“14-00000 e .TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction :II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967 Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? B. Is the Claimed”
“this instance the Second Chief Directorate) upon which there previously had been relatively little inside • information. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from other sources, it would be arbitrarily confining if an assumption were not made that certain KG3 standards”
“14-00000 y • TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since .30 October 1967 III. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? 1 B. Is the”
“14-00000 or specuw* INTRODUCTION The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi- zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt ”
“14-00000 SECRET PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been gi”
“14-00000 orpye onbnbl 1 October 196S MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security 7 FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich 1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with c”
“1 4-00000 SEUKE: PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been g”
“152 HT C 5/ ., 00 DNLY * CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . WASHINGTON 25, D.C 19! ■ , OffICE Of DEPUTY DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELUGENCE CM Man de . : 12 February 1964 HENORANDUN FOR: teexed c United States Intelligence Board Members. SUsJctsi.m Yuri Ivanovich NOSENK”
“1- 00000 • • 765. I I. Summary of Conclusions CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO case for the purpose of reaching a definitive conclusion about the bone fides of this xan who says he is a KGB officer-defector collaborating with American Intelligence. ”
“14-00000 SECRET ,sornt-nritt-wD-nodMSM ANA LY TICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi trary but realisti”
“14-00000 SECXEI "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, non”
“1 1-00000 1U/ 05294 .• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25 0 C 9 OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUCENCE 12 February 1964 NEORANDUN FOR: United Statas Intelligence Board Members SUBJECT: ‘‘. Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This memorandum refers to the Stat”
“30000 QEODET oLUNLI ANALY TICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi trary but realistic list of areas cons”
“14-00000 / . extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation — compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual of group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of t”
“4-00000 C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi- zation reasonably commensurate wit”
“Top Secret [ (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB”
“IF". .: u-v.— 1 October 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff SUBJECT . : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich / 1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director .of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclus”
“originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom ho had come in con”
“14-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO / In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency’s legal basis for i”
“14-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO / In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency’s legal basis for i”
“0- 7/08 SECRET I. PREFACE 1 A. Purpose of Paper This paper has been prepared to compare the results of the 1967-68 interrogations of YURI NOSENKO with a CIA paper dated February, 1968, entitled ”The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." This CIA paper was bas”
“4-00000 SECRET D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning - . KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen- surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor- mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations”
“’During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel ligence matters because h”
“14-00000 1 W TOP SECRET W 766, Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among E the alternatives, for what has transpired since contact with € CIA began in 1962. CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is unequivocal: de is a dispatched agent contr”
“mean our acquaintances, don't you? NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with someone, because anyone in the KGB should know' that, yes, there was a NOSENKO. INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV? NOSENKO: No, of course not, because I gave”
“14-00000 SECRET. D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ”
“14-00000 % OCODCT OLV.L: G. Is there evidence of a political or any other-type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA, concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific missio”
“1 4-00000 C 4 ‘4 C C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? D. . Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi zation reasonably”
“14-00000 SECRET select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter- act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for ”
“14-00000 187 til ,EYES CNLY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, O C. OFFICE or DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUCENCE 1 12 February 1964 NEORANDUN FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members SUSJSCT1 . Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This memorandum refers to the”
“The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN’s defection, the date of ABIDIAN’s visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSO- LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all ti”
“good memorization ofdetails. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the exceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short per”
“ntroduction On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nose nko, a Soviet official temporarily assi gned to Gene va, contacted an American Foreign Service Officer in a move that was eventually to lead to Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of events that is unequaled in co”
“14-00000 - .titd UNL1 • ’C-NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY /% WASHINGTON 25. D. C. (3, OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE 12 February 1964 NEHORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members SUBJECT Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO - .1. This memorandum refers to”
“14-00000 SLUAE! F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion € that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB, in reachin”
“iques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October. 4. Thi s first pha se has enabled us to confirm our analyses of key aspects of this case. More important is the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive. areas and this is worrying him be”
“14-00000 G. Is. There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions? H. Is ”
“14-00000 643 € January 1975 SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media. 2. NOSENKO was in the United States u”
“13-00000 I SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO * S BONA FIDES NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations again”
“14-00000 ■^ ;- - rorwro-or TOP SECRET 625. 2. Remarks by CIA Handlers wit- a. Introduction inate serv Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first C”
“withhold infor mation on recruitments of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did not hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations ”
“1 4-00000 .2 gEpour 0103-2 select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter-• act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO € was dispatched by the KG3, it would appea”
“14-00000 o-ADF OLUAE1 H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after hi”
“1 Top Secret 21 Introduction 81 The judgment of NOSENKO’s bona fides entailed the distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence information assembled in connection with his case, including the product of,his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of KGB operations ”
“14-00000 pg © G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Of er Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the au3 W.th Permission to Speak Freely to C A . Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NCSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions”
“% Csit. 2 TOP-SECRET -- - fee _ 603. VII. SPECIALISTS’ ASSESSHEITS OF NOSEIKO ACS32 OR CASE 19% A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality 30ECN BEWE PROGRAMS 1. Grephoioqical Analysis .1 Three pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made by NOSENKO during ”
“14-00000 SFPSC7 0uvf. 02 046 : Ay-ceavo i Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and r”
“14-00000 763. individual theories, it cannot explain the counterarguments discussed under component parts above. e. Insanity It might be postulated that NOSENKO went insano and that this was the cause not only of his seemingly unmotivated contact with CIA in 1962 but of”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET 759. wauttosert. Most of them have described the serious repercus- sions of NOSENKO’s defection. The possibi 1it lies with regard to the accuracy of these sources • reporting are: First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing analysis is in error, th”
“14-00000 TSP. C. ET 0/0300 LYE) une. : 9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, 0.0 ., OFFICE of DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 4 . - Jo it February 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: 3 United States Intelligence Board Members. h’IM V.Tcohr, ": - *4 : :: - -7 • SUB”