“congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that, would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further more, we were under i”
“from the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, and the Senate Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activitie”
“FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DI”
“CONFIDENTIAL 4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between ”
“Committee.i Six months earlier my letter of August 141, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the . Industrial State." .It concluded with the startling premise I am now propared to prove to the Senate: "It is my firm p”
“Special Prosecutor are continuing to be supplied. d. Requests for Agency documents and files for the Special Counsel of the Impeachment Committee are being honored. Our search has not revealed the participation of any CIA personnel not previously identified. 1IGG”
“confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain • within its legislative charter. ' I am arranging for the published * transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific. direction made ”
“-3- Any investigation and review of C.I.A., or any other element of that community should be made within that context. After many years of service in the security field, I can fully understand the extreme sense of frustration among the United States Government officials rega”
“sion is standing by to appear for a non-operational briefing covering organization, mission, etc. 2. Attached hereto is a Senate Select Committee document entitled "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" which represents the Committee's own ground rules. 3. According to this attachment,”
“sion is standing by to appear for a non-operational briefing covering organization, mission, etc. FR 2. Attached hereto is a Senate Select Committee document entitled "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" which represents the Committee's own ground rules. 3. According to this attachme”
“operations. The Committee intends to approach the issues of the CIA’s domestic activities with a broad perspective, realizing, as I am sure you agree, that the' threats to United States security and the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence, as well as CIA inst”
“(3) am alarmed that no witness has pointed a fingor of blame at the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. It is the Magna Charta of CIA’s Dom- estic Intelligence Division. This act specifically provided cover for CIA. It effectively repealed CIA’s restriction to foreign op”
“-6- . relating to that investigation was destroyed upon its completion.* A final deficiency in the evidence stems from the 12 doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed from the world and performed in such a way that if they were discovered, the role of ”
“CIA proposed secrecy law is a blacotail weapon. Intelligence, money and secrecy combine to constitute autocratic power in our society. The Congress enjoys no intelligence service of its own. _ It enjoys no offective control over spending of funds hidden in the budgets of non”
“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“requests from any committees of the - O M Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the M U T White House. At the present time, the consensus of those A IED persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release 2 ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN - ”
“(D • d 80, A. 1. J1■ Mr. Inderfurth. Ny-rlies ust add a line that that 'charter 9 should state that and then to into this. Mr. Kirbow. Are you recommending a revision of the 1 1947 Act to change the charter of the CIA or to make it clearer R 1 -or more specific, or do y”
“that will ’ .... establishment of a reason for it,, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open, many historical documents as be responsible for declassifying aas is “... an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that tion of intelligence sources and possible, ”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“supply the Committee with the sp e- cifics in those cases where the Agency has in fact engaged p riv ate investigators to do Agency wor k? I Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. con fess thi s m ay be a tough job to locate every case but I certainly will do my best. ”
“) ) Question 28 MR. DIRECTOR, WHEN YOU WERE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE LAST YEAR WE ASKED YOU TO OUTLINE FOR US THE PARTICIPATION IN THE WATERGATE BURGLARY AND THE SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT TO COVER UP WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT IN THAT BURGLARY AND YOU DID SO VERY WELL. HAS ANYTHING BEEN UNCO”
“w • ‘I Hio hiding places for res hiililitv on accountability But I think creation of a separate unit here and consolidation 5 i would enhance accountability rather than make it more difficult. 1 We have .found out in our look at the Kennedy assassination r ! and I think ”
“.. cy is et y‘ * in61%,itPA 110 to he before 1971, 1972. Senator Huddleston Is there anv chance that anybody would be denied the product of this investigation if We changed ■ 4 it? 5| Mr. Bader. One cf the things we should bear in mind. 6iMr. Chairman, is that if yo”
“0-2* &s 31 So it isn’t really lush a question. I would argue. 2 of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter of looking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiry 1 and saying, in fact, this- is going to be an impediment and it 5 is my personal opi”
“NA-HSM* F14 :83 ‘rember 27 because it has -bracketed portion that we might considerably do away with. That's page 40. v। The bracketed portion navs that the NSC would approve /7. all counter-intelligence activities of the CIA in the United *3 States and- it spells ou”
