“13-00000 1 with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from ”
“tation operational prog 12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are 88 satisfactory as ENGS be De 24T pected in view of the target. Given Mexico City’s strategic loca- Ope tion astride the only direct air link to Cuba, mor”
“13-00000 % -7- b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD. 0. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba. VI. COORDINATION The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of th”
“CLASSIFIED :MESSAGE *.4 * ROUTING TOP SECRET 1 4 2 5 ATE: 3 6 53 207 IC 402 st DIRECTOR DEFERRED' ■ CONF, ROUTINE INFO i - PAGE TWO OUT 60694 TO TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443 IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE”
“submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February, RFK PAper e 5 SENSITIVE TO”
“LEASING FACERS SUMATE 1 104-10228-10085 CONTINUATION OF LI DISPATCH UP AND MAARI HLSH-3354 210W 1001 4. As you are probably avare, infiltration of bodies and materiel into Cuba has become increasingly difficult and there is every indication that tightening of internal control was”
“TD SECRET SENSITIVE .3. Maintain refugee debriefing programs. D. Wexmmike Wliralin Nalso services SF dove zrodrers- 3. Peyeholoxical Warfare (CA)UN The program must primarily concentrate on and ***** reach the Cuban population. The following psychologize) wer fere activities”
“13-00000 F"ot 1ess and nasclutions : .AMOT-EOBL2ERelationship. The Agency must recoguire the 8. poss (t!I1ty of straimad Eeel1s the invasion. It La liaved because of the failure 08 re Prose «Ive Ageney 12 Lani will be able. beeause € 1 als excellent eracnal relationsh”
“with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish, the flow of intelligence from refugees, it ”
“with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it i”
“0 3 CONFIDENTIAL purpose of substantially reducing the tune required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be author- ized only by specifically designated commanders. — . "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean" CO”
“sal for approval. INTELLIGENCE 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA) To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is ade- quate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. ”
“to a drone. b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin A”
“13-00000 ) and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations; We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas ”
“S-E-C-R-E-T EYES ONLY obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined. 4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay- behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communic”
“is recommended. 3. Cuban Brigade Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 26”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN NOFORN 4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that . projects would be operable within the next few months. 5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military ”
“rsion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local SECRET NW 66000 Docld:32424012 Page 5 SECRET situation in the recipient country and included appropriate suggestions as to strategy which might be used in securing implementation of the desired actions. f. Requested posts in”
“• SECRET SENSITIVE Draftisew 23 Nov. 1962 OPERATIONAL PLAN - CURA * ANAT he" .A. The purpose of this plan is to cutlies the action to We undertaken by theCentral Intelligence Agency against the Ometro/ Commmist government of Cuba during FX-63 and for such longer " period ”
“more senior agents; to serve as a consuicana and advisor on ouban affairs for stations or bases which did uoc possess ca office: Imswledgeable regarding Cuban operations; to aid suea- Stations in conducting operations, to confer with and, where desired by the Local Station, to ad”
“- tions putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage. Really current "inside"news tips can do most to undermine the regime's morale and interest the Cuban public. Classifi- cation may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a pri”
“rsion steps. Each instruction was tailored to the local SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32401396 Page 4 SECRET situation in the recipient country and included appropriate suggestions as to strategy which might be used in securing implementation of the desired actions. f. Requested posts in”
“ORN SPECIAL BARLING PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS PAGE 10 - 18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA) To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed. Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA ”
“13-00000 ( € H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. Per’s As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from are”
“and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison servides]who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint , dis”
“recommended. 3, Cuban Brigade Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members. SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 94.”
“13-00000 ) 1 4 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six)Cuban vessels we are 24 now running as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running (12) Cuban diplomats station”
“addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their pl”
“05 3E th Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under take a clandestine assign”
“refugee pilots are personally acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the Castro intelligen”
“13-00000 ( I E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any 8 significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stres”
“ARTICULATE STUDENT TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. • SWIMMING ABILITY DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL. 3. SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT, STATION STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA, BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED. THUS SUB- JECT'S PARTICIPAT”
“4-00000 particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running RS controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba ”
“H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount ss much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continent”
“4-00000 and through the development of additional legal travellers. 4. Linison/ Operations: We will continue to press the linison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for ”
“the future. B. TASKS 1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira % (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at 06 A/3's father’s farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 III,__ Coords 993614)2 % 00 2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation f”
“addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited .assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre- arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their p”
“ns are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made. While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anti- cipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be”
“A. Communications Intelligence: We will continue 4 our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communten- tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be poss”
“DO* CFPRF CLONE SENSITIVE, woe as X. or. 2. % Assist State in 5**6se-9.0% ts, leaders. political groups. 3. Prevido covert 0.9 •” seeh other Cuban political PTorriate * ale •AC at 0 of the Osban nine 2 itting the A C. soncmict 1. Participate In inter-agency e”
“H. Exploitation of £xilo Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collecting, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount ss much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continent”
“13-00000 TOP SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLIKS NOFORN 7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by 'the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft shou”
“13-00000 668 SECRET TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban 1 ^ *9 *9 1 1 9 2 Government (FCG), the develo”
“politicalya .economic, psychological and military actions. Such -actions might include leaflet dropping propa ** are* * sabotage, strikes, and opposition to die regine tx che s* logical operations urging defections: large 9 eatsaidtg of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such”
“Mfr oronw Hag resistance group or uprising. 2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plant against Cuba. iv. DOLRAUXIOK: P (vo :2. P To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required develop the following program: 0 “toaye-ge 00 -errkevP Th s.0 t : Pe reawt”
“carry out the following activities: (1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services as required (OPS/WH). (2) Prepare organizati nal studies and blacklists Cuban Intelli- gence and Security Servicesporsonrel, and black lists of person s. aiding or ab”
“- 3 - 6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures t”
“13-00000 TOP-SECRET SPECIAL H"ANDLINO NOFORN 7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by ■the government of Cuba. Concurrently! genuine defections of Cuban1 civil and military air and surface craft sh”
“13-00000 II 1 DEUAC] -6- (5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad. 2 B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE 1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile. 2.”
“transfer of responsibility must bo accomplished harmoniously, without adverse press reaction, or support of this work would be withdrawn. Col. Wendell Johnson was hired and will ba placed in contact with Dr. Miro prior to 1 October. Re will function as the day-to-day contact”