“14-00000 co APPENDIX I PROJECT LIPSTICK SCHEDULE 03 INSTRUCTION 10 June Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology. 11-21 June Tradecraft (1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity Clandestine Activity of the Individua”
“OUTLINED, AND THE STATION’S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY % THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE. COS Explained THE DCID‘S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARaNCE, Secret”
“correspondence coming back from 20 overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence ! 21 activities abroad. 22 To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency 73 i on operational activity across the board. So, we are generally 24 J aware of the ope”
“specialized personnel, the GAUAS would go and locate the 21 personnel, talk to them, spot them, get their personal history 22 from them, send it in, and the: people would be traced out and 23 checked and cleared and eventually introduced to the station 24 case officer who”
“is clearly marked FOR EX-2AL u3z o:LY. 09 5. According to the operational plan, the Dase to agent SI: pesseges will be prepared for the Area Division by KURIOT at Headquarters. The Area Division will pouch the G pesseges (as "blank" sheets of stat onery to the appropriate Fie”
“- DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WCH WILL EFFECTIVELY DIS- . ASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES—PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY AND EFFECT COVER -RETAINS O”
“14-00000 Afr.NDla1 PROJECT LIPSTICK SCHESULE OF ISPR CTION 10 June Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology. 11-21 June Tradecraft (1) Nature ane Characteristics of Clandestine Activity Clandestine Activity of the Individual and”
“been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly we11 placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number" of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, ”
“four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number' of these contacts for periods ranging up to t”
“leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, .etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information .here to work with,, people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Al”
“of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal / agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for process log at a laboratory equipped for that purpose. After the film is ”
“clandestine activity, security, cover, compartmentation, •—(continued)- J 3624— Attachment: herewith DATE TYPED DATE DISPATCHED Training Schedule 24 March 64 MAR 27 1964 Distribution: cnonsnrumner to c-s a v 647” DIBPATCH SYMBOLAND NUMBER 3. C/SAS w/att !‘*19-124-27/2 UFGA-1”
“14-00000 of top-flight people who for some years have dealt almost exclusively with just such problems. We recognize all the difficulty, in the course of a project of this type, of shifting responsibility from one deputy to the other; and we realize that development mus”
“keeping informed about develop ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele ments of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring opera tional coordination similar to that achieved by the meeting of support elements ev”
“units photograph all persons moving in or out of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for process ing at a laborat”
“'3. Instructors: * The training instructors utilized were Alexander. V. DECLIPPEL and '. Iden C. IUPACAN PDO’s provided training as to cargo sling operation, rappelling and operational capabilities of special equipment. 4. Training Areas, Utilized: Training was conducted ent”
“additional technical surveillance devices in the target in the form of concealed radio transmitters. 0004094 NW 65924 Docld:32361431 Page 4 3 PAGE COPY NO. of 22 SECRET/KAPOK -2- D. Operational Assets (Personnel)”
“OA a. Penetration • Penetration of legal and illegal networks, identification of intelligence personnel and targets; collection of information regarding methods of operations; collection of positive intelligence. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 25 10-15-74 NW 88321 D”
“'individual operations. 21 For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would 22 review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and " might 23 say we think that the Station has overextended itself this 24 month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the 2”
“mail drop is: We have a tremendous job_ahead of us. Certainly, none of us pretend to know what the future holds for ourselves or for our- native land. We do feel, how ever, that our freedom is gravely threatened. It is not always possible to know the best thing to do. But w”
“understanding can be clearly made that this is in : fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big ‘input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters 2 to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in .the given concrete conditions”
“Legal, ettica(>morale, operational problems; political: non-attribute- 1belite 4 a) Our onn experience (Bangkok) (+eflect on DDP) and experience W/KGB (Crossup, Bandera group, Khohhloo) -> profesuinial, proven operationally competent, ruttilere, stable require most CE-exenie”
“political left and terrorist movement, and handling the Principal agent (LOC) presently employed at the Station. 4. TRAINING or siato INDICATE HA T TRAINING vou ofulEve vou SN00L0 •' nminc TMf Welt stvteal vears raining should be keyed to provide an even broador base for th”
“the only| communication with the principal agent is by secret writing. There 1 uW is nevergenough room in an S/W message for both the positive intelligence reporting and the supporting operational details, and it is the latter | that suffer. S/W communication also inevitably”
