“53 TOP SECRET him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and also Phone (A rea 202) 544-6000 1 in the State Department. But it was highlighted because this 2 experience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I was o Acting Secretary of State, and I had to ”
“56 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 1 this period to protect the President was also I guess there 2 was some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis a 4 Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a 5 mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a ”
“Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee. However, President Eisenhower raised certain questions as to the right of a Committee to ask questions on foreign - 196 TOP SECRET”
“Dulles." (Gray, p. 35.)* * Gray pointed out "that I was not with President Eisenhower twenty- four hours a day. It was a few.minutes every day, practically every day. 1 (Gray, p. 35-) According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone with President Eisen”
“come up with a plan which made professional sense to s which we felt sound enough 30 that we would present it or masters. We would have done SO and the resultant instruction t. the fiel’ would have depended or. their reaction as far as I was concern- within the Agency. ”
“t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. Dulles had 20 heard comments by the President previous to this meeting? 21 Mr. Dillon. Certainly. 22 Mr. Baron. Comments which called for "very straight- 23 forward action?" 24”
“57 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 TOP SECRET 1 would only be exceptional when they would deal with what we were doing ourselves. 2 Mr. Dawson. Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles 5 wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how did he 4 go about ”
“12 TOP SECRET untile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 1 announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary 2 of the Treasury. 5 That rather limited my capacity in the State Department. 4 But I did c”
“it as possible beyond an under standing of its general purpose. Such an approach ■ to the President - would have had as its purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it should surface. "My belief -- a belief based, as I have said, only to ”
“future. $ On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent that he was very much disturbed over the Director’s reaction.() He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to SECRET - 12 HW 50953 DocId: 32169180 Page 29”
“-6- "Officer: That's correct." * * * ■ "Question: And would it be accuaate to say that your recollections concerning what you now view as what Mr. Dulles' attitudes were are based on your general training, about what had always been said ... .[and] that after this incide”
“41 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 TOP SECRET 1 next week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't have 2 done that. Because where I particularly remember this, or get the feeling particularly strong, is dating back to 5 something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incide”
“operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on its existence. On the basis of the testimony and documentary JhnneB +v/a evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles. HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 537”
“Mr. Dulles attempt to 21 tell the President enough where he would have some idea of 22 what was going on, but not tell him directly what was 23 happening? 24 Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence 25 what other people were doing and what was happening”
“several times.. Also, I submit it is quite im plausible that I would have briefed Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General--and incidentally, I have no recollection of briefing those two gentle men except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen ”
“54 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 TOP SECRET 1 little different view of this. I think he had a view that 2 the press looked on the President as someone who was not in full charge of the State Department at time, and he thought 4 this would contribute to that, whic”
“Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, and 4 1 0 F irs t S tre e t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 20 Colonel Goodpastor. 21 And he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, and 22 gave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed' on 23 all the cov”
“J— Dillon Exhibit 5 September 21, 1960 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 21, 1960 Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State”
“Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should gc, I would be willing to do so. 3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles'”
“5 0009 aes (zor to r) 62 1 appropriate by the Chief of Station. 2 Mr. Baron. Dy contrast, the YQPROP cable would only have 3 been seen by the Chief of Station? 4 Mr. Tweedy. The Embassy would not have been shown this 5 cable anyway. We do not show the traffic to the Embass”
“TOP SECRET 53 tore (Area2029$44-6000 1 to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my 2 mind because of what had occurred and the way that these matters had been broached to the field by Mr. Dulles, that the thing & : was in the national arena and was jus”
“estriction on the Federal Government that 'the right of people to be se cure in their persons, house s, papers and effects, against, un- reasonable searches and sei- Dulles, Director of Central In- telligence, told Mr., Day that he had something "very secret" to disclose. Mr. Da”
“the State Depart ment, it might have been done in such a way that it would not appear on any record (Dillon, 9/2/75, p.. 43). Dillon added that "to protect the President as the public representative of the U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen Dulles "”
“hav- followed it in detail. Mr. Dawson, Would Mr. Dulles have had any access to thes- cables? Mr. Tweedy. ’Jot routinely. I think he would have expected TOP SECRET 1”
“sensitive as the Central Intelligence Agency. 20 I Allan Dulles and my impression is that this was 01 ! quite characteristic of him took an extremely firm stand 22 on this matter, and stood by his estimate that my brother was in fact in no sense a security risk, rather, to”
“13 TOP SECRET thing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan? 2 Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me. 5 And I think I might have ’been of some help to him if he had. 4 be”
“A% 9a 'TOP SECRET 45 ine ‘ are A triona (Albs 207) $44-6000 1 Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed. 2 I see he sent one specifically to DCI. Mr. Baron. Off the record. (Discussion- off the record.) Mr. Baron. Onthe record. 5! 6 I; Let's turn ba”
