“13-00000 SECREI 2.7 December 1961 General Cabell announces retirement effective 31 January 1962. 5 January 1962 Schuyler , Coyne added to Kirkpatrick study group. 6 January 1962 McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos. 8 January 1962 McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff. ”
“13-00000 SECRET 22 January 1962. McCone meets with House Sub-Committee on CIA. 28 January 1962 McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from Western Hemisphere Division in Panama until 2 February. 31 January 1962 Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of 71-12; total vote is 8”
“13-00000 OLUREI 1 2’6 June 1963 McCone notes Roy Tod's paper on an inventory of intelligence community assets. 1 July 1963 DCI's Scientific Advisory Board established under Dr. Kinzel. 9 July 1963 President Kennedy briefed on mosaic of Israel gas bomb in Yemen, and f”
“13-00000 •T SECRET CHRONOLOGY *> 10 November 1960 President-elect Kennedy announces that Allen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover will continue in their positions. 17 April 1961 Landing at the Bay of Pigs 22 April 1961 Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor, Arleigh Burke, R”
“13-00000 DEURE I ***28 May 1964 McCone goes to Honolulu for meeting on Vietnam until 3 June. 4,5,6,7 June McCone attends meetings with President Johnson on Laos with the President asking, "What comes next?" 6 June 1964 McGeorge Bundy and Michael Forrestal raise with”
“13-00000 * SECRET 28 October 1961 .Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe until 13 November. 21 November 1961 McCone meets with President and Robert Kennedy to discuss new program for Cuba. 29 November 1961 McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren 30 November 1961 McCone”
“operations involving the Agency's paramilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to remove the CIA from such enterprises. He also stressed the importance of planning an operation from beginning to end (an attitude which. dominated his approach during the Cuban mi”
“13-00000 SECRET 7 March 1962 McCone presents Carter to President Kennedy; Carter named DDCI on March. 30 March 1962 Robert Amory, Jr. resigns as Deputy Director Intelligence.. 1 April 1962 Office of General Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, and Office of Comp- tro”
“1 4-00000 1 ! f 1 Mont SECURITY INFORMATION 12 June 1952 MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECTS NCFE-CFA 1. I am attaching two memoranda having to do with NCFE on which it is unnecessary for you to take action. They point never- theless”
“13-00000 : :! ! -• f i,’ CA Ct 1ju en: wi 2 • *- • 4 into the US labor situation, and particularly to try ■ to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther . Cord Meyer steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnera”
“mmso some" 73 204 folsabaiauE tyre pary L:LS ball 4 into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. IDEN-36 steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to c”
“espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1961 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F.. Kennedy. - .Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had p”
“that: "a. The DD/P release for assignment to the Office of Security several individuals, as may be appropriate, of proven CE ability to handle and exploit all cases of CE aspect involving Agency personnel;. "b. SID and its function be eliminated from CI Staff; and "c. The ”
“year--this was about $50,000,000 less than what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in NPIC, an”
“include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren islet Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pert”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET Cuban crisis; after which all the positions in the new Branch and Section will be re viewed for reclassification purposes. 54/ The question of financing and budget for project JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible for the formulati”
“asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed J2D to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic support. ’ The value of such an operation to the intelligence community”
“€ Cu. t- 9. AFRICAN DIVISION Principal liaison officer with CI/SOG (1967-1973) 10. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION (now FOREIGN RESOURCES DIVISION) Gordon Jorgenson, John, Shaffer, Seymour Russell, Walter O’Brien, Stanley Gaines, Robert T. Cassidy, Joseph Bulik, Maurice Sov”
“was run and to Teraoli account . I believed that it required a to higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the to w Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various 04 to occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and. to ”
“14-00000 1 11 August 1952 MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT TY DIRECT “F CENTRAL IHTRLAIGENICE SUBJECT: Admiral Miller Letter about NOPE Personnel mentioned at the PRC Mooting on Friday, 0 August 1. Attached hereto in Adlral liiller’ a anewer on behalf of NOFE to numerous requests”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET B. Forging the Tool 54. Memo for DDS from John E. O’Gara, 24 Mar 60, sub: Establishment of a New Branch and Section within Headquarters WH Division. S. 55. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 24 Mar 60. S. 56. Memo for Comptroller / CIA from Allen W. Dulles,”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET 103. Memo for DDP from J., C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub: JMARC U. S. Base Requirements. S. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting with DDCI. S. 104. MR from J. C. King, 7 Nov 60, sub: Dinner with Adolf A. Berle, Jr. 105. MR from J. D. Esterl”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET planned program for paramilitary training and opera- tions under the aegis of CIA. Insofar as can be determined, however, there is no indication that in his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr. Dulles went into a”
“12 May 60. 14. Memo for Chief, WHD from William E. Eisemann, 27 Jun 60, sub: Administrative Plan for the JMARC/4 Phase of Project JMARC. - 376 - TOP SECRET”
“NA TOP SECRET 1S Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 group in constant contact with Mr. Harvey. The second chain 02 of command, paralleling that, was Mr. Harvey reporting to the IO DDP and the DDP subsequently reporting through his chain of command to the Director, and that wou”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET senior officer or any position to be filled that they would fill it without any hesitation whatsoever." 116/ But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out: I can't say that was true on the opera tional side of the shop. A Contingency Task Force, a progra”
