“-120- O’BRIEN: Well when you get back, you talk to President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone) A as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here? LANSDALE: Well, this was when I came back, I met the A President. I went in with Taylor and Rost”
“-120- O'BRIEN: Well when you get back, you talk to President A 9 Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone) as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here? LANSDALE: Well, this was when I came back, I met the A President. I went in with Taylor and Rosto”
“-13- 50 don’t know.”,I gathered that he felt it would 1 succeed. 7 O’BRIEN: Well then 10you are pretty much from the point that you battle ito out of touch • with it until it actually comes off. You LA N DALE: That's didn’t get i nBo any of the changes in the Righto O'BR”
“-122- don't think it would have been completely in the, Vietnamese context. O'BRIEN:. Yeah, do you get any of this thinking when you . get back? Any contingency planning or thinking about the building of troop levels to a:more substantial levels maybe linked wi th the se”
“-122- don't think it would have been completely in 9 the, Vietnamese context. O'BRIEN:. Yeah, do you get any of this thinking when you . get back? Any contingency planning or thinking ep about the building of troop levels to a more substantial level -maybe linked with the”
“-31- 01 It took us tgen, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed. O’BRIEN: tWell how do you come back into. . . well. maybe, perhaps we ought to pursue this.whole business of ”
“-31- 08 It took us then, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed. O'BRIEN: Well how do you come back into. .. well. maybe, perhaps we ought to pursue this whole business of co”
“-111- And I didn’t know about it, and they took it that I was pushing myself for it. I said 066x21**5 / again that isn’t I’d want to do.- So this 6R was about the time that--no, maybe [William / Westmoreland] Westy was coming in about then= it was around that time. O’BR”
“-35- having quite a bit of an advisory role with H.C 0 our military commanders out there, and influence and were WAL• with them, was fighting another Korea in Vietnam more or less. Wife There was some changes in tactics) A A t but was more use of helicopters just fo”
“-114- to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing. O’BRIEN: Yecal Well between this time and the time A Tww] of the Taylor-Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . LANSDALE: th. no. Off and o”
“-121- 0 is with a rather substantial commitment of U.S. troops. Is that.. . • 0 LANSDALE: Yes, there was some. Now where. . Hmm, there was some, and I can't remember just • where it was coming from. This was one of re ' . the things that Diem asked me when I saw him. He”
“-102- happened in each others sessions and what he was telling the guy. Then how useful this was mind you; I don’t know. a -A O'BRIEN: Well do you, find -again, in passing on to A c-A .the task force -and the formation of that Vietnam task force in the early part of ■ ”
“-121- 0 is with a rather substantial commitment of U.S. troops.. Is that.. . .© LANSDALE: Yes, there was some. Now where. ... . Hmm, there was some, and I can't remember just - where it was coming from. This was one of the things that Diem asked me when I saw him. He aske”
“-114- to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing. O’BRIEN: Yech. Well, between this time and the time A wtwa of the Taylor-Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . LANSDALE: Uh, no. Off and ”
“-12- nd met them, I didn’t get in on that© The one woula-av, WO person who has a view of their reactions 1o.th-m] would probably be Bill Bundy, (William Bs Bundy) who I know at the time was discussing this with them. O'BRIEN: Did you have ... Bundy and his £00 ... - at ”
“1 -13-. 50 don't know." I gathered that he felt it would succeed. O’BRIEN: Well then 0you are pretty much out of touch 1 A . . From • the point that. You ----- - _.battle DALE: ito That's . with it until it actually comes o: IN You LARig NS hto O'BRIEN: didn't get i”
“-57- a bell. LANSDALE: Hmm, yeshnwell, hmm, my memory isn’t too good on this thing. There was some talk .at the time, there’s high country across theBolovens Plateau and so forth down in the south, and there was talk at the time of that.being the dominant area and what ”
