Results for COMMENTS ON MANUSCRIPT 'GIVE US THIS DAY'; 'CIA AND THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION' BY E.J. HAMILTON.

“13-0Q000 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION DCI-8 Volume III EVOLUTION OF CIA'S ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES, 1959-JANUARY 1961 December 1979 Jack B. Pfeiffer TOP SECRET”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET Source References- Part II Castro Must Go A. Organizing for Covert Action, Jan-Mar 60 1. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 8 Jan 60. S. 2. CIA Inspector General’s Survey of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Oct 61, p. 5. TS 173040. (Hereinafter cited as I. G.”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION Volume III Evolution of CIA's Anti-Castro Policies, 1950 - January 1961 Part I Background A. Watching from the Sidelines Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo Bay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis, to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief, Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were w”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET In the mid—1950's, Havana Station ran seven approved FI projects, most of which were aimed at the Cuban Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular). Agency funds also were used to support the efforts of an anti-Communist organization enga”

“El 249 ^ ^ M -^ W ^ 2 * 2 $8% 5 6 0 g 1 and ■ our COMINT, ELINT and other specialists to look at the OV and make & decision as to whether the operation should go or 3 not go. At that point I probably would have known that i was 4 a cache, that it contained weapons, that ”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET there was training. That was clearly authorized, and it was clearly contemplated that there would be or could be a military action. But it simply was not true that • Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't change. As a matter of fact, the planning ”

“■ Ponor IAras 2021 5*4 Goco 1 Mr. Halley.: Yes. That’s aff the top of my head. That’s 2 :my recollection of it-- 3 ME. Johnston, Just for the record, I think it was the ■ ■ % . ' 4 1019 1 Senator Sehweiker. But in sum and fubstande your duties 6 I were basically the s”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET Finally, the reader of this volume should gain • some insights to the character of various of the principal actors — Agency and non-Agency — who were involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro policy during the period from its inception th”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET it would be "desirable" to break relations with Cuba prior to 20 January of 1961. At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960, it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group’s membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to in­ clude Amba”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET to be made if strike operations were to be conducted against the Castro government. In the course of his eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need for resolution of the problem that had particularly bothered the Special Group — that was whethe”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET "deniability" would be the albatross around the necks of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, (C.G., 15 April 1961) it became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs. This volume describes the Agency’s organization”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET States), the possible commitment of the United States personnel (as ''volunteers" or contracts), and possible overt US intervention to'remove Fidel Castro.* 46/ * Despite the availability of documentary records and autobiographical information about P”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET Mr. Gray commented that a problem would be posed for administration offi­ cials if a decision should be taken to change our attitude toward Castro, as outlined earlier in the meeting. He acknowledged that any such decision must be kept highly secret,”

“SECRET Lt Col Haig/78029/29Oct63/md OSA 353-CUBA October 29, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN CRIMMINS 10/29/63 Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Department of State SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Revision of the Paper Entitled "Training of”

“General, Director of Central Intelligence , General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM’s are discovered in Cuba:. "McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive ”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET 2. That any move, to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted. 3. That the operation be abandoned if policy does hot provide for use of adequate tactical air support. In order to insure the success of both”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET forcefully as being sure their host would object. I asked if he was proposing overt in­ tervention by US armed forces. He said absolutely not. The essence of his plan would be to land in Cuba, presumably in the next month or two, a force of 600 tra”

“fi THE WHITE HOUSE TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTON 'EYES ONLY November 12, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba 1. I refer to your interest in hearing more about the Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment ”

“■ 1: 4 0 4 - - . - trend • AaLMe* de 7, y :, Ja, VEX o . 1 wee ****** together to try to keep these operations from going to Cuba,■ In that context, : • - - :: .a 5 :' coor clnation me chani Em that. we ■ had fo%. gstting bonts ■ our. 1: don’t recall our taking thei”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET to anti-Castro dissidents, November’s plans called for an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support by State controlled to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a provisional government (approved and sponsored by CIA) could issue i”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET Minutes of Special Group Meeting (from Thomas A. Parrott, 12 Jan 61].S. 34. MR from John S. Warner, 9 Jan 61, sub: DCI Appear­ ance before CIA Subcommittee on House Appropriations Committee, 6 Jan 61. (TS 174817). 35. Daily Progress Reports, WH/4/Su”

“alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere. 6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not direct”

“13-00000 . CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TOP SECRET IS March 19S0 Dear Gordon: Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum on U. S. action in Cuba which may be of interest to you.. Sincerely yours. Anleigh ARLEIGH BURKE The Honorable 11 Gordon Gray Special Assistant to the P”

“13-00000 QEPGET EYES ONLY -2- There were some questions as to the feasibility of having some- what larger teams, but Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that that is not practicable now. Mr. Bundy suggested that special attention be given to electric power installations to the ext”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET at this particular time. According to his own report of his position at this meeting, Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation without the determination to see it through and that, an abortive effort would be w”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET commitment by me, or by anyone in my admin­ istration," and he doubts that Kennedy felt "he was frozen to any position by me." 44/ Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower’s National Security Adviser, also supported his former boss when queried about the Eis”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET governments would recognize that the force lodged in Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional Government of Cuba. 8/ One strange and contradictory note which appeared during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan the briefing for the D”

“accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting on his opposition to the earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated program.' The Group then”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET propaganda including radio and publica­ tions and the paramilitary effort. Again he pointed out that this is an expensive program running to approximately $28 million. Mr. Dulles discussed the radio effort and paramilitary effort in some detail, indi”

“understood. In response to objections that such a course might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends. Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that there was some movement afo”

“plan, was discussed at length. It was reported by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was de­ tailed informatio”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET Foreword This is the third volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the problems of establishing a policy for the United States Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts came to power in Cuba. * The policy decid”

“-9- 36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965. Chase recommends phasing out suppoi t to Artime. The CIA is consider- ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; th is is similar to the kinds of tactics mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and a re a manifestation of the moral bankrup”

“General Carter has had this matter under consideration with Admiral Riley. We should receive and study the JCS plan immediately upon its approval. 2. Defense indicated that the Army have developed plans for large- scale operations against Cuba involving sabotage. No present”

“13-00000 0BCT 026-% HL! EYES ONLY 2 - / 98 All members of the Group expressed their interest in getting on with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of the / principal problems in this area is the question of a base. It was f agreed that we should”

“9 September 1978 78-2667 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT : Meeting with HSCA Staff Representatives 1. Last night at 2000 hours Messrs. Hawkins, Sturbitts, Sednauoui, Shepanek, Holmes, Joannides and the undersigned met with Messrs. Blakey and Goldsmith of the HSCA staff. The pur”

“TOP SECRET 35 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 appreciated. 2 Mr. Halley. I think what I would like to do is to try to 5 put this into some perspective. 4 The perspective really starts with the failure of the Bay 5 of Pigs Operation. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, th”

“13-00000. ( 0 98 5. The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension. DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations : which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing the operations by means of overflying Laos”

“TOP SECRET 24 1 which did occur in'the case of Cuba, all of them took their 2 authority from and came for their authority to the 54/12 3 group. 4 And when there was a question in such a meeting as to 5 whether the matter required further judgment, it was the 6 respons”

“-7- X9 1 basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA- directed covert program. 28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE. A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army to u”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET the US program should be overt or covert, with the overt implications being the ultimate application of US military force to oust Castro. DCI Dulles emphasized that contingency planning should be under- taken by the Special Group, without necessarily i”

“that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John-F. Kennedy Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is n”

“13-00000 TOP SECRET him with the necessary information, Holcomb then noted: It was the impression of the CIA ■ officers present that Admiral Dennison is a cooperative officer and favorably and objectively inclined towards CIA, and that if his needs can be met, he will ”

“■ SECRET-EYES CMLY I told the President it was my impression from information gained from clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various”

“13-00000 nw1.7/ - 5 - bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indi­ cated they would immediately take whatever steps were feasible to improve the situat”

“13-00000 NE EYES ONLY 6 November 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group, 5 November 1963 PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone. The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon, and Co”

“13-00000 taiSaaSSUBMESS 207 -2- missions (both contained in papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 7 May). There was no objection by the Group to any of the infiltration/ exfiltration operations. This approval includes the seven CIA operations, the infiltra”