“management for Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), did insure that the support elements got the best people for Project JMATE, "he [White], directed all Support office heads that if there was a need for any - 12”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET would be transferred to the project Table of Organization, effective the beginning of the first pay period in July 1960. Employees on detail to the project from the Clandestine Services offices will not be transferred since DDP considers them tempora”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET D. Personnel and Training From the time of the official approval of the anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question of personnel and personnel management for Project JMATE was of constant”
“3.1 LILO-orul% PROJECT MOCKINGBIRD-• Project Moekingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted 3408 between 12 March 1963 and.15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington- based newsmen who,, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quo”
“essentiality. * 129/ * Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that only the best people be assigned to the WH/4 project. As early as August of 1960, it had been indicated that the DDP might be leaning toward the us”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET Source References Part IV Presidential Resurgence 1. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, pp. 13-14. 2. MR from Richard D. Drain, 29 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Meeting with DDP. S. 3. Memo of Conversation”
“qualified personnel would be completely immunized and processed and ready to go with passports at any given time. But you couldn't get the people you wanted - I'm talking about qualified key professionals ■ in the Clandestine Services because the Division heads in the Cland”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET . 19. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. cit. 20. WH/4 Prop Notes for 9 Aug 60. 21. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 1 Sep 60, sub: Radio Swan. 22 . Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Aug 60, sub: Radio Swan. (DD/P 0-4013). Memo for DDP from Jacob ”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET aware of some sort of planned assassination activity. One of the principals of WH/4 recorded that on 24 Feb ruary 1961 he: Asked Ed [Stanulis], Dave P[hillips], [Ed] Hinkle, [Bob] Moore, and Jake [Ester- line] why not proceed with Operation AMHIN”
“the second history includes the last year of the Eisenhower Administration) 15. A Project for the Procurement of Intelligence Material Through Commercial Channels, 1960-1967 (207) (note that the time period NW 50955 DocId: 32112994 Page 5”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET On 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an inter esting telephone call from- General Cushman, contain- ing two messages from the Vice President. First, Mr. Nixon was interested to know if there were any obsta- cles that the Agency was encountering”
“13-00000 7 - L. 7 DA/P-2-0171 th 13 *. : 3 V 77/7/5-62-0173 $ 1 Le) ST 1099[ —U Gap E Executive Registry 67-310 10 January 1962 MEMORANDUM FOBS Deputy Director (Support) SUBJECT 8 Project MATE REFERENCES t a. Recommendation approved by the President, 4 August 1”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET By way of illustrating some of the problems encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the JMATE operation, on the very day that President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET the project and the office of the DDP In point of fact, such restrictive measures were somewhat meaningless inso far as keeping awareness of the project's activities away from PP/PMG. The A/DDP/P granted permission to PP/C/PMG to read the daily proj”
“time extolling the virtues of President Kennedy, and what he had been trying to do. At the 27 Nov 63 Esterline-HYSAGE-1 meeting, H-1 TOP SECRET UMBRA”
“means of sending coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus, the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the families to send answers back Meanwhile, the Technical Services Division of the'’ . I Item 275, Manuscript page 394 new optics for satellit”
“TOP SECRET 47 • Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 © 1. Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships 2 between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives 3 or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would 4 it be fair to say that any activiti”
“( ( CI Personnel handling Projects: SRPOINTER HTLINGUAL SRWESTPOINTER MKSOURDOUGH 3. OPERATIONS STAFF Seymour Bolten 4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF Chief and Deputy Chief/FI (1967-1973) Division (of Staff) D: Carelton Swift, Warren L. Dean, Frederick. Griffin, ”
“07 MAY 1973 JFKND rMEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA : Deputy Director for Management and.Services FROM : Director of Finance : SUBJECT • : Special Other Government Agency Activities 1. Project MHDOZEN - Colonel White, Executive Director- • Comptroller,”
“13-00000 TOP SECRET covert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed, reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, a sizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection through clandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny. ”
“involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes tha”
“only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960; and in August of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwarded a revised staffing guide, calling for a total of 274 positions and requesting that "as soon after 15 August as is possible, a total of 40 additional staff personnel" - 137 ”
“TOP SECRET 16 Phone (Area202)544-60000 1 have the date because the Agency has been researching all sorts 2 of material for you. I feel that you would just have to get 3 those dates for the record. 4 Mr. Baron. We can do that. 5 Would you say that every major operation th”
“VE OLBY 15190 LI DECL DREVW ON Y DERIVED FROM NW 65924 Docld:32369811 Page 2 SECRET CRC (C) : SECRET Page 2, Footnote 14. Scratch our negative comment. The initial concern was over the date of formation of the CRC (late 1960 or early 1961). Stating that it was formed shortly befo”