“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“also absorb the present Operational Services Staff and certain other activities. 9. A Special Task Force is created for such operations of a magnitude that transcends the capabilities of one division. 1C. The International Organizations Division and Covert Action Staff are”
“… 6RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked ID CSS during the IPHOTOCOPIED’ BY THE KENNEDY, …”
“SANT16P vL If 16\ d. 5/11 6 SECRET CIA June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization 1 submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. On bal …”
“IAREI 15. The structure which would mne at the crite. nggusted in this memorandum would be as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general clesronca authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment Io”
“SECRET IC 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this ■.I memorandum would e as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general .clearance authiruty over all clandestine activity. This. • right be effectuated on the British model by the ap”
“Administra and ICA MOF THE presently do..: * I t: ■ : 4) / second semi -independent agency would be set up, again .bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi-ci :note with the operations agency. This agency would be charged :. a with responsibility f”
“which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the 21 military services, the Department of State, and all other -22 agencies concerned.< 23 You are going to have to have a perception of the real problems and what is involved in counterintelligence in order © 24 25 to o”
“14-00000 Her We believe the DCI’s office should also review all assign- WT ments in the middle management echelon with particular reference 7 to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training and suitability. Public Relations We recommend that the p”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“F.2f -Tet ghee 9.: 14 Now mv question in this. Assuming that we were to achieve all of the measures in the recommendations that we have here for the DCI budget and all the rest, it seems to me that that is an awful lo t of work without having to be concerned with the da”
“SECRET 6 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows: ‘ 1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment”
“wEin V8d&s SFRACITEFF SECRET Ge-twts EiLa deception lack ready or frequent access to the policy level. They attempt to frame deception plans in ignorance of new policies, and they can obtain top- level review of their plans only on an ad hoc basis. The remedy is not ”
“function among the area branches and a degradation of the work to such lowest common, denominators as name tracing, maintenance of counterintelligence files and the like. A notice of 20 December 1954 announced the formation of a new, senior counterintelligence element, the”
“IC. .to” 8. (the other 2200 BTC presumably under military OF er —State official cover). Oridnally the us of State Departs r for CIA personnel W38 supposed 3 trictly limited as The Dulles-Correa- ackson report stated 1948, e CIA should not use State Departtuent cover is a ”
“SEGHE SENSITIVE IV. RECOMMENDATIONS The following recommendations are presented for the consideration of the Commission with the sole intent of revitalizing national counterintelligence and enabling it to discharge its assigned responsibilities in furtherance of nation”
“-2 - 1) Clarify CIA’s mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to' reflect: --that included in the proper functions 6f the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter- ”
“otUnt I IC- 14. that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number low -level agents in operations branch CIA, was denied to € me to ficiale be Intelligence 1 nch. The Bureau Intelligence and Research kar ven lass about the Cuban operation. The”
“congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that, would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further more, we were under i”
“0-2* &s 31 So it isn’t really lush a question. I would argue. 2 of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter of looking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiry 1 and saying, in fact, this- is going to be an impediment and it 5 is my personal opi”
“14-00000 handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro priate Congressional committees on these matters. We are par”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordt- nate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now ca”
“SECREI 9. the uighot of €9 Conerols’ revnst ia Algerl?. pe$*ezo-by noted with amnueemznt that the top floor van ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to ascora entrance that night to the CIA offices cely with difficulty.) . CLA 10 moparently d”
“charged the Director of Central Intelligence with the conduct of all organized federal counterespionage operations overseas, the new Agency did not have a central counterintelligence unit of mechanism through which it could meet its counter- intelligence responsibilities. o”
“If -< t *0i 1 awhile before stepping yto the question of whether he can really adequately perform and wear both hats. Those are essentially, I think, the arguments. If there 1 are-others that ought to be offered in explanation of the choice 5 Mr. Bader. I would just und”
