“Through its technical coverage of the Soviet Embassy, 24 the station has been able to spot and, through subsequent action, to thwart a number of such Americans, several or whom might have done untold damage to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. 20 In this respect, ”
“Fenway opr 14-00000 V. DISPATCH 114-19 19 .E0L1-1892 10 • *‘ *1a: e* Fi. >> Chiat, WH DNV ‘ton. NO -y-1-16 Chief, KUDLSK FROM 15*7 Chief of Station, Mexto filly i 19 July 1962 smile* ‘ Rt TO r - (OHIC W ONS Mexico Guy Station Security MASkED FOR NONG ACTION P0UB”
“14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH SECRE T/hipp 'HMMA-20393 15-69-87 Soviet Embassy (Military Attache) 15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office) 15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative) 45-61-80 Czech Embassy 45-61-81 Czech Embassy KA. B. Material Processed In N”
“-0A6600--------- . '[104-10301-100101 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SECRET with a limited number of people. We believe the direction of the station is of high caliber, but not all the station effort is carefully directed ”
“14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH see’te. , IIMMA-22005 Other leads appear in the full transcripts or daily resumes. They also are exploited by the Station case officer responsible for the target where the lead appears. For example, on 12 August 1963 Boris KAZANTSEV, rece”
“• asqiri A MION DISPATCH SECRET M1IHC F.B ***** Chief of Station, Mexico City X NO INDEXING MQU00 wro rerNCH J 20 OMIT ouatinte cess* , CAN woc€ KH>Q F1900 Chief,WHD per COM 43-43- 1miceoriLes susureT PBRUMEN/LIEIIVOY action SEQUINED .REFERENCES References: A. MEXI ”
“14-00000 CLASSIFICATION 10 DISPATCH SECRET PRO , POSIC1 PROCESSING ACTION mirnge fom ICEUNG accou USD Chicf, Wi Division xx ; w ***** MQUIRED If O one guntitito M ROVARTIES DISM Chief, HR Division: Chief, KUDESK CAR OCE INDEXING FROM ABSTRACT Chief of Station,”
“issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion arises as to the classification status of information, it could lead to complicated legal proceedings and pro”
“Station’s only secure surveillance asset. It is a very anall untrained unit at present, but through this project it will be developed Into a useable, valuable asset. 4. We are not passing FI/OP's comment to the field, because WH Division believes that unilateral assets should”
“request. CIA - IR-15 - Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes (S) The Directorate of Operations has checked Headquarters records for files referenced in HMMW 12454 20 .”
“14-00000 4s” 5. Seeking approval of Station Mexico City for the release of the total report seeEs violate the concept of Headquarters control of operational information. Would It not be more appropriate to ask Station's opinions only in areas of doubt in the matter of sou”
“13-00000 8 ECR ET vE-e. Exclude routine travel information and CI/CE information from TDCS and reports, and. d. Use the cable channel only for reports that are perishable or are of special intelligence interest. Organisation for Administration 56. As in his direction of ”
“previously mentioned in connection with Soviet operations, resulted from an approach six years ago 24 from President Lopes Mateos. After considerable discussions, the a , operation was approved, providing the Mexican Government would 1a- 29, 34 clude Soviet and Satellite targ”
“sly designated by Mr. Gary Cornwell as being of interest to the HSCA. Mr. Edwin Lopez, of the HSCA - if, was also present, but did not have access to the Mexico City Station material. 2. Mr. Blakey was furnished the following sanitized portions of the Station history which he rea”
“years at the station, the primary objective of recruiting a Soviet a- national has not been achieved. Although the station’s knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities centered about the /exbesay in " + 32 Mexico City has been greatly widened, it hear led to little positive ”
“13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Release of Information on Mexico City Teltaps 1. Protection of sources and methods and liaison equities require that references to the Mexico City Station teltap activity be excised from any documents released under the auspices of the JFK Assassi”
“13-00000 -SECRET.! SUBJECT: Release of Information on Mexico City Teltaps 1. Protection of sources and methods and liaison equities / require that references to the Mexico City Station teltap activity be excised from any documents released under the auspices of the JFK A”
“btained selected letters from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system. 2. Liaison Coverage: Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we co”
“14-00000 ft "I SUBJECT: Unidentified Man Seen Going into Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City in Oct 1963. Photos Taken by Mexico City Station”
“13-00000 SECRET L September 12, 1995 WORKING PAPER Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995 Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting It was agreed that “STATIONS” would be the focus of the presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour. Marwell recommended”
“RECENT MONTHS. IN APRIL 1978, THE STATION UNDERTOOK Al AUDIO OPERATION DIRECTED AT THE OFFICIAL OUT-OF-TOWN RETREAT OF A PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY IN MEXICO. SUBJECT PARTICIPATED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF A CARETAKER ■ WHO PROVIDED ACCESS TO THE TARGET INSTALLATION AND WAS SUBSEGUENTL”
“13-00000 (two case officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob embassy. The FBI officer had left the FBI to come with the stationt but pains have been taken to conceal his CIA employment1 Driscoll, t a retired operations officer now working under con- order to”
“opez, of the HSCA If, was also present, but did not have access to the Mexico City Station material. 2. Mr. Blakey was furnished the following sanitized portions of the Station history which he read in my presence: a. Volume I, Chapter II (C) Station Expansion and Joint Operation”
“the FBI, they might be used identify Soviet illegals. Three of these double agents have all received intelligence assignments from the Soviets of an 1 yet undefined nature in the U.S. Another appears destined for some Soviet es- signrent in the Philippines. Since the Soviets ”
“and operational action on their - own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did n”
