“submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February, RFK PAper e 5 SENSITIVE TO”
“major CIA project. Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Decep tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this. Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popu”
“ifteen more weeks of Phase I, which is essentially intelligence collection with low U.S. visibility. Intelligencé collection is reaching a point where the U.S. is starting to get a firmer fix in detail on order of battle, the political structure, the economy, and internal resista”
“required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up. After this second look, GIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational c”
“13-00000 % -7- b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD. 0. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba. VI. COORDINATION The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of th”
“rained on the ground by the team, and then continue the survey. This is slow and dangerous work. CIA CIA reports that 11 teams will have been infiltrated by the end of July and that 19 maritime operations have aborted. Of the teams in, the most successful is the one in Pinar del ”
“S-E-C-R-E-T - - ' EYES ONLY - i icover and deception operations by that date. 7. Task 7, p.5. Byl February CIA will submit an opera- 1 tional schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance move- t ment inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities select”
“sal for approval. INTELLIGENCE 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA) To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is ade- quate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. ”
“S-E-C-R-E-T EYES ONLY obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined. 4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay- behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communic”
“SYCHOLOGICAL 6. Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (STATE) To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public. This has been a normal”
“Lie Communist regime through broadcasts (st witch would appearTO COTTO from local dissident groups activelyplanning to harass the regime. 1300 2). Task 10, CLA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castros failure to the uban population via balloon with a view of p increas”
“is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational asset for Operation Mongoose. At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban peop”
“als and giving them useful employment after they are trained is an important and a difficult one. 2. Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and the Madrid clandestine in”
“some carping and pro tests from dissidents can bo anticipated with the usual security - hazards whenever the decision is made to terminate this project. These possibilities can hardly justify the indefinite continuation of this enormous expenditure of funds which to date am”
“13-00000; :• Reconnaissance of the Middle East 98 /Mr. McCone reported that the British will probably not approve the request to use an RAF base on Cyprus for high-performance /coverage of Middle East areas. He said that the feasibility of J /using Wheelus is being explor”
“13-00000 % 0 % CN : / 4 V. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE PERIOD. The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to increase and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capabi”
“13-00000 II 1 DEUAC] -6- (5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad. 2 B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE 1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile. 2.”
“Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow from supporting one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become active, it will be obvious that ”
“13-00000 4 C The response of the various Agency components, both by Head quarters Desks and by the Field Stations, has been most satis** factory and has aided the Task Force considerably in the perform ance of its assigned mission. Within the Task Force, selected offic”
“13-00000 4 0 - to develop the target and was able to provide significant OB at the same time. Neither this, nor the other efforts to penetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had met with full success by the end of the reports period. : 08 66 (b) The Cuban la”
“transfer of responsibility must bo accomplished harmoniously, without adverse press reaction, or support of this work would be withdrawn. Col. Wendell Johnson was hired and will ba placed in contact with Dr. Miro prior to 1 October. Re will function as the day-to-day contact”
“produced some political intelligence responsive to our requirements. 12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting has covered general political developments. 13. A librarian and teacher who is a ”
“. 5. Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA) These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have pur - poseful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support t”
“A. Communications Intelligence: We will continue 4 our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communten- tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be poss”
“s, and the Children's Institute, as well as the Special Con-1 sultative Committee on Security. 2. 12 Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban wor”
“n. Communications Intelligence: To will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA - station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communion- tions. As the current situation "norma 1izes" it sheu to be p”
“S-E-C-R-E-T ■ - EYES ONLY - 17. Section D, p.3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus. have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by l February. 18. Section”
“13-00000 CILY The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion. ”
“e place in the future with respect to our relation- ship. All agreed on the need for tight security. 3. After lunch we drove to the Hotel Court and from approximately 1330 until 1730, we discussed the prospectus. Using Mr. Barnes' out- line as a general guide, I stressed the impo”
“with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and the Mad clandestine interroga- tion center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets ”
“communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. I The Rritish want too wknowe—whowwseriousvar”
“inside Cuba. Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and suggestions for possible future actions. Apparent Equities: Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities, usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon sta”
“13-00000 8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communica tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it shoul”
“13-00000 * woedooo8 5 15. A lawyer in Havana reported on Rancho Boyeros Airport in Havana where a certain airline) is one of his clients. 08 16. A pineapple firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited in July 1962 reported on military developments in his area.. 17. A Cuba”
“an In of operations. policy levels. telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA”
“l is given, to begin to prepare these assets for an organized revolt of substantial proportions. Thi s additiona l time will be required since un der exist in g limitations we are not permitted to prepare the teams or cadres from their inception for any concerted revolt nor, in f”
“would assist. This autonomous group is re ceiving financial and limited logistic assistance from CIA, and desires to ount an infiltration operation from Florida. has good con- Melons in Cuba. should be urged to proceed. Mr. Bundy stated he was not enthusiastic about Bay oper”
“s is only one sector of the collection effort inside Cuba. Again, I defer to Mr. McCone for details. CIA has identified seven resistance organizations inside Cuba, as realistically potential. A hard assessment, up close, is still to come. Under the revised plan for Operation Mong”
“J2 ack 23, Counterfeit Currency to increase Cuban economic oblems is considered feasible within 30-6A days upon a mited basis and in considerable scale within six months. LA asks the Group approval before proceeding with this tion.— Other Tasks. I note here that CIA does ”
“13-00000 F"ot 1ess and nasclutions : .AMOT-EOBL2ERelationship. The Agency must recoguire the 8. poss (t!I1ty of straimad Eeel1s the invasion. It La liaved because of the failure 08 re Prose «Ive Ageney 12 Lani will be able. beeause € 1 als excellent eracnal relationsh”
“1 - Incident 21 GuantanamoOCCURICU 26 May when a light Cuban aircrait lancer there. Three Cubans had forced the pilot. .t pistol point, to land them at our Naval Ease, kith State’s con- currence. Defense acted: the Cuban pilot flew home, the 3 Cuban escapees stayed on the”
“13-00000 Co te‘ - 5 - (2) Deputy Chief, ICD, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration of Cuban Communist Party via third countries. using Cubans as agents (as agreed by Chief, Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/L/CI and”
“13-00000 0 . (b) Nickle Industry: The seat of this important industry unfortunatelyis in two small towns in Oriente province. Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importance always pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns are no exception. Numerous we”
“the agents would certainly talk if captured. Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he re commending them, and further”
“representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the - cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. $100, 000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by th”
“increased coverage of entin Castro groups, activities at the airport and no entreee into the diplomatic concuni ty. C. Four agents were recruited and two agents were termi- noted during the period. d. In ecoporation with the German desk, we have initiated so operation to de”
“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”
“wn if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPIONAGE 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban refugees were entering the United States at the rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS)”
“Cubans. Commodities going into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached $101 million. While this represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high. (d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that s”
“13-00000 CVro nall LILS UNLYV SECRET ■2 Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan. and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalti”