“this instance the Second Chief Directorate) upon which there previously had been relatively little inside • information. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from other sources, it would be arbitrarily confining if an assumption were not made that certain KG3 standards”
“14-00000 e .TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction :II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967 Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? B. Is the Claimed”
“14-00000 y • TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since .30 October 1967 III. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? 1 B. Is the”
“14-00000 or specuw* INTRODUCTION The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi- zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt ”
“14-00000 SECRET PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been gi”
“1- 00000 • • 765. I I. Summary of Conclusions CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO case for the purpose of reaching a definitive conclusion about the bone fides of this xan who says he is a KGB officer-defector collaborating with American Intelligence. ”
“1 4-00000 SEUKE: PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been g”
“14-00000 orpye onbnbl 1 October 196S MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security 7 FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich 1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with c”
“14-00000 SECRET ,sornt-nritt-wD-nodMSM ANA LY TICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi trary but realisti”
“14-00000 / . extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation — compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual of group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of t”
“30000 QEODET oLUNLI ANALY TICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi trary but realistic list of areas cons”
“152 HT C 5/ ., 00 DNLY * CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . WASHINGTON 25, D.C 19! ■ , OffICE Of DEPUTY DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELUGENCE CM Man de . : 12 February 1964 HENORANDUN FOR: teexed c United States Intelligence Board Members. SUsJctsi.m Yuri Ivanovich NOSENK”
“14-00000 SECXEI "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, non”
“1 1-00000 1U/ 05294 .• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25 0 C 9 OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUCENCE 12 February 1964 NEORANDUN FOR: United Statas Intelligence Board Members SUBJECT: ‘‘. Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This memorandum refers to the Stat”
“4-00000 C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi- zation reasonably commensurate wit”
“IF". .: u-v.— 1 October 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff SUBJECT . : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich / 1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director .of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclus”
“originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom ho had come in con”
“’During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel ligence matters because h”
“14-00000 SECRET select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter- act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for ”
“mean our acquaintances, don't you? NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with someone, because anyone in the KGB should know' that, yes, there was a NOSENKO. INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV? NOSENKO: No, of course not, because I gave”
“4-00000 SECRET D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning - . KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen- surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor- mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations”
“14-00000 % OCODCT OLV.L: G. Is there evidence of a political or any other-type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA, concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific missio”
“The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN’s defection, the date of ABIDIAN’s visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSO- LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all ti”
“good memorization ofdetails. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the exceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short per”
“14-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO / In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency’s legal basis for i”
“14-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO / In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency’s legal basis for i”
“14-00000 SECRET. D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ”
“14-00000 SLUAE! F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion € that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB, in reachin”
“1 4-00000 C 4 ‘4 C C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? D. . Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi zation reasonably”
“14-00000 187 til ,EYES CNLY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, O C. OFFICE or DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUCENCE 1 12 February 1964 NEORANDUN FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members SUSJSCT1 . Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO 1. This memorandum refers to the”
“Top Secret [ (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB”
“14-00000 1 W TOP SECRET W 766, Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among E the alternatives, for what has transpired since contact with € CIA began in 1962. CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is unequivocal: de is a dispatched agent contr”
“withhold infor mation on recruitments of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did not hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations ”
“ntroduction On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nose nko, a Soviet official temporarily assi gned to Gene va, contacted an American Foreign Service Officer in a move that was eventually to lead to Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of events that is unequaled in co”
“0- 7/08 SECRET I. PREFACE 1 A. Purpose of Paper This paper has been prepared to compare the results of the 1967-68 interrogations of YURI NOSENKO with a CIA paper dated February, 1968, entitled ”The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." This CIA paper was bas”
“14-00000 G. Is. There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions? H. Is ”
“13-00000 I SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO * S BONA FIDES NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations again”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET 835. H. Evaluation The conclusion that NOSENKO is on a KE mission could carry damaging implications to the Amer ican intelligence sources wno have supported his bone tides. Unless tpeir statements or. NOSENKO can be convincingly explained as innocent ”
“counterintelligence officer. From a comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who defected to Western services has produced significant military, economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few have supplied political information (usually co”
“14-00000 - .titd UNL1 • ’C-NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY /% WASHINGTON 25. D. C. (3, OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE 12 February 1964 NEHORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members SUBJECT Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO - .1. This memorandum refers to”
“so large that the damage to KGB agent opora- 1tions was substantial. None of NOSEKO’s unique GRU identifica- tions were abroad at the time of his defection or have been since. These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence of NOSENKO’s bona fides. At the same”
“14-00000 o-ADF OLUAE1 H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after hi”
“14-00000 AVIULVUIILI 750. 3. Motivation Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source might not want or be able to admit even to hinself. Thus, what NOSENKO said a”
“1 4-00000 .2 gEpour 0103-2 select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter-• act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO € was dispatched by the KG3, it would appea”
“14-00000 TOP SECRET 759. wauttosert. Most of them have described the serious repercus- sions of NOSENKO’s defection. The possibi 1it lies with regard to the accuracy of these sources • reporting are: First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing analysis is in error, th”
“14-00000 pg © G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Of er Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the au3 W.th Permission to Speak Freely to C A . Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NCSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions”
“14-00000 ■^ ;- - rorwro-or TOP SECRET 625. 2. Remarks by CIA Handlers wit- a. Introduction inate serv Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first C”
“1 26 Top Secret (SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS) Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector , it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for. Here,, it must be providing the information he has given. Here ”
“14-00000 763. individual theories, it cannot explain the counterarguments discussed under component parts above. e. Insanity It might be postulated that NOSENKO went insano and that this was the cause not only of his seemingly unmotivated contact with CIA in 1962 but of”
“14-00000 cUnul necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of the particular areas considered was ”