“14-00000 Canav oozatir vaiso WD NO DISPATCH SECRET KU BARK ONLY HNNA-14045 coellay 1257 TO maoquadiit rutpooloe" Chief, WH Division INFO 50-6-74/3 DATE FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City November 1959 ----------------- ------------------- 21------ SUN/FC: LUEMPT”
“14-00000 1 tezPatw 9V8D CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH SECRET HINA-19729 Category station files receive the clips pertaining to Soviet commercial. activities, propaganda activities, Soviet contacts, etc. Very often, a single clipping may have to be copied to be sent to the fi”
“anti-Commien should occur in Mexico. 4. DIAZ Ordas has asked ne through CAS whether I would have any objection if the information we furnished him were made public should an appropriate occasion arise in the future. He said there would be no mention of the U.S. Govt and that”
“ARE THOSE WITHIN THESE RANKS WHO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE MEXICANS SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON. STATION BELIEVES THAT ANY EXPOSURE (WHETHER OLD OR NEW) AT THIS STAGE OF THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP (A NEW REGIME IS COMING TO POWER) WOULD ”
“Classification: :swes, ’ee 879006 %--dwo% 1 6U6g OLUNLi (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) -52- 6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance Operations The Mexico City Station employed an operating procedure”
“th ist intimate knowledge. We further recommended that maximum discrimination be used 1h determin ing material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the e filing be reduced. We further recomi be reduced. ded that . overtir made voluntarily when”
“rs has on occasion appeared to be developing a basis for criticizing CIA's performance in its part : of the investigation in Mexico City, under its charter to evaluate the performance of the intelligence agencies. At one time, and possibly ز کرد still, they appeared to be attempt”
“13-00000 SECRET 2A. Faction to counter these activities as they might affect U.S.- interests. While all the U.S.S.R. diplomatic missions are targets of vital importance for U.S. intelligence, the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City has special significance bece or its* proximity”
“effect, the whole history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the digraph and protecting the root - specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is familiar with the decision to release almost all LI-cry”
“the Soviet merstion in Mexico City and now covering a 3 many 0a thirt. lines in n given month. The project - 1a staffed by an "outs:de" cage officer (Career Agent David M. WILSTAD (p) of Project ICG), four contract a ento who Jo ad- . ministrative work, and twenty-one field a”
“liaison operation; LA4cdwi*- = 21 had taps on 30 lines. If it was. not the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have been. Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four o”
“Division to have made significant contributions to the Station's well developed, high priority Soviet Operations Program. During the past year the various LIEMPTY base house installations produced valuable information in the form of photographic coverage and physical surveil”
“btained selected letters from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system. 2. Liaison Coverage: Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we co”
“on, which became known as 3 NW 65924 Docld:32343841 Page 4 SECRET/SENSITIVE 0000160 9 i SECRET/SENSI LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In 1961, because of mism”
“Operations program of the Mexico Station." The project produces primarily operational data and counterintelli gence information. It provides leads, evidence of which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy and which ones have been away, who has used which car, who has been ”
“Mexican military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI, regularly by the station. which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico Stan Watson, the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station,”
“l coverage on it if possible; however, the switchboard was beyond the Station's capability tohandle. Maryknoll priest Felix McGOWAN contacted the Cuban Embassy on 31 July 1963. MEXI-5565 reported details of this contact. This cable was sent to Headquarters for dissemination and a”
“uing operational support in the CI/CE field, the following informational reporting was provided. :.. HMM-6626, 10 August 1962 (Soviet Scholarship for the Daughter of David Alfaro Siqueiros, Imprisioned Communist) HMM-667, 24 August 1962 (Mexican Delegates to Technical Movie Congr”
“13-00000 221173 A w&wtsa 1-141 (e tc by) YOSH Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City’s station's operations 1 dee one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency? 3 : 6 Mr. Scelso. It was then. That is; the variety and - prober 9 E the National, Archives ”
“peration, which became known as NW 65990 Docld:32392425 Page 4 3 SECRET/SENSITIVE > SECRET/SENSITIVE LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican Army officers. In 1961, because of mism”
“MBC AND NO DISPATCH SECRET HMMA -19233 0-1880 ro utADuAEitaS HU N°, Chief, WH Division CO[NOITI7PD 751 +3 50-6-75/1? INFO FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City LDENSITIZED ger CSN 43-43 DafE 19 June 1962 SUBJECT RE: "43 3” - (CHECK "x" ONE Monthly Activities Report o”
“Mexican and Cuban officials and to arrange for his. return to MADD before any such contacts were made.: .(2) LIFFAT/LITAUS continued to provide daily information on the official Polish installation in Mexico City which is described 6.32/13 P ro je c t KDMANGO, - by the in”
“lected letters NI MUDOU beaine operation, from a subagent employed 2. Liaison Coverノル postal system. Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we co”
“Satellite Branch, Covert Action Branch, Communist Party Branch, and operational catch-all which is called the ’’Operational Support Branch." This letter branch is headed by senior operations officer who, has two assist- ante, but the branch in reality 1 extension of the chie ”
“The scheme, which was admittedly clever, succeeded, but we were concerned about what would have happened if the Cubans themselves had decided to contact the individual. Would not the LIENVOY operation have been exposed to some extent? We grant that the Cubans and other bloc pe”