“… haps can be senpared to a degree to the one anion, in the days of Hitler’s corcany, obeyed the orders of the 38 miefHeinrich Himmler. The Central Intelligence Agency, which was created at the end of the decade or the," forties in the midst of the cold war against the Soviet Union and other matione or th …”
“… 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections are briefly these - these dealing with the chart …”
“7vos 10, 1961 THE SENT OJH. SIL A Reorganization /agbryit; 0 worked in EJ feullsveiing vierwis 93 Gods vybyr during the 10 F nod wovred ts a parleie CLA consultant in the years since. tia eakanco, CIA’s recurd no prokaily been very gent in the nature o’ cimndisine spem”
“KI SECRET SuE SANEI2ED 1 06RSISN. la % U-M-1N9 T ARRB/C.C. 9/02 5 June 30, 1961 u a m ^ ^ ----- DETERIORATION MEMORANDUM FC THE PRESIDENT 2 -7 SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization - - - - - __ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B a j THE 9 I submit the following views as one ■ho worked I”
“… n this report, however, in a somewhat more, .limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly …”
“element. 18 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Miler. From a counter-intelligence standpoint, 191 it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that 2C in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad. There i- 21 a means of working together ”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 178-10004-10115 REPORT' TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission: In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique ”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have zething to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte 0 the world. A number of …”
“SECRE[ J. For ikn part, CIA Lias developed A whale series 01 functions poral- .lelinng already existing functions of the State Department, and cf the Defense Department as well. Today it bas its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign servi”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency shouldEoVa nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the yesra since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte ef the world. A number of …”
“which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the 21 military services, the Department of State, and all other -22 agencies concerned.< 23 You are going to have to have a perception of the real problems and what is involved in counterintelligence in order © 24 25 to o”
“%Au VERom J OLNVOlEIVE them intimately and to keep our knowledge current. Our performance falls too short. core A lack of communication and inter- action between the Director of Central In telligence and CIA's counterintelligence unit. The present Director lacks counter”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous pro- tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff,”
“4 SECRET' Central Intelligence Agency Operations in the United States assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the a …”
“Agency were designed to protect. The Central Intelligence Agency, because of the unique statutory 2AM/ PCI SD BTt, 9 Aa A U 1A CEPDET NW 50955 DocId: 32423532 Page 190 OLUNL\”
“wEin V8d&s SFRACITEFF SECRET Ge-twts EiLa deception lack ready or frequent access to the policy level. They attempt to frame deception plans in ignorance of new policies, and they can obtain top- level review of their plans only on an ad hoc basis. The remedy is not ”
“TOP SECRET * -& 72 Phone (Ares 202) $44-6000 1 wo S* o it went to many other people. But whether it actually got to C 2 the Secretary of State, I do not know. 3 Mr. Miler. I think one important point here that I 4 would like to make is that what has happened, in m”
“from the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, and the Senate Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activitie”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yot. to the yeare since, CIA has, to effect, ‘made’ policy in many parts of the world. A number o …”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its …”
“13-00000 CON FIDENTIAL B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and main”
“Intelligence: a. A conversation which occurred in a motel between VSs09a Marchesesa and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central In- telligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged by Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade Mr. ”
“(3) am alarmed that no witness has pointed a fingor of blame at the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. It is the Magna Charta of CIA’s Dom- estic Intelligence Division. This act specifically provided cover for CIA. It effectively repealed CIA’s restriction to foreign op”
“SANT16P vL If 16\ d. 5/11 6 SECRET CIA June 30, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization 1 submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. On balance, CIA’s record has p”
“perroneal. Partly because CIA paid higher calasies and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave him people courageous pro- tection against McCarthyite attacks. CIA was able to attract and hold large number of able and independent minded men. Tke more It elded brilliant act”
