“*‘% wor he ‘a pKFA 4.4 Now the next gogbien refers to the fentral Intelligence Agency in general. Now lesganino so much of our inquiry is Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather ■1 long series of recommendations regarding it. R Now the sections ar”
“14-00000 other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation. White House Relations We are concerned about Agency relationships with the White House insofar as handling of intelligence matters i”
“requests from any committees of the - O M Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the M U T White House. At the present time, the consensus of those A IED persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release 2 ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN - ”
“aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or at tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa tive on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff ”
“approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations”
“SECRET analysis, for FBI personnel. • In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Cur”
“SECRET 00 - 2- Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more, .limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intell”
“counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical 19 work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment 20 E the situation, which should be f value to policy-makers 21 in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI., 22 to the Director ”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 178-10004-10115 REPORT' TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission: In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique ”
“4 1•* shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central‘ Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the . national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available t”
“13-00000 CON FIDENTIAL B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and main”
“shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central . Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Direc”
“contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on : a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the ”
“shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the . national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Direc”
“iIn volume the most material and according to CIA analysts p most of that information. a large proportion of that is keyed to their report an’ yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carrie d out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a s”
“IAREI 15. The structure which would mne at the crite. nggusted in this memorandum would be as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general clesronca authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment Io”
“ould so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances where continuin g CIA p ursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau s discharge of its in te”
“CIA •* photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign breadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with e State Department or White House chairman.”
“effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly. I cl . 1 ° * : % Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all W. S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual fi”
“14-00000 6 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities 1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the working group which you established in January to consult with y”
“element. 18 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Miler. From a counter-intelligence standpoint, 191 it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that 2C in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad. There i- 21 a means of working together ”
“14-00000 JrDIcI PART H This section contains comments and recommendations on areas of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree, or felt that considerably more study w”
“of U.S. Intelligence. What clandestine perations are being carried out in the name of America? Is the CIA INTELLIGENCE paring to entangle us in another war similar to the Indochina War? REPORT "hat information is going into Federal, State, local and private data cols on innoc”
“to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intellierce oמ- eration or an internal security case which does not have direct or in rect international ramifications. The course of events and the birhly conable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services h”
“SECRET IC 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this ■.I memorandum would e as follows: 1) The State Department would be granted general .clearance authiruty over all clandestine activity. This. • right be effectuated on the British model by the ap”
“confided to CIA •- photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt ccllec- ticl, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with State Department 08 1 2120 ”
“exposed to the HSCA. There is, therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the Report's being made available. 11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain”
“13-00000 ... / * PUBLICATIONS JOIN THE COUNTER-SPY INTELLIGENCE REPORT CARIS publishes a bi-weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT and a uaterly named COUNTERSPY featuring various articles examining 'he structures and operations of U.S. Intelligence. In addition, CARIC -***% jub ishes”
“In such cases it will be apprecia ted if you will advise us of suc h r eferral in order that we m ay anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission (?) and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710) CIA The policy of eliminating reference to ”
“J* APTACELZE 1. The report furnished to the President by Dircetor Colby in January 19 2. .All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda. (NSDis) or Intelligence Directives (HSCIDs), and other White House directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guid”
“SECRET SENSITIVE 8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison abroad be improved through a judicious aug- mentation of exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing with the common advers”
“Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency shouldEoVa nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the yesra since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many parte ef the world. A number of governments 111! in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts 0% overthrow •”
“SECRET 14-00000 Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera- tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated. Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important”
“13-0000 1 Nic0k DAN JH ( AN MB O Mr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think . appropriate? Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with the Committee off the recor”
“4-00000 SEUNLT Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated. Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an importan”
“INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 19 f___ 21 jaw an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. "Cixthe n got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation. Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluate”
“FOR THE AGENCY IS WHERE THERE IS "...CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE THREAT TO THE CONDUCT OF US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THAT DISCLOSURE WOULD REVEAL AN INTELLIGENCE METHOD CURRENTLY UTILIZED AND NOT OFFICIALLY DI”
“extended readership. There will be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of . problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. Inevitably, the net effect will be to reduce the usefulness of the system. Another difficulty involves security. To be usefu”
“Agency's domestic installations and to determine the sources of unauthorized disclosure of classified and sensitive intelligence information to public media. While I am not now privy to precise statistical data. I believe the United States Government Agencies involved in int”
“by the U. S. Government if they were presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government. CIA Personnel Under State Cover The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various allowa”
“.- ta APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CW HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 23 October 1962 00 10/255/62 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: After Action Report on the Findings of the Working Group This is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April 1962 which”
“Agency efforts abroad by publishing lists of CIA personnel in specific Stations; revelation 28 of office of Communications)personnel in every Embassy abroad; the Agency role in countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking and training provided other services to counteract thes”
“~.3W CEARET OLORLI " '(Z) Mail Coverage. 'Another much needed intelli-ns gence tool is mail coverage.. • Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our represen- tatives should confer and exami”
“%Au VERom J OLNVOlEIVE them intimately and to keep our knowledge current. Our performance falls too short. core A lack of communication and inter- action between the Director of Central In telligence and CIA's counterintelligence unit. The present Director lacks counter”
“14-00000 t yST CR E-T—„7.tl -• -------------------------- Hd/gl: versus area division prerogative in the conduct of operations. Noting that there might have been some immediate reasons for the CI Staff to take on operational aspects in its efforts to increase CI activity”
“memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. " AR THE ORIGINAL Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many IBR parts the world. A number of governments still la power know”
“CONFIDENTIAL 4. In addition to the "category II" items, there are a number of additional subjects largely geographic in nature for which the DCI feels CIA should assume responsibility for preparing comprehensive papers. In view of the apparent adversary relationship between ”
“congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that, would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it- self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further more, we were under i”
“13-00000 1 Guidelines for Providing Information to Congressional Oversight Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Security Services These guidelines take into account tlie fact that foreign intelligence and security services, when acting in connection witli the Agency’s o”
“by the House Assassinations Committee are a large number of FBI documents that "implicate national security interests"). n155. See Assassination Materials Disclosure Act I, supra note 96, at 7 (statement of CIA Director Robert M. Gates) (asserting that "we have an obligation”