“false colors, will give station great 21 flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations 22 securely". 23 To me this second paragraph indicates that these false 24 flag officers were people that had experience’ in this very 25 kind of intelligence operations”
“1/• • €e 3 (s S-E-C-R-E-T 3- D. Det. 1 furnish 1 C-54 and ores in standby capacity until further notice. Standby capacity is heroin defined as capability to position the eircraft at any port of entry in east, south or southwest U. S. from Boston to Los Angeles within 15 h”
“develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, *= you must RA moot kave specific Instructions for any specific covert activity. At lds the present time we are unable to transfer core arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that metho”
“interest of collecting .. marginal intelligence. -Must -be prepared- to sacfrice - diversionary - tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective.. If tangential . things are Tolled up we then have a different op, and a new op . line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves a”
“FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS HMDRIG mNINSD MIO CONTA) ALL., FOR Fol SP-2 ALM 3/12 ____________________________ I 101 31 pels” pAS NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 311”
“Security- - - ■ 19. Psychological warfare - 2. Cover - - - - - - - 20. Political warfare - - 3. Observation & description - hit 21 Economic warfare - %. Intervlesing 22. Sabotage : 5. Interrogation 23. Counter-sabotage - 6. Surveillance 24. Resistance force activities - 7. ”
“purposes. e. Information Support : (1) To supplement available normal news sources, broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material upon intelligence -5-■ SECRET HW 50955 DocId: 32424022 Page 9”
“20003 1 Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or mav not jot ! down some additional requirements and ask that that person be irecontacted and asked specific questions.- 0 Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this 23 smaller broup of SXdo for the Agency ”
“Escape 27. Weapons 28. Demolitions 29. Special Devices (RID) 30. Air Reception The efticiel tow m this: is ontris! e por 31. Sea Reception sonolty resper— wathi: his d: retion. a C: 12 32. Map Reading 33. the repost should le th wa k the studen whom it concerns. 34. 3”
“.10. CE Operations ....... - 17. Communist Theory ... 18. Soviet IS....................... 19. Psychological Warfare 20. Political Warfare T 21. Economic Warfare. \22. Sabotage ........ ...... 23. Counter-sabotage .... 24. Resistance Force Activities ... 25. Guerrilla Wa”
“counterterror, SDB offi cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept, and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB offi cers attend”
“ed and that it was strictly an infil1- tration procedure and not a commando type bit and run action. This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distribute”
“not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for report- ing on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally 19 0001179 •>.‘r” ': ‘obnd: QCP5rT”
“2 preparation for adranceddraining in these three importanioastivities which will be dealt with in greater detan further on in the training program. INTI!I.UGHNCE Underground warfare, as we customarily think of it, cannot succeed unless it is supported by a well developed ”
“neighborhood three hundredpeople, f Te ■ and that 21 21 was those people who would be involved in the management 22 effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover 23 procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing 24 out from that were people w”
“......................................... ■17 . Communist Theory..... . 18. Soviet IS..................... 19. Psychological Warfare ........ . :: 20. Political Warfare............. 21. Economic Warfare................................... 22. Sabotage........................”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424016 Page 8 5 SECRET”
“agent’s sensitivity of the opt ration should be indicated—e.g., observation, special suitability to the cover suggested and, or the special ad spotting and reporting only; case officer for established agents; vantages of the cover vis-a-vis the target. SECRET SECRET”
“(Hein) or from WB/III/ Ouba (Eoland). 3. Should OTR contemplate presenting in any form any of the CP penetration case studies contained in PHB 52-865-% ("The CP Penetration. Program’s Issue No. 4) te subject during the training sessions, CI/ICD (Hein - extension 3919) should”
“security reviews of operational activities. g. Coordinate double agent operations. : E 2 IMPDET CL BY 055431 ’J cpordt wi. ..l”
“eng Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested. 5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make man”
“the agents employed in the project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner wiin varying' patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Fre-arran ed cignals are employed in " "! accorn iching the meetings. When heavy or bulky raterial is”
“o be prepared to provide U.S. assistance in the final interception of shipping in territorial waters SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424017 Page 8 5 SECRET”
“S-E-C-R-E-T Security Information to operate a transmitter, should be allowed near the transmitter site. The delivery of tapes, etc.. should be through a cutout. . Like- wise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the operation of the transmitter as wel”
“However, to get to latter . it must be done logically. .2. Tightly Structured Op: Emphasis upon tight, controlled contacts which seek to accomplish a specific purpose—collection of info not necessarily one nor always one. Purpose is to lay %ground work for future development”
“with one of our local units, or better still, help you organize your own unit with our assistance after you have completed preliminary training. Sincerely yours. - Captain Patrick McDonald S.A. O. Headquarters Staff / 8 20 ww 88296 Docld:32989574 Page 519:”