“staff meeting every morning. : Mr. Dulles did. These were attended by his Deputy Directors, o’ which Mr. Bissell was On-. I used to see Mr. Bissell — he had a staff meeting OnCt a week which all Chiefs of Division attended. Nothing like ;this would be discussed at thos”
“14 TOP SECRET those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so Phone (A rea 202) 544-6000 1 from time to time there were those moreor less informal 2 contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were 3 generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secr”
“received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise, from this organization. Also ha claimed to suffer from lack of contact with vs. lio stated that when ho saw Mr. Dulles a week or so ago, it was the first time he had talked to anyone in authority here in many a moon. As far”
“21 P hone (A re a 2 0 2 } 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 TOP SECRET 1 many years, all my life. But when I was down here at that time 2 I knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in charge 3 of all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetings.: 4 there, orteven at the W”
“14-00000 July 8,1952 Note: Nelson please deliver this to Allen. To: Allen Dulles You recently asked me for our views on Yugoslavia. The enclosed memorandum 1s a consensus formed from all of our key staff members. It also meets with the approval of John Hughes. I think ”
“13-00000. TOP SECRET. suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal decision makers in the period prior to the take-over by the Kennedy administration. When asked for an explanation of this sudden resurgence, Jake Esterline, then Chief, WH/4 stated: I can't”
“STATEMENTS BY C: DOUGLAS DILLON TO RHETT DAWSON ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1975 I, C. Douglas Dillon, do wish to make the following statement. 1. On September 15, 1975 I was shown by Rhett Dawson, Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With. Respect to Int”
“TESTIMONY OF C. DOUGLAS DILLON 2 TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 questions at any point to seek advice of counsel? 2 Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me. 3 Mr. Baron. And are you vuluntarily appe”
“9 TOD tow Beyond this General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell’s assumption of a "circumlocutious" personal conversation between Dulles and the President "completely unlikely".. "That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He had made it very cl”
“tre e t, S .E ., W a s h in g to n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 3 20 And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet 21 announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew 22 that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it 23 followed electronically. And but it ”
“'eesAe^^Mr tff 1 TOP SECRfT 12 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 fact is that you were given a briefing, and you didn't urge it, 2 but on the other hand you didn't say it should stop. Sett. 5 How can you explain, if you can, the testimony of your 4 friend Mr. Bissell, and t”
“-3- General Cabell, are deceased. Since we were unable to take any testimony from either, the Committee's investigation centered around the documents available and the testimony of those still alive who served under Dulles and Cabell. * *The Inspector General questioned n”
“TOP SECRET P 58 Phone (Area 202) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 7 3 1 the fact that.he had been mentioned, "because it seemed to me 2 that in my recollection that must be wrong, and he would be 5 interested in getting it. straightened out. 4 Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversatio”
“firsthand knowledge of the briefing, and that he had most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or 'Connell. . ** The calendar also reflects no meetings during that period between Dulles, Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles and Edwards. HW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Pag”
“39 TOP SECRET they referred to as his associate, that is the key point. He Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 1 worked for the President. 2 Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony 3 from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes, for this meeting and 4 other Speci”
“TOP SECREToces 39. ■ 1 order to clarify my recollection of the 6thof August 1962. Phone (Area 202) 2 And I was allowed to look at the NSAM files. And my memory was 5 refreshed by NSAM-1, which I believe the committee has. 4 Mr. Smothers. Have you made a similar request t”
“19 For example, we had certain political overtones where mone (Area 202) 2° we 66. were used in an affirmative way under President Eisenhower. toy 3 He wanted to make a real attempt to see if there could ever 4 be a peace in the Middle East. And with Alan Dulles, his 5”
“TOP SECRET 6000 objection i have aeskieecotatonanethxcFintona to mave co-l, Phone (Area 202) thePress which will’simp1y re-emphasize to them what I thinR Iosieerciingnenitencee, -20 :!4 209 the trole of President Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy Skew ---------bee”
“iW*****R*T*EPOMoos TOP "heerort,, - n’. SECRET H Le 75.9 Phone (Area 202) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 '©9 9 0 1 Now, are you able to testify with respect to the likeli- 2 hood of the conversation you have recounted taking place , 3 prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961. ”
“63 TOP SECRET of foreign policy? P hone (A re a 2 0 2 ) 5 4 4 -6 0 0 0 1 Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just what 2 institutional changes are really necessary, but there should be the clarification that the Special Group, or whatever 4 name it is given”
“Smothers. Did the White House male the selection f documents for you? vr. Bundy. No. The White House handled me a file of documents which covered the period. Mr. Smotrers. They handed you a f:‘e of documents cover.g rouchly the August 1962 period? TOP SECRET 8”
“most. The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Belmont. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of In structions Section 83.” The Chairman. Yes; I have it.■ Mr. Belmont. The first page is the same information that we previously fur nished to Secret Service involving threats.”
“34 TOP SECRET is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it Phone (A rea 202) 544-6000 1 is Lumumba or Castro. And you won’t be able in the Castro 2 area, or particularly in this area, to run.it down, because 3 the people aren’t here anymore. But the per”