“title (the Foreign legearch Agency), coordi- nato with the operations agency. This agency world be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation 2t would include CLA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Reosarch tn State, and the various service functions now car”
“CREr Z. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggs sta ways in which some cf those prob- lemns can perhaps be alleviated 1. CIA Autonomy • CIA conducts three main forms cf secret work; clandestine intelli- gence collect”
“of 5,662. As a result CIA could not meet its counterintelligence responsibilities adequately even at this peak of on-board counterintelligence strength. It is our view that the Operations Directorate ought to devote no less than 10 per cent of its manpower to counterintel”
“4-00000 7 C 24 all matters involving -. Further, this officer should have full control authority over. C 24 and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I, should keep this officer advised on a daily basis C 24 _s .ac. 1 War Plans Because of the vital”
“.. cy is et y‘ * in61%,itPA 110 to he before 1971, 1972. Senator Huddleston Is there anv chance that anybody would be denied the product of this investigation if We changed ■ 4 it? 5| Mr. Bader. One cf the things we should bear in mind. 6iMr. Chairman, is that if yo”
“14-00000 6 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities 1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the working group which you established in January to consult with y”
“officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board. 7”
“need for revamping of the "intelli gence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not able to control its operatives once they are in the field and of the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo.) HW 509”
“6 SECRET 14. that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State kne”
“confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain • within its legislative charter. ' I am arranging for the published * transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific. direction made ”
“SECRE[ J. For ikn part, CIA Lias developed A whale series 01 functions poral- .lelinng already existing functions of the State Department, and cf the Defense Department as well. Today it bas its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign servi”
“perroneal. Partly because CIA paid higher calasies and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave him people courageous pro- tection against McCarthyite attacks. CIA was able to attract and hold large number of able and independent minded men. Tke more It elded brilliant act”
“CIA id higher salaris Ieven * EKE perhapa scause Allos one pro-.0 H tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA able t and hold YT OF . a large number od able independent-m a DB added brilliant i ctivist its staff, the n 9p038tions developed, and the greater role it pl”
“14-00000 - 2 - he As the first and principal step toward this arrangement, it is recommended that an experienced, knowledgeable, high-level CIA officer responsible to ADIC be stationed in the NCFE organisation to work directly with Admiral Miller. For cover purposes he wou”
“w • ‘I Hio hiding places for res hiililitv on accountability But I think creation of a separate unit here and consolidation 5 i would enhance accountability rather than make it more difficult. 1 We have .found out in our look at the Kennedy assassination r ! and I think ”
“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“Sttmtl 8. 0A % wdlothan220,0 freprempu / under military or other 'mitato 3Eficial cover)." Originally the uge of Siste Department cover for 0° Moe personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. be bullen-Correx-Jackeon report stated in 1948, "The CTA should ”
“above. Further, he does not concur in this recommenda tion because it does not distinguish sufficiently the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-wide functions which the recommended Office must perform if the DCI is to execute effectively his prin”
“and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing. \ While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely th”
“.- ta APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CW HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 23 October 1962 00 10/255/62 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: After Action Report on the Findings of the Working Group This is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April 1962 which”
“NA-HSM* F14 :83 ‘rember 27 because it has -bracketed portion that we might considerably do away with. That's page 40. v। The bracketed portion navs that the NSC would approve /7. all counter-intelligence activities of the CIA in the United *3 States and- it spells ou”
“14-00000 ,5 “ SEP. 28. 1998 3:25PM A NO. 279 P.4 / Oar ^ 0. SE C RET 98 (Israel, and a contract agent in New York. In addition to the ft Office of the Chief (including two special assistants and a Secretariat) the Staff was composed of seven "Divisions" and four "Gr”
“e1 1 SECRET \o. 2. conception 01 the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum al so suggests in which tl lems can perhaps be alleviated. L CIA Autonomy 8 CIA conducts three r ain forms of icret work clandestine intelil- gence collection: Co- po”
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