“CIA id higher salaris Ieven * EKE perhapa scause Allos one pro-.0 H tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA able t and hold YT OF . a large number od able independent-m a DB added brilliant i ctivist its staff, the n 9p038tions developed, and the greater role it pl”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“Sttmtl 8. 0A % wdlothan220,0 freprempu / under military or other 'mitato 3Eficial cover)." Originally the uge of Siste Department cover for 0° Moe personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. be bullen-Correx-Jackeon report stated in 1948, "The CTA should ”
“FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DI”
“911312 : 0LC1L LAN21001 OLNOHLL II. THE NATURE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The counterintelligence unit of the CIA bears a direct responsibility for the security of all Agency espionage and counterintelligence operations conducted abroad. It is also directly resp”
“harm, it would not disclose the name of one CIA official involved with the Mexico City operation, although the names of . other officials were released in cooperation with the CIA. _ _ - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - • nl86. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act III, supra ”
“CREr Z. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggs sta ways in which some cf those prob- lemns can perhaps be alleviated 1. CIA Autonomy • CIA conducts three main forms cf secret work; clandestine intelli- gence collect”
“… 18 on the production of intelligence which would authorize them 19 CIA to produce national intelligence.. That kind of thing. The 20 Central Intelligence Agency as the producer of national ‘21 intelligence must”
“SECRET la For its part. CIA bed developed • whole series functions paral- leling already existing functions of the State Depi tment, and of the Defense Departrent as w 11. Today own political desks d military staffs; it 88 A ect on foreign service; 18 b as (or bes had) Su w”
“existence.. Mr. DULLES. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation existed during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has continued now with great cooperation on both sides. Mr. HOOVER. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence agency”
“20 TOP SECRET oBocs-tAaneeom 50 Phone (Area 202)1644-6000 1 We rean a seminar using the highest talent that we had and N 2 revealing as much information as we could conceivably reveal. 3 And so our whole mental attitude was that counter-intelli gence, one of its high”
“Committee.i Six months earlier my letter of August 141, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the . Industrial State." .It concluded with the startling premise I am now propared to prove to the Senate: "It is my firm p”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison abroad be improved through a judicious aug- mentation of exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing with the common advers”
“of 5,662. As a result CIA could not meet its counterintelligence responsibilities adequately even at this peak of on-board counterintelligence strength. It is our view that the Operations Directorate ought to devote no less than 10 per cent of its manpower to counterintel”
“In such cases it will be apprecia ted if you will advise us of suc h r eferral in order that we m ay anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission (?) and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710) CIA The policy of eliminating reference to ”
“30A • 7* /• 50 N 1n Reply, Plcuse Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 File No. 40 February 7, 1966 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATIONS IK THE UNITED STATES % 6i / . ■ ■ ■ (1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any .foreign official in the United Stat …”
“~.3W CEARET OLORLI " '(Z) Mail Coverage. 'Another much needed intelli-ns gence tool is mail coverage.. • Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our represen- tatives should confer and exami”
“SECRET IC 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this ■.I memorandum would e as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general .clearance authiruty over all clandestine activity. This. • right be effectuated on the British model by the ap”
“INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 19 f___ 21 jaw an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. "Cixthe n got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation. Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluate”
“to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intellierce oמ- eration or an internal security case which does not have direct or in rect international ramifications. The course of events and the birhly conable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services h”
“function among the area branches and a degradation of the work to such lowest common, denominators as name tracing, maintenance of counterintelligence files and the like. A notice of 20 December 1954 announced the formation of a new, senior counterintelligence element, the”
“SECTET 5. 14, peralloom and Policy wertd-on < iilium,■ to we vuewe teewww semew vowon tone, who Minim Clandestine activities abould 20 acneaned net only in the context of their relationship to an open society but *le® in tito catsext of their ralzticnebip to United States”
“iIn volume the most material and according to CIA analysts p most of that information. a large proportion of that is keyed to their report an’ yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carrie d out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a s”
“memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. " AR THE ORIGINAL Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many IBR part …”