
“State/CIA relations, he said that he felt this relationship had been codified to the extent that this was possible and that it was now a matter for Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station to work but their own individual arrangements. He hopes that we will be able to find some way”
“Agency efforts abroad by publishing lists of CIA personnel in specific Stations; revelation 28 of office of Communications)personnel in every Embassy abroad; the Agency role in countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking and training provided other services to counteract thes”
“14-00000 Her We believe the DCI’s office should also review all assign- WT ments in the middle management echelon with particular reference 7 to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training and suitability. Public Relations We recommend that the p”
“SANT16P vL If 16\ d. 5/11 6 SECRET CIA June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization 1 submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. On balance, CIA’s record has p”
“government. There have beon troubles of a comparable revtin B 00t onalsverst 00 in a 2566 0 CIA has I gold‘ that, in 3ush CE88S, neither the Embassy nsr the Depart 0 is noszeelly : mint in Washington informed this type 1 operation. n F A i- - ndexciseassho”
“element. 18 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Miler. From a counter-intelligence standpoint, 191 it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that 2C in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad. There i- 21 a means of working together ”
“FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DI”
“In such cases it will be apprecia ted if you will advise us of suc h r eferral in order that we m ay anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission (?) and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710) CIA The policy of eliminating reference to ”
“extended readership. There will be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of . problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. Inevitably, the net effect will be to reduce the usefulness of the system. Another difficulty involves security. To be usefu”
“confided to CIA •- photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt ccllec- ticl, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with State Department 08 1 2120 ”
“ongoing operations or harm individuals. If CIA did not provide evidence of one of the i. Review Board guidelines. With only a two above-referenced harms, the Review few exceptions, the Review Board released Board released the name at issue. In addition, the pseudonyms of indiv”
“from the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, and the Senate Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activitie”
“CIA proposed secrecy law is a blacotail weapon. Intelligence, money and secrecy combine to constitute autocratic power in our society. The Congress enjoys no intelligence service of its own. _ It enjoys no offective control over spending of funds hidden in the budgets of non”
“DCI."L/ The memorandum went on to sa y: b. c. It is obviou s that a compilation of Special Group ap provals in no way reflects the totality of signifi- cant CIA activities carried on over the past 15 years. With respect to overall DDP activity, it does not include any mention of ”
“CREr Z. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggs sta ways in which some cf those prob- lemns can perhaps be alleviated 1. CIA Autonomy • CIA conducts three main forms cf secret work; clandestine intelli- gence collect”
“sion is standing by to appear for a non-operational briefing covering organization, mission, etc. FR 2. Attached hereto is a Senate Select Committee document entitled "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" which represents the Committee's own ground rules. 3. According to this attachme”