“agencies or private companies and CIA’s assistance to them; CIA management of its investments; CIA use of proprietaries, notional organizations and devised facilities; CIA experi ments with drugs on unwitting U. S. citizens; CIA detention of individuals within the United St”
“iIn volume the most material and according to CIA analysts p most of that information. a large proportion of that is keyed to their report an’ yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carrie d out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a s”
“trie € ( id Mr. William E. Colby Page Five June 26, 1975 10. Have governmental officials outside the CIA sought and obtained the CIA’s assistance for-political pur poses or personal advantage? To what extent have private organizations or individuals enjoyed special tr”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 178-10004-10115 REPORT' TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission: In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique ”
“January 28, 1976 The Honorable Otis Fiko, Chairhan House Select Committee on Intelligence, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D. C. 20515 Dear Congressman Pike: Congratulations on your Committee’s great service to the American elec torate in removing some of the ”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“13-00000 1 0 0 AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES 1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive mat”
“13-00000 , APR 04 ‘97 10:10AM P. 32/44 PAGE 32 D 56 Md. L. Rev. 1. *27 % and accompanying text. nl70. See Exhibit Three infra p. 43. The CIA originally sought to postpone the information that is in the brackets. See id. In some cases, information was postponed, but subst”
“TOP SECRET * -& 72 Phone (Ares 202) $44-6000 1 wo S* o it went to many other people. But whether it actually got to C 2 the Secretary of State, I do not know. 3 Mr. Miler. I think one important point here that I 4 would like to make is that what has happened, in m”
“0P. 44. at 043 1 intelligence information. that this would not, you know, that 2 at the same time the Agency could be directed to perform such 3 other collection tasks as directed by the NSC. 4 In other words, the point is that certainly they do 5 some overt collection. For”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“element. 18 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Miler. From a counter-intelligence standpoint, 191 it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that 2C in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad. There i- 21 a means of working together ”
“CIA, see Victor Marchetti & John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 4-12 (1974). See generally Johnson, supra note 29 (discussing the problems of strategic intelligence in a democratic society). n73. See Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, Repo”
“13-00000 1 Guidelines for Providing Information to Congressional Oversight Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Security Services These guidelines take into account tlie fact that foreign intelligence and security services, when acting in connection witli the Agency’s o”
“view of this matter supply the Committee with the spe- cifics in those cases where the Ag enc y h as in fact engaged private investigators to do Agency work? I Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. confess this may be a tough job to locate every case but I certainly w”
“KI SECRET SuE SANEI2ED 1 06RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked I”
“~.3W CEARET OLORLI " '(Z) Mail Coverage. 'Another much needed intelli-ns gence tool is mail coverage.. • Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our represen- tatives should confer and exami”
“13-00000 APR 04 ‘97 10:04AM P.16/44 PAGE 16 56 Md. L. Rev. 1, *13 D violated 50 U.S.C. 403 (the statute creating the CIA), to determine whether there were adequate safeguards to prevent activities that violated the statute, and to make recommendations to the President and ”
“20 TOP SECRET oBocs-tAaneeom 50 Phone (Area 202)1644-6000 1 We rean a seminar using the highest talent that we had and N 2 revealing as much information as we could conceivably reveal. 3 And so our whole mental attitude was that counter-intelli gence, one of its high”
“In such cases it will be apprecia ted if you will advise us of suc h r eferral in order that we m ay anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission (?) and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710) CIA The policy of eliminating reference to ”
“ment entitled "Outline for Inquiry Procedures" which represents the Committee's own ground rules. 3. According to this attachment, witnesses or interviewees will fall into two categories: a. b. : Those discussing information on the structure and functions of CIA plus substantive ”
“details, about the , , project might prompt other nations . to a lower court for further hearings. offended by the project to retaliate“ The filing marks an abrupt change against the United States. j from the previous position taken by Scowcroft said that retaliation1 the Ju”
“. de € ( Cencoo 0 Mr. William E. Colby Page Two June 26, 1975 4. Relationships between other organizations, public and private, and the CIA. 5. The use of CIA personnel, funds, or facilities for pur poses unrelated to its intelligence missions. Within these broad su”
“14-00000 handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro priate Congressional committees on these matters. We are par”
“0000 • • ,*• . 1 : C D. In making any excisions or other alterations of requested materials, CIA shall be bound by 18 U. S. C. Subsection 1505 and all other applicable statutes. • • II. Request Procedure A. The CIA element responsible for dealing with the Committee is th”