“-110- isn't my idea of a good spot to be in. You just get belabored over that. O’SIN tAySPKL*: Well, did Nolting ever try to get you back to A Vietnam, in an advisory position? LANSDALE: I think so. There were a number of attempts by the- Vietnamese themselves, and unfortun”
“-102- happened in each others sessions and what he was telling the guy. Then how useful this was mind you I don’t know. A O'BRIEN: . Well do you. find, again, in passing on to a cA .the task forces-and the formation of that Vietnam task, force in the early part of ■ the”
“-12- and met them, I didn’t get in on that. The one .wwbu/A Faye person who has a view of their reactions . . Tillite P.T. . 95 would probably be,Bill Bundy, (Wi±hiamt • Bundy) who I know at the time was discussing this with them.-. O’BRIEN: Did you have -Bundy and . h”
“-58- LANSDALE: Well, I had wanted the Laotians to defend ow.- their country, and I 'was all for the work - Meos A 9 0 wi th the Maoists and s on of- doing it. A / Once it left that and started involving us Vietnamese or us, on bombing or anything . else, I felt that the”
“-57- a bell. LANSDALE : Hmm, yesht well, ham, my memory isn’t too good on this thing. There was some talk at the time J—there’s high country across theBolovens Plateau and so forth down in the south, and there was talk at the time of that.being the dominant area and what”
“-111-. And I didn’t know about it, and they took it that I was pushing myself for it. I said ■ d ■ 6t-*33 / again that isn’t I’d want to do.’ So, this ■ 6: x was about the time that--no, maybe [William’ Westmoreland] Westy was coming in about then- it was around that tim”
“-74- put some red-blooded American boys in uniform out someplace) and they're going to start doing A other things as well. In collecting information) lcK) . they couldn't help but tell a guy, Well, if you didn't do it this way and did it the other way, it would work b”
“-58- LANSDALE: Well, I had wanted the Laotians to defend their, country, and I was all for the work • Meos A . 9- with the Maoists and s on of doing it. A z Once.it left that and started involving us I Vietnamese or us, on bombing or anything )else, I felt that the cost o”
“Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U. S., but that some adjustments could no doubt be made. Mr. Dulles said that "Lansdale could be counted on to carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated to upset Diem." 8% gol -27 HW 50955 SOURCE : Minutes ”
“-61- changed, or has anything? LANSDALE : Oh, a great deal. Excuse me. [Interruption] 'BRIEN: What changes do you,find? LANSDALE : Well, the main change was in a growing isola— / 2 tion from reality of the constituency of the / President of Vietnam, a repression of, y”
“-60- O'BRIEN: Well, when does some of the covert activity, interms of the use of some of the Montagnards yards- in interdicting those supply lines in 2 Laos, younknow, from Vietnam, start? Is that going on in the late Eisenhower administration, or does it begin in the Kenn”
“-60- O'BRIEN: Well, when does some of the covert activity, I 0- interms of the use of some of the Montagnards yards- in interdicting those supply lines in 0 Laos, you know, from Vietnam, start? Is that - going on in the late Eisenhower administration; or does it begin i”
“-110- isn’t my idea of a good spot to be in. You ■ just get belabored over that. / O’BSIEN LANSDALE: Well, did Nolting ever try to get you back to Vietnam, in an advisory position? LANSDALE: I think .so. There were a number of attempts by the- Vietnamese themselves, and un”
“-59- / • the Pathet- Lao and pushing on into the area.. 4. "I felt that more could be done with the armed forces of Laos themselves in making them more able to stand up for themselves and defend their country. But if it couldn’t I couldn't see an intervention of any sort”
“-74- put some red-blooded American boys in uniform out someplace) and they're going to start doing A other things as well. In collecting information) 11 kck) A . they couldn't help but tell guy. Well, if 3I.A you didn't do it this way and did it the other way, it woul”
“-61- changed, or has anything? LANSDALE: Oh, a great deal. Excuse me. [Interruption] O'BRIEN: What changes, do you.find? LANSDALE : Well, the main change was in a growing isola tion from reality of the constituency of the President of Vietnam, a repression of, you w”
“i -11- up with details of whether it could succeed or not. That was my last advisory role with him. I was taken off advising on the project after that, actually by my own request because I was apparently causing too much trouble and orks of progress. . O’BRIEN: ‘.. s th”
