“4-00000 Is -6 -*‘4 1 ( (all the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part : and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.• Remarks concerning certain errors, incon”
“14-00000 SECRE1 the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omiss”
“tho 7. NOSENKO’s exact statements and meaning on various specific sub- jects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled 7. 48 and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particul”
“zUnEAy , The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March. 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the . bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was ”
“The : matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first,be made on the respon- cu sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above. 0001166 :6 SECRE % 9aa”
“14-00000 cUdta The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually”
“14-00000 SECRET A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IX THZ NAVAL RU IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND TIMES HE CLAYED *' r 0001120 . 1 " excluded trim aztematic downgrading and - SECRET declassifter’len■ J 0229,”
“should report to him." [In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.] 5/BR 132 0001402 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ----- -”
“1 4-00000 SECRET IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO * -eo*p: 0. 0001112 -SECRET :Exctacez r. art:motte - Conopraling and o rowsenu y. 4 *2 1 , - )■ ilixo U b ill gin W 26 26 a t”
“purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn’t say". or "didn’t comment" o”
“summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. 0001150 To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty 3 OFns —-”
“given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts 19 0001097 SECRET y .r.. :59 % •/** ISA”
“the work erted that'^ the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest .237 00015C9 TS No. 197 TS No. 197124 C°py Top Secret Cop”
“in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the p”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MIS”
“1-00000 : Iv. v VOLt. 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his I career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). I Al’A 4 % y TOP SEC”
“14-00000 Tthorted 1 cover, “I 2.7 Rinwiom negeseg Fvh. 769. 314*9,10 12°. tos.e s -p "‘emseegin men are also considered because they 7 Mio overlap Kesnmo’e to go extent, although by saying he was a Ipu co c* civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff wAdoreokn contra”
“'assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such. inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch. ”
“FCD. NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiqniNS NKO 10 EL”
“13-00000 Source 111 Source 112 said, but under the given circums tances of how 700-9/8080/998408 and acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected. No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted Source 112, Source #3 and Source 11”
“basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that s”
“time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 • 9 SECBET i”
“1 4-00000 artssivarsanden serw Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a . Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a ”
“Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his ihaving provided such information. 0001069 4”
“14-00000 F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGS DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY11 IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB? I ca? 1 :Exc^J fra ctm| i 0001078 SECRET 1 si 1”
“1 4-00000 J^ 1 • Mi 1 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in. March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel 1 report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes, are cons”
“14-00000 vLURLE ANNEX The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A, " Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B, " Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In”
“14-00000 (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a sign”
“claimed he was being punished for misuse of operational documents.] In response to his interrogator ' s question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he thought the truth would not have been believed. In a voluntary statement”
“Vovs Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a ( Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not nece”
“operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more. NOSENKO’s sourcing for the notes does not Comment: Chis explain how he learned of the cases des”
“the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. . The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in SECRET 00010C8 2 ? L”
“observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area. 4 The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be 6001237 examined and can be cited as follows. G5ol? 1 Excludes t szimmatic ”
“discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2). (2) There”
“14-00000 SECRET G. IS THERE EVIDENCE 07 A POLITICAL, OXANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIEY A DISPATCH' OF NOSENKO BY THE KC-B WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK •z FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND' WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION ”
“14-00000 Annex Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text Annex - The Cherepanov Papers 0001005 3”
“1 4-00000 F A e * wh To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current 1 ews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO 0% approximately 20 of e 49 cases. )even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has lo”
“a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially, confirm”
“1 4-00000 P W R ! ^ y w , '^ First Section, First Depar ent. s inform On Was pepornegsy.ver-nerecegg furnished to NOSENKO pri arily because of his friend 2 with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENXO learned of certain v. de casts or was”
“14-00000 SECRET H. IS THERE ANY EVSAENCE 7 THE CONTACTS CF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1950 TH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE "RGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR .OR RGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFE”
“14-00000 spilite by NOSENKO 0e considerel toto as having resulted in re to the MOB and/or has neoyesrasorsakin nished by NOSENMO: cant senelt to Western intelligence? The conclusion is regard to both of the above Ques.lOho xs anirmalve, even -oug- - «d rcLseG -o-n nat”
“14-00000 .cr.r LT -11-1 intelligence information is not a significant factor in & determination of his bons sides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intellig”
“knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Em-”
“ct that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosanko ia sensible enough to realize that undue publicity”
“14-00000 a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SGD. It has not been possible to substantially”
“(Retracted.NOSENKO accompanied 0001607 336 BR TS No. 197124 Top Secret C°py _”
“admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most -----• of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one ”
“Top Secret (EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES) Notes for the -Reader (Continued) 400 At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination of NOSENKO's claims with respect to that period of his life. The judgment of ”
“14-00000 SECRET E. GAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/ OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSEN KO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? 0001C65 UROUP 1 5 Excluded fro”
“period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. 0001156 9 OnPAT SEGNE”