“lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It c oncerne d itself, during most of the per iod to be co vered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Rus”
“eriod to be covered in this report, primarily with i nformation *This area component d uring the per iod of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:3240”
“f the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during th e period of this report was known as Soviet Ru ssia Divisi on ( 1952-1966) and S oviet Bloc Di vision (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. L NW 65990 Docld”
“elf, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area c omponent during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. L N”
“as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used in ter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:3240487 1 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redun”
“most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component dur ing the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990”
“cts a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in th is report , primarily with information *This area co mponent du ring the period of this repo rt was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974”
“-9 GGGG0_____ 11104-10301-100021 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 SECRET 1 yes CIA Internal Use Only Access Controlled by DDP Historical Staff Central Intelligence Agency THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORICAL SERIES CS HP”
“was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during mos t of th e per iod to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Divi”
“rily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet R us sia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. L NW 65990 Docld:32375547 Page 7 SECRET وس بکه 104-10211-10004 SECRE”
“cording to individual's differing views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning. This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually func- tioned in the relevant period, the 1960s, as distinct from how it mi”
“ormation *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russ ia Divi sion (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counteri”
“he period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1 966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as ”
“nctioning. This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually func- tioned in the relevant period, the 1960s, as distinct from how it might theoretically have functioned according to Agency organizational charts and regul”
“centrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-cal led Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with informati”
“kn own a s Soviet Russia Divis ion (1952-1966) and Soviet Blo c Di vision (1966-197 4) . The t wo na mes are often used inter- changeably. L NW 65990 Docld:32375547 Page 7 SECRET وس بکه 104-10211-10004 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and”
“concerned itself, during most of the perio d to be covered in this report, primari ly w ith informat ion *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter-”
“tually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carry ing thi s name did not even concern itse lf to a ny ap preciable able extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB ”
“n of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to ”
“value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinc tion was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable able extent with the counterintell”
“counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, du”
“rated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodg ed the so-cal le d Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information”
“n te lligence organs of the USSR, and as such w as ine vit ab ly somewhat redu nda nt s ince the sam e field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there was during most of the period with which we are concerned a substanti”
“ced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did no t even concern itself t o any app recia ble exte nt with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countrie”
“to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actual ly a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable able extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a wo”
“this name did not even concern itself to any ap preciable able extent with the co unterintellig enc e function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group”
“h a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation c arr ying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the U”
“function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of the”
“90 Docld:32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intel ligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant, since the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there was durin”
“a misnom er, because the organi- zation ca rrying this n ame did not ev en concern itself to any ap preciable able extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Divisio”
“onsidered a "line" organi- zation, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal organizat ion were to be taken at face value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer”
“lodg ed the so-called Soviet CI Group, whi ch was in many re spects a competitor of t he CI S taff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Ru”
“CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal organization were to be taken at face value) th at its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying t”
“rincipal Soviet intelligence services. Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the Sov iets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place such as Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event. Once again, i”
“iet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. SECRET NW 65990 Docld :32404871 Page 8 SECRET -4- on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redunda nt, since the same fie ld was the major pre”
“gather such information, the section’s officers employed large numbers of agents and informants among the indigenous employee's of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts. The officers also benefitted ”
“ed to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was act ua lly a misnomer, because the organ i- zati on carrying this name did n ot even conce rn i tself to an y appreciable extent with t he counterintelligence function of the Agency o”
“authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955, but now you have better apparatus... What do we do [when we know the attaches are taking special equipment,? Well, they are get”
“gence agent until 1964 when it was determined that she would be more valuable in a defector role. D. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION OPERATIONS As noted earlier, infiltration/exfiltration operations, which started in mid-1962, were undertaken for a variety of purposes, such as: a. Empl”
“te nt with the counterintelligence f unction of the Agency on a wo rldwide basis. R at her, it conce ntrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It ”
“in this report, there was during most of the period with which we are concerned a substantial co ng ruity of views between the SB/CI Group and CI Staff that militated in favor of coherent operational policy, even though the two organizations might disagree on matters of detail. O”
“gence agent until 1964 when it was determined that she would be more valuable in a defector role. D. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION OPERATIONS As noted earlier, infiltration/exfiltration operations, which started in mid-1962, were undertaken for a variety of purposes, such as: a. Empl”
“on was considered a "line" organi- zation, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal o rganization were to be taken at face value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced. "CI Staff" was actually a ”
“intelligence services. Although we had ha d o ur successes also in penetrating the So viets, the y w ere primarily th rough G RU de fectors-in-place such as Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event. Once again, it is not ”
“concerning the national security, and consequently years were lost in pursuing the national counterintelligence objective. During this period, in our view, national estimates and evaluations were formulated in concrete establishment of detentist philosophy which marked th”
“SECRET SENSOT counterintelligence personnel should be allocated to the counterintelligence unit in Headquarters. This 10 per cent, comprising 566 officer and clerical employees, would still fall considerably short of our counterintelligence strength in the fall of 1945 whe”
“elfe so that, by detecting them and signaling their presence to the West German authorities, he coul d build up his reputation as a counterintelligence specialist. While there is debate about the value of the assets the Soviets made available, there appears to be enough substance”
“was fortunate to acquire a KGB defector in December 1961 who had spent many years at a very high level of Soviet security acquiring the most sensitive information in the full knowledge that when the time was propitious, he would defect to the West and impart his information”
“general program of that nature to discredit 21 either a foreign political leader or a foreign political fac- 22 tion, or domestic political groups or leaders? 23 Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no. Domestic, I am 24 not aware of any. 25 I think the Soviet Russia divis”
“t within the Agency, particularly upon those persons who were members of the former Eastern European (EE) Division of the Plans Directorate. In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB success in penetrating Western governments made it the more feared of the two principal”