“-32- that up originally, I don't know. I was rather surprised—he seemed to have seen copies of lectures and other things that I’ve given on the subject, But-, who had A passed those to him and who had talked to him about it, I just don't know. BRIEN: Let's say, let'”
“70 -2- that it was, NSC [National Security Council meeting but it was comparable to that with A the personnel that were attending. There were several secretaries: Defense, State, and his National Security people were there. O’Brien: Could 9 A ; with McNamara and . Gil”
“-85- SURCO LANSDALE: Oh yes)A They were being trained actually to meet the challenge that the Vietnamese and American top officials foresaw, and they were thinking that-this—and incidentally, the French General [Paul] Ely before he left was thinking the same way--just in ”
“-32- that up originally, I don’t know. I was rather surprised--he seemed to have seen copies of lectures and other things that — I’ve given A on the subject, But- who - had passed those to him and who had talked to him about it, I just don't know. 0 BRIEN: Let's sa”
“-59- / the Pathet- Lao and pushing on into the area.. " I felt that more could be done with the armed forces of Laos themselves in making them more able to stand up for themselves’ and defend their country. But if it couldn’t) A I couldn't see an intervention of any sort”
“i -11- up with details of whether it could succeed or not. That was my last advisory role with him. I was taken off advising on the project after that, actually by my own request because I was apparently causing too much trouble and orks of progress. O’BRIEN: ‘lac's the”
“-35- having quite a bit of an advisory role with 1oura military commanders out there, and influence the and were with them, was fighting another Korea in Vietnam 1 more or less. wife There was some changes in tactics) t but.was more use of helicopters just for- verti”
“-85- LANSDALE: SURCO Oh yes. They were being trained actually to meet the challenge that the Vietnamese and American top officials, foresaw, and they were. . thinking thabsthis--and incidentally, the . French General [Paul] Ely before he left was. thinking the same way--”
“-56- you who are asking questions ought to have people out there with him who would tell you immediately and take a first-hand look." C And—the a. remember Irwin was picked right on the spot go immediately; and.said to me on the side, "You and your big mouth you.know." [”
“-3-- stopped my visit to Vietnam, and back stopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as 0 well as economic, military, and psychological / and everything else. This, frankly, took a . consid - standing on his part. . that because”
“-19- rather than the Agency. I guess what I’m trying to say is, can you of 0 see any decline ona in 0 the neinpy influence in the Agency in decisions? LANSDALE: Yes, I think so. I’m not certain that it was .well the military as such. It might have been the tiri of ■ - l”
“-3- stopped my visit to Vietnam, and back- . stopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as well as economic, military, and psychological^ and everything else. This, frankly, took a consife - standing on his part. . that because my ”
“-56- you who are asking questions ought to have JA people out, there with him who would tell you immediately and take a first-hand look." C___ • And-thea. remember Irwin was picked right on the spot to go immediately) and said to me on the side, "You and your big mouth, ”
“-7- . stage. I remember General (Lyman L.D. Lemnitzer was sitting in the meeting - He was.chairman of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, and he backed up my urging them to get some military planning in on that. After th lent among our poiin pie of that, and then ”
“-9- O’BRIEN: Well, I suppose you had some conversations with Dulles and.with Bissell and some of these people about it. LANSDALE: Yes. O’BRIEN: What’s their feeling? You already discussed • _king you to sort of hold your criticism,. • 0 LANSDALE: Well, Bissell definitely fel”
“-7- stage. I remember General (Lyman L. Lemnitzer was sitting in the meeting- A A He was,chairman of the JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, and he backed up my urging them to get some military planning in on that. After the aent among our polin die of that, and then”